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ABSTRACT?
Although Anglo-Egypt!an negotiations began in 
1920, it was only in 1936 that a treaty was concluded.
This was mainly due to the radical change of the Wafd's 
tactics in the 1930’s from extremism to moderation. Chapter 
I suggests the reasons for this and describes the successful 
attempts of the Wafd to persuade the Egyptian public to 
accept an alliance with Britain.
Though signs of the Fascist imperialist aims had 
begun to appear in the mid 1930fs, Halidas and his colleagues 
do not appear to have been convinced of a real and immediate 
Italian danger, and may have used the Abyssinian crisis as 
a face-saving pretext. Chapter it, discusses these topics 
and also the reasons for the desire in Britain to have a 
treaty with Egypt.
Chapter III is devoted to a discussion of the reasc 
of the Palace and minority parties in Egypt, and of some 
extreme Conservatives in Britain, for opposing the 1936 
negotiations, and their attempts to wreck them.
Chapters I?, V, and VT give a detailed account 
of the military, Sudan# and the civil clauses of the treaty, 
and reactions to them in Britain and Egypt.
The Appendix gives the texts of the 1936 treaty 
(with a map printed at the War Office to illustrate it)
3and an important memorandum handed by Ha^as, the Prime 
Minister, to Lampson, the High Commissioner, on 1 June 
1936.
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In translation from Arabic to English, 
primary consideration was given to conveying the 
exact meaning. In transliteration, except for minor 
variations, the system adopted in the second edition 
of the Encyclopaedia of Islam was followed. Where 
Arabic names of places had a form generally 
accepted in English, they were not altered.
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9INTRODUCTION
Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 in order to restore 
the government from the hands of cUraBl, the nationalist 
leader, as his continuation in power might provoke European 
powers to interfere and consequently endanger the security 
of imperial communications, Though she had continuously 
declared her intention to evacuate Egypt once the Khedive's 
authority was restored, Britain was actually consolidating 
her position. In doing this, she did not face any serious 
opposition from the Egyptians Before the Eirst World War* 
Though there was a great amount of dissatisfaction, there was 
practically no resistence during the first decade of the 
British occupation, and even when the nationalist movement was 
revived in late 1890*3, it was too weak to obstruct the 
British plans. The Erench recognition of the British position 
in Egypt in 1904 was a serious Blow to the nationalists who 
had Been relying on Erance to support them in their struggle 
against Britain. The anti-British Nationalist Party was 
continuously declining particularly after the death in 1907 
of Its founder Mustafa Kamil, and By 1914 it was nothing 
But a name* To counteract the influence of the extremists, 
Cromer, the British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, 
encouraged the moderates to form-in 1907 a pro-British party, 
the Umma Party, under the leadership of A^unad Lutfl al-Sayyid,
10
While relying chiefly on the intelligentsia, the Nationalist 
Party did not address the fallakin who were impressed hy the 
numerous reforms achieved by Cromer and his two immediate 
successors, Gorst 1907-11 and Kitchener 1911-14-.
The declaration of war between Britain and Turkey 
on 6 November 1914- made the former's position in Egypt very 
difficult, Egypt was legally at war with Britain since she 
was still a province of the Ottoman Empire, To evade this 
illegality, Britain declared a Protectorate over Egypt in 
December 1914*. Khedive cAbbas IJnlmi, who was collaborating 
with the Turks and Germans, was deposed and his uncle gusayn 
Kamil was appointed with the title of Sultan. Britain 
assumed for herself the rights of the Ottoman Sultan and 
former Khedive and the responsibility for the defence of 
Egypt,1 while Egyptain foreign policy was to be conducted 
through the British representative in Cairo. Though diss­
atisfied with the Protectorate, the politically conscious 
Egyptians accepted it quietly as a war measure only, and 
co-operated actively with Britain's war effort. As a reward 
for this and in fulfilment of the Allies' promises of freedom
1. Hurewitz, J.C.: Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 
Vol.2, pp.5-6.
2. As a result of the Protectorate, the post of the British 
■ Agent and Consul-General was elevated to that of High
Commissioner. Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State 
for War while Sir Henry MacMahon came to Egypt as High 
Commissioner.
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for small nations, they expected the satisfaction of their 
country's national aspirations at the end of the war. 
Consequently the Wafd, whose most leaders were moderates 
and "belonged to the old Urnma Party, was formed in 1918 under 
the leadership of Zaghlul to achieve Egypt's independence "by 
peaceful means, though it was ready to recognise Britain's 
vital interests.
Believing that the Protectorate had settled Egypt's 
political future, and against the advice of Wingate, the 
High Commissioner who succeeded MacMahon in 19171 the British 
government refused the requests of Zaghlul and Rushdl, the Prim< 
Minister, to go to London for negotiations, and later turned 
down another demand "by Zaglul to go to the Peace Conference 
in Paris. Alarmed by this attitude, the moderate nationalist 
movement turned to be extreme and anti-British. Rushdl 
resigned and Suita Pu'ad, who had succeeded on the death of # 
]Jusayn Kamil, found difficulties to form a new Cabinet owing 
to the determination of the Wafd not to allow any Egyptian to 
do this. Paced by this situation, the British government 
committed another serious error of judgement by deporting 
Zaghlul and two cf his colleagues to Malta. This was the 
spark that led to the 1919 revolt and brought the country to 
a standstill. Only then did the British government admit 
that there was an Egyptian question, and that it was face 
to face with a widespread national upheaval. Allenby,
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who was appointed as Special High Commissioner in March 1919? 
released Zaghlul and his colleagues and allowed them to go 
to Paris. The British government appointed a mission under 
the chairmanship of Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, to inquire into the causes of the disturbances 
and to report on the most suitable constitution for Egypt 
under the Protectorate. The Milner Mission recommended that 
no settlement should be imposed on Egypt and suggested a bi­
lateral agreement in the form of treaty of alliance. The 
hopes of the nationalists that the Powers would persuade 
Britain to declare Egypt's independence collapsed on their 
formal recognition of the Protectorate. The Wafd now 
realized that the only way for a settlement of the Egyptian 
question was by direct negotiations with Britain.
Angle-Egyptian negotiations for the conclusion of 
a treaty began in 1920 when Zaghlul proceeded to London to 
sta"t unofficial negotiations with Milner. The result of 
these negotiations was a memorandum in 1920 which formed 
the starting point for all subsequent negotiations. It 
provided for an offensive and defensive alliance by which 
Britain would defend Egypt. Egypt would freely accept the 
presence of a British military force, and undertake to give 
her ally all assistance in her power in case of war, even 
if her territory were not threatened. Subject to the 
cpproval of the Capitulatory Powers, their rights in Egypt
15
would be transferred to Britain, and Egypt would appoint 
two British Financial and Judicial Advisers. As for the 
Sudan, this memorandum said nothing, since, in Milner's 
view, its status was clearly defined by the Condominium 
Agreement. Though the majority of the Egyptian delegates 
supported this proposed settlement, Zaghlul opposed it, and 
inspired his followers in Egypt to insist on four reservations 
to it. The most important of these was the demand for actual 
Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan. Milner refused them and 
the negotiations collapsed.
After Britain's specific declaration that she would 
accept the abolition of the Protectorate as a basis of treaty 
negotiations, cAdlI formed a new Cabinet in March 1921 and 
accepted Britain's offer to discuss Milner's suggestions.
C i *  _Though Adli made every effort to persuade Zaghlul to parti­
cipate in these negotiations, the latter insisted on the 
leadership of the Egyptian delegation. cAdlI refused this 
as, in his view, "according to precedent, the premier 
[should] preside over an official delegation".^ In his 
subsequent negotiations with Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, 
the latter offered a draft treaty which restricted Egypt's 
proposed independence more than did the Milner-Zaghlul 
memorandum. In fact these negotiations were doomed to
1. Viscount Wavell: Allenby in Egypt, p.6A.
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failure from the start, as Zaghlul, with his overwhelming
support among the masses, was not ready to accept any treaty
negotiated by his rival, cAdli« Besides the resignation of 
c —Adli, the failure of these negotiations resulted in the 
division of the Wafd and consequently the whole nation into 
cAdlists and Zaghliilists.
Arguing that it was impossible to form a new 
ministry without some concessions to Egypt, Allenby per­
suaded his government to announce the Declaration of Indepen­
dence on 28 Bebruar5r 1922., While unilaterally abolishing the 
Protectorate and recognising Egypt's independence, Britain 
maintained the status quo in the following matters (usually 
called the Reserved Points) until the conclusion of an agree­
ment with Egypt; the security of imperial communications,
the defence of Egypt, the protection of minorities and foreign
1interests, and the Sudan^ On this now basis Tharwat formed 
a ministry and the Constitution of 1923 was enacted, under 
which jaghlul became the first Prime Minister in January 1924* 
The first attempt to settle the Reserved Points was 
made in the negotiations between Zaghlul and MacDonald, the 
British Prime Minister, in September-October 1924.
Zaghlul, however, was not genuinely anxious to conclude a
I. Hurewitz, J.C.: Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East,
Vol*2, p*102o ‘ ~
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treaty, as was clear from the intransigent demands which he 
insisted upon at the beginning of these negotiations: the
recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, tbe 
withdrawal of the British forces and the Financial and 
Judicial Advisers from Egypt, the end of British control 
over Egypt's foreign affairs, and the abandonment of the 
British claims to protect foreigners and share in the defence 
of the Suez Canal, which should be entrusted to the League of 
Nations, Naturally MacDonald rejected these demands and 
the • negotiations failed*
Anglo-Egyptian relations were complicated by the 
assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor-General of the 
Sudan and the Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, on 19 November 
1924* It was followed by Allenby's famous ultimatum, ^ the 
resignation of Zaghlul*s ministry, and the appointment of 
a Palace government, which immediately suspended the Con­
stitution. When it revived from this shock, the Wafd allied
with tke Liberal Constitutional Party, whose then leader was 
c —Adli Pasha, and both launched a strong campaign demanding 
the restoration of the Constitution. Being dissatisfied 
with Palace rule, the British government agreed to this, pro­
vided that Zaghlul was not the head of the new ministry.
Though the elections of 1926 resulted in an overwhelming majo-
1. For the text of this ultimatum see Ibid., pp.130-131.
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rity for the Wafd, Lord Lloyd, the High Commissioner, forced 
Zaghlul to accept a coalition government under °Adli,s 
premiership. When he resigned in April 1927 > he was 
followed hy another Liberal leader, Tharwat Pasha.
Against the advice of Lord Hoyd, the British 
government invited Tharwat to enter into negotiations with 
Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary, in July 1927®
The Tharwat-Chamberlain draft treaty, however^.did not in­
volve any important retreat on Britain's part from the Reserved 
Points. Both parties agreed that the British troops might 
remain in any part of Egypt, subject to a review of the po­
sition after ten years. In case of disagreement the matter 
would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. 
Britain was to continue to be responsible for the protection 
of foreigners pending the modification of the Capitulations, 
the Financial and Judicial Advisers were to continue their 
functions as before, and the Sudan was left outside the 
scope of the negotiations. The death of Zaghlul on 27 August 
1927 clouded the prospects of these negotiations, and his 
successor, Mustafa al-Bja^as Pasha, rejected this draft 
treaty. Tharwat resigned to be followed by NaT^as, who re­
mained in office for about three months only. A new Palace 
government was appointed in June 1928 under the premiership 
of Mahmud Pasha, the leader of the liberal Constitutional 
Partyo
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Without the knowledge of Lord Lloyd, the British 
government entered into negotiations with Malimud in June 1929» 
and the resulting draft treaty represented a considerable 
advance on that of Tharwat as far as Egypt was concerned.
The British troops were to withdraw from the cities to the 
Canal Zone, Britain recognised Egypt1s responsibility to 
protect foreigners, and’promised to use her influence to 
abolish the Capitulations, while the problem of the Sudan 
was reserved for subsequent negotiations, through Egyptian 
troops were to be allowed to return there. The British 
government made it clear that it would not recognise this 
draft treaty unless it was ratified by a freely elected 
Parliament. In spite of Mahmud*s attempt to bring the 
various political parties to accept these proposals, the 
Wafd refused to egress any opinion before the general 
election. Paced with this difficult situation, Mahmud 
resigned and was followed by °AdlI who held the elections 
in DecCmber 1929* The inevitable result was the return of 
the Wafd to power early in 1930*
The next abortive negotiations, between Na^as 
and Henderson, took place between 51 March and 8 May 1930*
1. Owing to sharp differences between Lord Lloyd and the 
British government, Henderson, the Boreign Secretary, 
asked Lord Lloyd to resign in July 1929* He was 
followed by Sir Percy Loraine, who arrived in Egypt in early 
September 1929*
\
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Though, the British government emphasized that it would not 
go beyond the Mahmud-Henderson draft treaty, Nainas tried to 
get more concessions. While agreement was reached on the 
military and Oapitulatory clauses of the treaty, the nego­
tiations broke down over the Sudan question, owing to the 
Wafd*s insistence on unrestricted Egyptian immigration and 
the revision of the whole status of the Sudan after one year 
only. The failure of these negotiations gave King Fu'ad 
the chance to dismiss Na^as and appoint his own Prime 
Minister, §idql Pasha*
When he consolidated his position in Egypt, §idql 
naturally turned to treaty negotiations, because he wanted 
to counteract the opposition's criticism that the British did 
not regard his government as competent to represent Egypt 
in any further negotiations. Consequently, through the 
Egyptian Minister in London, he asked to see Sir John Simon, 
the Foreign Secretary, at Geneva in September 1932. The 
British government agreed, because it thought that, after 
packing the Egyptian Parliament, §>idal would ratify any
treaty "by what in name -at least was the representative
q
organ of the Egyptian people". In this interview, Simon 
accepted that any future negotiations should be along the
1. P.O. 371/20100, N. J 1633/2/16, Minute by Ronald 
Campbell, the head of the Egyptian Department at the 
Foreign Office, on the raison detre 6of the Forthcoming 
Conversations with the Egyptian Treaty Delegation,
20 February 1936.
main lines of the 1929 and 1930 draft treaties which, in 
his view, meant the ending of the British occupation, an 
alliance between the two countries, the modification of the 
Capitulatory regime, and Britain's assistance for Egypt to 
join the League of Nations. But he made two important 
reservations with regard to the military and Sudan clauses,. 
Though he agreed to the removal of the British troops from 
the cities, he insisted on basic modifications, which he 
did not define, to the 1929 and 1930 proposals. While 
agreeing to recognise Egypt's interests in the Sudan, Simon 
told Sidqi that Britain would not accept any alteration to 
the existing system and personnel there. As regards the 
Sudan, Sidqi agreed that the field was clear for discussions, 
but he insisted on the removal of the British troops from the 
cities to the Canal Zone. He suggested, however, that 
preliminary conversations should be held between himself 
and Sir Percy Loraine in Egypt in the winter of 1932-33.
The interview ended with an agreement to avoid "premature 
and exaggerated publicity on the subject",'1' i.e. to emphasize 
that this was merely a personal meeting. Simon, however, 
undertook to consult his colleagues, but no answer was sent 
to Sidqi's request. Though the British government had
1. P.O. 371/2.0117, No. J 7128/2/16, Memorandum by H. Godwin 
of the Foreign Office Concerning Anglo-Egyptian Relations 
June 1929 - December 1934, 9 April 1936.
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offered in 1929 and 1990 the withdrawal of the British
garrison to the Canal Zone, it refused to allow this in
1993* It was partly because of this that it refused Sidqi?s
request although it was on the xvhole favourably disposed to
it, since Sidqi was felt to be sufficiently strong to impose
his treaty on the Egyptians. If it could not offer the
Egyptians terms which would have a chance of being accepted,
the British government decided to shelve the treaty question
rather than to rui: the risk of another fiasco. The other
reason for this refusal was that Sidqi had a stroke in
February 1933 and lost his grip on the administration. In
September 1933 the King dismissed him and replaced him by 
cAbd al-iattah Yahya. The new Palace government was so 
deplorable that Britain considered it better not to nego­
tiate at all.1
1. FcO. 371/20100, No. J 1633/2/16, Minute by Ronald
Campbell on the raison d'etre of the Forthcoming Con­
versations with the’TSgyptlan Treaty Delegation, 20 
February 1930,
21
CHAPTER ONE
FACTORS. THAT LED TO THE 1936 NEGOTIATIONS (1)
INTERNAL FACTORS
■ Though the Wafd had accepted the principle of 
negotiations to settle the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, it made 
no genuine attempt before the 1950rs to reach an agreement. 
Once a treaty was concluded oho party might have expected 
that its raison d 1§tre would partly disappear, and that it 
would lose its overwhelming support among the masses. Con­
sequently it insisted on complete Egyptian independence and 
also on sovereignty over the Sudan, a matter which it knew 
that Britain would never accept. The leaders of bhe 
minority parties who advocated moderation were denounced as 
stooges of imperialist Britain and the draft treaties 
negotiated by them were condemned by the Wafdist press as 
high treason. When Tharwat showed Nahhas the draft treaty 
he had negotiated with Austen Chamberlain, Nahhas, as was 
reported at the time, said, "the only place for this is the 
water-closet".“ »
In Egypt there were three centres of power: the
Residency, the Wafd and the Palace. Though Sultan (later
1. Delany, B.C.: Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, p. 7*
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King) Pu'ad had supported Zaghlul's movement after the
1first World War , he hoped to control it and use it nfor 
his own ends, a means of increasing his stature and power, 
just as Abbas Hilmi had done in the case of Mustafa Kamil 
and his Nationalist Party before he broke with them in 
1 9 0 4 " But ho was soon bitterly disappointed, as Zaghlul 
followed an independent path, and was planning, in Pu’ad’s 
view, to overthrow the Monarchy and declare a republic in 
Bgypt. Tn such circumstances, it was natural that Pu'ad 
concentrated all his efforts to destroy the Wafd and con­
sequently secure and consolidate his family’s position.
Becou.se of the Wafd's extremism before the 1930’s, 
the British government relied in the last resort on Pu’ad, 
though it distrusted him, to act as a buffer between it and 
the Wafd, and to enforce it wishes. The widespread Wafdist 
anti-British disturbances, which wore particularly violent 
after the failure of the previous negotiations, compelled 
the British government on several occasions to ask Pu'ad to
1. In 1917, fu’ad whg had jugt come to^the throne, asked 
that Zaghlul and Abd al~ Aziz Pahmi should be made 
ministers. The British government refused, and there­
after they, with .a few others, constituted what had been 
called the King’s officine nocturne. Wingate, P.: 
Wingate of the Sudan, pp,"”223-“26.
2. Kedourie, E*: The Chatham House Version, pp* 90-91-
3. See below, p. 142.
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form a strong government to suppress then. He immediately
responded and exploited this to establish his own rule. In
less than seven years., Pu'ad suspended, the 1923 Constitution
thrice: the first constitutional coup d'etat was made by
Ahmad Pasha Ziwar who dissolved Parliament twice: on 2d-
December 1924, and 26 March 1925* When he became Prime
Minister in 1928, Mahmud Pasha was faced by a large Wafdist
majority in Parliament. In a letter* to the King, he accused
the opposition of "exercising its powers in a dangerous
partisan spirit, and of gross maladministration".^ Pu’ad
immediately reacted to this accusation by issuing a Royal
Rescrip>t on 19 July 1928 which suspended Parliament for three
years, in 1930 Sidqi abrogated the 1923 Constitution and
promulgated a new and less democratic constitution and
o
electoral law.*- During the greater part of the succeeding 
five years, Egypt lived under anth-Wafdist governments.
1 . R . I , I . A . : Great Britain and Egypt, p . 21.
2. Sidqi abrogated the 1923 Constitution on the grounds
that it "was f?amed on lines of liberty far too advanced 
for a people whose political education was only beginning". 
Tweedy, 0.: "Poor Egypt", The Fortnightly Review, 130,
1931, 198. ~ ~ ~
Sidqi also claimed that by the suspension of the 1923 
Constitution and the introduction of that of 1930, he
wanted to remove parliamentary autocracy.
The now Constitution, however, decisively tilted the 
balance of power away from the legislative and towards 
the executive. The laain objective of the new electoral 
law, as that which Ziwar tried to introduce in 1925, 
was to Peep the Wafd out of power.
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Apart from its indirect support of Palace rule, 
the British government took direct steps to suppress the .-■ 
Wafd's attempt to obstruct its policy, The Wqfd' s anti- 
British campaign after the failure of the cAdli-Curzon 
negotiations compelled the British government to deport 
Zaghlul and encourage a general anti-Wafd policy. The 
murder of Sir Lee Stack in Cairo on 19 November 1924 was 
exploited by Allenby to humiliate the Wafd and Zaghlul, 
whom he threatened with the overwhelming power of the 
British government. With his government’s approval, Lord 
Lloyd prevented Zaghlul from becoming Prime Minister in 
1926, though the Wafd had obtained a majority in the 
elections. The Brirish government prepared, itself for any 
attempt by Zaghlul to resist this veto by sending a battle- 
ship to Alexandria. Following the failure of the Tharwat- 
Chamberlain negotiations, Lord Lloyd demanded that Nahhas
1should take immediate steps to prevent tho Assemblies Bill 
from becoming law. When the Egyptian government proceeded 
with this Bill, Lord Lloyd warned Nahhas,
nI am instructed to request your Excellency
1. At the end of 1927s the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies 
annulled the law defining and punishing unlawful 
assemblies. It proceeded v/ith a new Bill which sought 
to take from the executive all pov;er of preventing, 
directing, or dispersing public meetings.
Lord Lloyd: Egypt since Cromer, Pol. 2, p. 268.
bo give me a categorical assurance in writing 
that the above mentioned measure will not be 
proceeded with. Should this assurance not 
reach me before 7 p.m. 011 May 2nd, His Britannic 
Majesty’s government will consider themselves 
free to take such^action as the situation may 
seem ro require".
The popularity and prestige of the Wafd suffered 
much from the successive anti-Wafdist governments parti­
cularly from Sidql1s rule from 1930 to 1933- By boycotting 
the general elections, Nahhas gave Sidql the chance to win 
an overshelming majority and to dominate the political scene 
in Egypt. It might have been far better for the Wafd to 
have follov/ed Zaghlul*s precedent by entering the elections 
of 1925v when Sidqi was the man behind Ziwar’s Palace 
government0 Like Muhammad Mahmud before him, Sidql used 
all means to destroy the Wafd. Its newspapers, al-Bolagh 
an(3- kawkab al-Sharq were suppressed, and the licence of
the Wafdist weekly magazine, Pose al-Yusuf was indefinitely
2
suspended on August 1930. The Wafd leaders were sent to 
prison, and their supporters (including 600 village headmen) 
were dismissed from their posts in the government and civil 
service. This was a serious blow for a party like the Wafd 
which seemed to have gained the support of the electors 
partly through distinguished and influential personalities
1. Ibid., p. 272.
2. Fatima al-Yusuf: Lhikriyyat , p. 139*
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whose adherence had "been obtained through bribery and
distribution of government offices.*^
Because of this anti-Wafdist policy, the Wafd had
begun gradually but continuously to decline and lose its
overwhelming control on the masses, especially aftor the
death on 27 August 1927 of its extremely popular and gifted 
c •“leader 8a d Zaghlul. He was described by his own countrymen
as having "a tongue of gold, a pen of fire and an eye as
2bright as the stare". His popularity was not only among 
the masses, but also among the deputies, and his domination
7*
•over the Wafd and its leaders was unquestioned.^ Though 
his successor, Nahhas, had inherited much of his popularity, 
and much., if not all, of the support of the people, he was 
less intelligent and impressive than Zaghlul. He was not
1. Once the Wafd came to power in 1956 it dismissed a 
number of administrative officials (Mudirs, Mamurs and 
Jmdas)• Lampson advised Nahhas to refrain from this 
"both for the reputation of*the Wafd and in the interests 
of good administration"„
E.O. 571/20108, No. 53 (Saving), Lampson to Eden, 11 
May 1956.
2. Tweedy, 0 .: "Saad Zaghlul" The Fortnightly .Review,
120, 1926, 111. ~  “
3. Amin Yusuf, a relative and close associate of Zaghlul 
claimed that he had an interview with Gandhi in the 
summer of 1931 in which he spoke very highly of Zaghlul 
and considered him the father of all nationalist move­
ments in the East.
Amine Youssef: Independent Egypt, p. 199.
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able to maintain the prestige and unity of the x>arty 
because he lacked control over* and the respect of, some 
of the Wafd leaders* Immediately after the death of Zaghlul, 
there was rivalry between Nahhas and Fathallah Barakat,
v  •  c *
Zaghlul's relative, over the leadership of the Wafd. Though
the press of the minority parties supported Barakat, the
majority of the Wafd leaders choose Nahhas because they
feared the former's strong character.'1' A more serious rift
in the Wafd happen 3d in October ~ November 1952. It was
alleged that the High Commissioner, Sir Percy Loraino, had
suggested, the formation of a national Cabinet, under the
c —presidency of Adli, "in view of the deteriorating security
conditions In the country which was [sic] giving rise to
2some anxiety among the British in Egypt5'. The majority of 
the Wafd executive agreed, to this suggestion. If Eidqx's 
rule were not quickly overthrown, they felt that the Wafd, 
which had completely failed to do so by violence, would 
soon disintegrate and Sidql would continue indefinitely in 
power. Supported by some distinguished leaders including 
Madame Zaghlul, Nahhas opposed this idea and insisted on 
complete Wafdist government. The result was a division in 
the Wafd, when Nahhas dismissed all who disagreed with him.
1. Fatima al-Yusuf: Dhikriyyat, pp. 110-11.
2. Vatikiotis, p .J .: The Modern History of Egypt, p . 284.
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They included such important Wafd leaders as Hamad al-Basil
and Fathalluh Barakat.'*'
*
The Wafd's popularity and influence decreased in 
some sectors of Egyptian society* In the 1930's Prince
c -  2Abhas Halim successfully started, under his own presidency,
a Federation of Labour Unions, which was open to workers
in all branches of industry* Originally cAbbas Halim was
an ally of the Wafd, but, as his influence in the labour
world increased, h-3 drifted away from it, and became in a
notable degree independent of political parties. To obtain
the allegiance of the working class for the Wafd and "to
dim the brilliance of Abbas Halim", the Wafd leaders tried
in 1935 to control this infant movement by imposing on the
Federation a Higher Council of Labour consisting mainly of
Wafdist politicians under the nominal presidency of °Abbas
Halim. According to P.M. Graves, the director of the
4Egyptian government labour office, apart from Zuhayr Sabri,
1. CAbd al-Pahman al--Hafi°i: Bi A°qab al-Thawra ah- 
Misr i y y a Vol. 2, pp. 171-72."
2. Prince cAbbas Halim was an energetic and attractive 
member of the ftoyal Family. He had been the Ottoman 
Minister of Public Works, and had served in the German 
army during the First World War.
3. F.,0. 371/20098, Ho. 90 (128/3/36), Review of Labour 
Developments in Egypt during 1935 by R.M. Graves, 23 
January 1936.
4. This labour bureau was organised in 1930, by Sidqi's 
government as part of the Ministry of Interior.
Vatikiotis, P .J .: The Modern History of Egypt, p . 336•
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a lawyer with comunist tendencies, none of the Wafdist
members of this Council was interested in the defence of
the working class, hut merely wanted to exploit it to obtain
1political support for the Wafd. This attempt, however, was 
unsuccessful, as the Prince publicly declared that the 
labour movement should be kept away from politics, and he 
was supported in this by the Council of the Federation in 
February 1935-^
cAbbas Halim had organised this movement to annoy 
his cousin, King Eu'ad, who had deprived him of his princely 
title (Nabll) and reduced his allowances from the Palace 
as a sign of djs^tisfaction with him and his wife "who was 
considered to be insufficiently orientated in her way of
7,
life and demeanourn.^  It was not strange, however, for the 
ruler of Egypt to face opposition from members of his own 
family.
Though the Wafd v/as the first party to organise 
the students and dominate their movement, it gradually lost 
their support. The change of the Wafd's policy from
1. P.O. 371/20098, No. 90 (128/3/38), Review of Labour 
Developments in Egypt during 1935 by P.M. Graves, 23 
J anuary 1938,
2. limes, 15 May 1935-
3. EoO. 371/20098, No. 90 (128/3/38), Review of Labour 
Developments in Egypt diring 1935 by R.M. Graves, 23 
January 1938.
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1extremism to moderation in the 19301 a might have been the 
main factor for the loss ot its popularity among the 
students0 Realizing the importance of the students' 
political role, the minority parties v/erg quick to take 
advantage, and had in fact gained some support among them.
This growing influence was viewed with favour by Lutfi al- 
Sayyid, the Rector of the Egyptian University and a good 
friend of the Liberals. Owing to his personal’grievance 
with the Prime Minister, Hasin, and his connexions with 
the Palace and the minority parties, Dr. cAlI Ibrahim,
Dean of the faculty of Medicine, secretly encouraged the
p
students to oppose the Wafd. To consolidate this newly-
won influence, Muhammad Mahmud, whilst himself keeping
behind the scenes, induced Prince cAbbas Halim to form a♦
new group among the students of the University, the secon­
dary schools and the unemployed. Under the leadership of 
Hu: al-Din Tarraf, a liberal medical student leader, a 
new organisation, the Rational Student Group, was founded.
It included followers of the Liberal Party, of the Rationalist
c “ *“Party, and of Abbas Halim himself. It was organised on 
military lines and its members had a distinctive uniform
1. Bee below, pP* 37-39*
2. P.O. 371/20097? Ho. 34 (1/8/36), Lampson to Eden, 
10 January 1936.
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and badges, while Muhammad Mahmud helped the Group
financially, Sidqi sympathised with it and allowed it to
meet an his house.”
Anxious to avoid trouble for its friend Jlasim,
the Wafd asked the students to maintain law and order.
Nevertheless, prompted by the minority parties who wanted
to get rid of Uasin, they were engaged in anti-government
and anti-Wafdist demonstrations in late 1935 and early 1936.
The continuous deccease of the Wafd's influence among the
students reached its nadir at the tenth International
Surgical Congress which was held &t the Egyptian University
on 31 December 1935- While the once--hated Sidql received
a warm welcome from the students, that given to tTahhas was
less cordial, and his appeals to the students to stop riots
2
were totally ignored.
The Wafd was much worried about the loss of 
control over its storm-troops and decided to take immediate 
steps to regain their confidence. In early January 1936, 
a Congress of Wafdist Youth was called and Muhammad Bilal, 
a medical student, announced the formation of the Blueshirts.
1. E.0i 371/20093, ho. 102 (19/15/36), Memorandum by 
parid Bashatly Effendi, deputy assistant Director- 
General of the European Department, 27 January 1936.
2. Manchoster Guardian , 1 January 1936.
It was organised on Fascist lines, said its members were to 
be the soldiers of the Wafd with the motto "Obedience and 
struggle". They 'were to have a distinctive uniform composed 
of a blue shirt, grey trousers and a tarbush. The spirit
of discipline, love of country, and self-sacrifice were to
1 cbe strictly observed. Both Makram Ubayd and Zuhayr
Sabri took a special interest in this organisation which 
cooperated actively with the Wafdist committees in suppor­
ting the Wafdist candidates in the 1936 elections. To 
counteract this movement, the- Falace and minority parties 
encouraged the Young Egypt Society’s G-reenshirts. Though 
this para*milibsry organisation was the first of its kind 
as it was founded in 1928, it became active only in 
January 1934-*
By the 1930’s there were two rival factions of 
the Wafd: that of Nuqrashl and Ahmad Mahir on the one
ha?vd, and that of Nahhas and Makram cUbayd on the other. 
While the views of the former were expressed in the daily 
evening paper Kawkab a l - S h a r q -chose political editor was 
Ahmad Mahir himself, the latter controlled the daily 
morning paper al-Jihad, which was completely under the 
direction of Makram cUbayd. Ahmad Mahir and Nuqrashl 
disliked their rivals’ domination over the Wafd, and were
1* limes, 7 January 1936.
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particularly worried by the great influence over Nahhas of 
Makram whom they hated, Makram had acquired this influence 
by exploiting Nahhas's weakness, and continuously flattering
him to the extent of describing him in one of his speeches
c- 1as al-Za im al-Muqaddas, i.e. the "Sacred leader". Having
more intelligence than Nahhas, Makram became the most —1 * # '
influential person in the Wafd.
Makram suspected that Nuqrashi and Ahmad Mahir
encouraged Madame Nose al-Yusuf to publish in March 1935
a daily morning newspaper, Rose al-Yu&uf, to compete with
al-Jihad, and persuaded al~cAqqad and Mahmud CAzmi, al-
2
Jihad!s most important editors to join it. Nuqrashi in
particular was accused of being responsible for encouraging
the strong campaign of this newspaper in the autumn cf 1935
against Makram and Nahhas, who were accused of having sold
themselves to the British, It was reported to the Ministry
of bhe Interior that the Mahir group had contacted the Young
Egypt Society and. other elements of opposition to intensify
their attacks on Nahhas and Makram. There were rumours, -# • *
1. Fatima al-lusuf: Dhikriyyat, pp. 118-19*
2. Madame Rose al-Yusuf, however, claimed that she 
published both her daily newspaper and weekly magazine 
voluntarily.
3* E.O. 371/20109> Tel. No. 576, Lampson to Eden, 21 May 
1936.
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to which the three Regents1 gave sore weight , of a plot 
inspired by Ahmad Mahir, who was suspected of being in 
touch with his former terrorist agents, to assassinate 
Makram, whc appeared to have been heavily guarded for the
first time just before he left for England to sign the
4 ■ 2 treary.
There was considerable friction between the two 
rival factions of the Wafd over a number of issues. Nuqrashi 
and Ahmad Mahir strongly opposed some of Makram's candidates 
for the 1936 elections, particularly Tawfiq Diab, the 
editor of al-Jihad. Because they threatened to renounce 
their membership of the Wafd if he was nominated as one of 
its candidates, Makram reluctantly agreed that Diab should 
enter the elections as an independent.-' It was originally 
the intention of Nahhas to include in his 193& Cabinet 
competent administrators from outside the Wafd. Suspecting 
that Nahhas's real Intention behind this might be to 
exclude them, Nuqrashi and Ahmad Mahir insisted that the 
government should be homogeneous!;/ Wafdist. Faced by this
1. These were Prince Muhammad °AlI, cAziz °Izzat, and 
Sharif Sabri.
2. Adn. 116/3591 * Tel. No. 1066, Kelly to Eden, 10 September
1-936.
3* F.O. 371/20105  ^ No. 420, Report by the Director-General 
of the European Department, 17 April 1936.
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strong opposition, Nahhas gave up his idea and forned his
i
Cabinet on strict party lines. According to a secret
report of the Ministry of the Interior, Makram, who did not
v/ant to have a hostile Auditor-General prying into his
nanagenent of the Ministry of Finance, persuaded Nahhas
not to proceed with the creation of this post, to which
2 -Ahmad Mahir was aspiring* Nahhas and Makram showed their 
mistrust of Ahmad Mahir and Nuqrashi by handing over all 
the Wafd propaganda work, formerly entrusted to them, to 
Mamduh Riyad and cAbd al-Fattah al-law.Il, parliamentary 
under-secretaries of state for foreign affairs and Palace 
affairs respectively.
Though the minority parties expected a Wafd 
schism and were ready to back the Nuqrashi group against 
their rivals, the unity of the Wafd was temporarily main­
tained. Ahmad Mahir, though a very intelligent, energetic 
one capable man, was too preoccupied with gambling.^ 
Moreover, both he and Nuqrashi, who were not orators and
1. F.O. 371/20109* lei. No. 57S, Lampson to Eden, 21 May 
1936.
2. Ibid.
3* A dm. 116/3591* lei. No. 1084*, Kelly to Eden, 17 Sep­
tember 1936.
4. Ibid. Ihg opinion is that of the Regent, Prince
Muhammad All **
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had no vide popular appeal , did not want at that tine to 
"break openly v/ith Fahhas , the leader whom they had con­
tributed to inpose on the nation. They night have con­
sidered it unwise to do so, as Nahhas, who had been contin-' o • *
uously glorified as Zaghlul1s successor and the people’s
1
reader, was still very popular among the masses.
The conflict between the two factions of the Wafd
manifested itself clearly over the treaty issue. For
2reasons suggested later, the small extremist Mahir group 
wanted to continue the Wafd's old anti-British policy,
They aspired to complete independence, which, they claimed, 
could only be obtained by force. They preached that it 
was no use pleading with the British and appealing to their 
sense of justice. It was the Indian terrorists who had 
gained self-government for India by the Bill of 1935* and 
it was the revolt of 1919 which had extracted the Declaration 
of Independence for Egypt, So, it was felt, only the threat 
of future troubles would induce the British to yield again.^ 
An informant reported to the Residency that at a meeting
1. P.O. 371/20109, Tel. No. 570, Lampson to Eden, 21 May 
1936. The split, however, cane in September 1937 when 
Nuqrashi™ and Ahmad Mahir formed the Sa dist Party.
2, See below, p. 153*
3* Times, 1 October 1935-
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of the students' committee at the Sacdist club in Cairo on
16 October 1935* Nuqrashi ashed the uenbe3?s to make every
effort to boycott British -goods. This,, he argued, was the
only weapon to force the British government to grant Egypt
independence.^
In the 1930's, however, Nahhas and the majority
of the Wafd leaders were on the side of noderation. Just
after the failure of his negotiations with Henderson,
Nahhas claimed thac though he had lost a treaty, he had won
Britain's friendship. After its failure to overthrow
Sidqi, the Wafd conducted a campaign in Britain to persuade
her to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt. A
Wafdist leader spent much tine in London in 1930 agitating
on behalf of intervention by Great Britain on the Wafd's
~ 2side against Sidqi. Though Nasim's government was reluc­
tant to give a speedy solution tc the constitutional question, 
which the Wafd anxiously awaited in order to return to power, 
the Wafdist press stood firmly beside at. While discouraging
1. E.O. 371/20090, Tel. No. 1456, Lampoon to Eden, 6 
January 1936.
2. Great Britain and Egypt, pp.28-291 could not
identify this Wafdist leader.
3. The minority parties severely attacked Nasim whom they 
described as a puppet of the British. They particularly 
criticised his decision to apj)o.int Sir Geoffrey Latham 
Corbett as an adviser to the Ministry of Commerce with 
direct access to the Minister, Tho_real motive behind 
this was their desire to remove Nasim from power because 
he was pro-Wafdist. Manchester Guardian, 26 April 1936.
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students from demonstrating against Nasim, Nahhas declared
on 8 September 1935 that he would not resign because he had
1the "support of the nation behind him". It was because of
its strong campaign against Nasim's government that the
Wafd branded the daily Hose al-Yusuf on 29 September 1935
2as nob representing the party's view, and later dismissed 
al-°Aqqad from the Wafd. Since the British government 
wanted Nasim to continue in office, the Wafd's support for 
him might have been a gesture to win Britain's friendship. 
Moreover, the Wafd 'wanted to avoid the return to power of 
any of its declared enemies such as cAli Mahir or Muhammad 
Mahmud. A3, the ugh Nasim was not a member of the Wafd, he 
was well-disposed towards it, and his government took a
x
number of measures in its favour.Anxious to maintain a 
friendly atmosphere during the 1938 negotiations, the Wafd 
government tried to persuade the Egyptian press to stop its 
violent campaign against British policy in Palestine.
Nahhas himself summoned Tawfiq Diab, Hafiz cAwad and cAbdo # -*• $ # ^
al-Qadir Hamza, representing al-Jihad, Kar:kab al-Sharp and
1. limes, 9 September 1935*
2. Eatima al-Yusuf: Dhikriyyat, p. 174. The Wafd govern­
ment cancelled the licence of the daily Hose al-Yusuf 
in 1938 for the ostensible reason that it was not 
published regularly.
3. Nasim was a brother-in-law of Zaghlul and had served as 
Minister of Finance in his Ministry.
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al-Balagh respectively* In very firm language, lie advised 
then to refrain from criticising Britisli policy in I-alostine 
on the grounds that this was untimely "when the government 
was trying to cone to a friendly settlement with Britain 
and wished by all means to preserve a friendly atmosphere"* 
The Wafd’s new moderation was most evident during the treaty 
negotiations when it was ready to give the British substan­
tial concessions. Lanpson claimed that Nahhas told him in 
a meeting between bhen on 20 July 1936 that he was prepared
to give the British "the substance if [they] could, give him
2
the form".
f-hile no direct evidence explains this complete 
change in the Wafd’s policy, it seems likely that, through 
hard experience particularly in the lastsix years, the 
majority of the 7afd leaders realized that the old extremist 
policy would not work. It enabled Fu’ad to play politics 
an^L frequently to establish his own rule. In spite of 
Britain's declared policy of neutrality, theyclaimed that 
the anti-Wafdist governments of the last few years would 
not have remained in office but for the moral support of 
Britain and the army of occupation behind them. Experience
1. IhOc 371/20110, No. 868, Kelly to Eden, 11 June 1936.
2. E.O. 371/20114, No. 713> Lampson to Eden, 20 July 1936.
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had shown that it was only Britain who could, if she desired,
check the autocratic tendencies of King Pu’ad. Thus,
Hash'at Pasha, the chief of the Royal Cabinet and the hand
behind the political intrigues of the Palace, had been
dismissed from office by the interference of the High
Connissioncr. In October 1925 Lord Lloyd persuaded King
q
Pu'ad to transfer hin to a diplomatic post in Spain.
Similarly, Zaki al-Abrashi, the Director of the Royal
Estates and the King's loyal servant and adviser, who was
responsible for many unpopular decisions made by him, was
forced to resign on 22 April 1955 under pressure from the 
2Residency, While the Wafd could not tolerate exclusion 
from office any longer, as Nahhas openly admitted to Madame 
Rose al-Yusuf by saying Ihna TiCabna  ^i.e. ,lWe are tired", 
the majority of the- Wafd leaders probably realized that the 
only way to return to power, and consequently stop the 
continuous weakness of their party, was by strengthening 
themselves against the King through a deal with Britain.
To achieve this, they gave up their old extremist doctrine 
and followed a moderate policy with Britain.
1. CAbd al-Rahman al-RafiCi : Pi ACqab al-Thawra al- 
Eisriyya, tol. 1, p. 249*
Daily Telegraph, 23 April 1955*
3- Patima al-Yusuf: Dhikriyyat, p. 159*
4-1
Arne cl witli this new deal with Britain, the Wafd
planned to reduce the influence of the Palace and perhaps
hoped to overthrow the monarchy itself* The death of the
intelligent and experienced Pu'ad leaving a minor son was
a valuable chance for this* While planning to omit any
member of the Royal house from the Regency, the Wafd
suggested that Paruq's age of majority should be twenty-
one and that he should return to England as soon as possible,
on the grounds that this was necessary to give him a proper
education before assuming the power and responsibility of
Kingship. Although the Residency admitted, that this
argument bad some weight, it felt that the Wafd, having got
all the power in its own hands during the four years before
the King would attain the age of twenty-one, night be
tempted "to give an anti-dynastic turn to Egyptian
1nationalism". On coming to power on 10 May 1936, the 
'vaj-di st government took several measures to reduce the 
power of the Palace. To debar the King from the service 
of experienced men such as CAlI Mahir, it made drastic
p
reductions of Palace expenditure." Moreover, the Wafd 
wanted to control the Palace by making the Minister of the
1. P.O. 371/20107, Tel* Ho. 522, Lanpson to Eden, 18 May 
1936 •
2. P.O. 371/20109, Tel. No. 5A (Saving), Lampson to Eden, 
4- June 1936.
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Palace a Cabinet appointment. Paced with the strong oppo­
sition of Lampson, who considered that this would bring the
1
Palace right down into the arena of internal politics, 
the Wafd reluctantly accepted a compromise; namely to
create a post of parliamentary under-secretary for Palace
. c — —affairs, to which Abd al-Patiala al-Tawil was appointed.
He was to be attached to the Prime Minister’s office 
instead of being in the Palace and would function as his 
assistant instead of acting on his own responsibility. All 
documents, whatever their importance, were submitted to the 
Pegents for signature at the last moment, with no attempt 
at explanation or consultation. The Wafdist press, par­
ticularly al-Misri, showed definite hostility to the 
reigning house. While ostensibly criticising certain 
Princes for their hostility to the treaty, it praised 
cAbbas HiIni, the ex-Khedive, and his line. The plan was 
to use him as a weapon of attack against Muhammad CAlI,
the First Regent, Paruq, and perhaps the institution of the
2
monarchy itself.
Naturally the minority parties and the Palace men 
stood firmly beside the new King against the Wafd's intrigues
1. P.O. 371/20107? Tel. No. 267, Lampson to Eden, 20 May 
1936.
2. P.O. 371/20151, No. 106 (Saving), Lampson to Eden,
3 November 1936.
They insisted that his majority should begin at eighteen
1
and chat he should stay in Egypt to establish his position
and hold on thepeople. They kept hin in the public eye by
c “encouraging hin to entertain and receive at Abdin Palace, 
to say his prayers in the public mosques, and to pay cere­
monial visits to the members of the Royal family. This 
tendency provoked the Wafd’s resentment, as it did not wish 
the Palace to take the upper hand over it again, Nahhas
complained to Lampson about the way in which King Paruq
2
was ’’paraded before the public”.
To persuade Britain to support its anti-dynastic
policy, the Wafd claimed that the Palace and the young
was reported to have 
king wore anti-Britxsh, and Makram/frankly told Lanpson,
the High Commissioner, that Paruq was completely unfit for
has coming responsibilities. But the British government
made it quite clear to the Wafd that it would not tolerate
unjj attempt to irterfere with the succession to the throne,
1. Though Britain preferred Paruq to return to London to 
continue his studies, she did not insist on this, as
it might be interpreted_in Egypt as an attempt to control 
the young monarch. Paruq, however, finally staged in 
Egypt ancl- English tutor was appointed form him.
Later he took a trip abroad to braoden his mind and 
experience. P.O. 371/20107* No. 44-1 (R) , Lanpson to 
Eden, 17 May 1936.
2. P.O. 371/20107* No. 4-19* Lanpson to Eden, 13 May 1936.
3. P.O. 371/20116, No. 77 Craving), Lanpson to Eden,
11 August 1936.
and that it would loyally hack Paruq. While it felt that 
it had a measure of responsibility for his welfare, it 
wanted to maintain the monarchy in Egypt "for the degree of 
stability it can confer on the political life of the nation". 
It thought that the sooner the Palace became again a real 
power in Egypt the better as it j?epresented Britain's 
best chance of keeping the Wafd in check.
The Wafd had a strong influence on the public
opinion in Egypt, thanks to its efficient organisation and
strong propaganda, which it directed whenever and wherever
it wanted. How that the Wafd wanted a treaty, it made the
Egyptians feel that this was an absolute necessity. Por
the first time in the history of Anglo-Egyptian relations,
they were continuously repeating the statement T,cAwzin Nakhla
2
i.e.,"We Want a Solution".
The Wafdist press launched a strong campaign 
asserting that agitation would lead nowhere and that it was 
in Egypt's interests to conclude a treaty with Britain. It 
was felt that the Egyptians were too weak to force Britain 
to meet their demands. Since they did net advocate armed 
resistance, and had decided to settle their dispute with 
Britain by negotiations, they should know that these meant
1. P.O. 371/20107, Ho. 4-19* lampoon to Eden, 13 May 1936. 
2* A-l-Musawwar, 28 August 1936.
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1"give and bake1'. While a treaty could recognise Britain's 
vital interests, Nahhas claimed that it could also achieve* e <
Egypt 1 s independence .
The Wafd claimed that the absence of a treaty with 
Britain was a disturbing factor in Egypt's internal policy, 
lb was felt that the treaty issue had been the main factor 
for the differences between the political parties and 
groups in Egypt since the beginning of the century. It was
the main reason for the division of Egypt into Zaghlulists
c c “and Adlists after the failure of the Adli-Ourzon nego­
tiations. Since that tragic conflict between Zaghlul and 
cAdli and until the conclusion of the 1956 treaty, al-
Jihad claimed, Egypt lived in a series of party struggles
2and nasty political intrigues.
Wafdist propaganda claimed that the treaty Issue 
was the fundamental reason for all the political instability 
in Egypt. The governments that failed to conclude an 
agreement with Britain either resigned or were dismissed 
by the King. Between 1919 end 1956, Egypt had twenty-two 
governments i.e. an average of less than a year for each.
Kawkab al-Sharq, 5 July 1956.
2* Al-Jihad, 25 September 1956.
3. Mahmud Zayid: "Tamhid li °Apd Mu°ahadat Sanat 1956 
bayn Misr wa Biritania", al-Abhath , 16, 1965, 529.
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This short tenure cf power was detrimental to the welfare 
of Egypt.
In the period between 1919 and 1935 the econoniG
conditions of Egypt continuously deteriorated, mainly
because of the international depression and the fall of
the price of raw materials, particularly cotton, Though
the Egyptians were generally known for their reluctance to
emigrate, some of then showed in the mid-thirties a desire
to leave the country. When Italy wanted Egyptian workmen
to build roads on the Abyssinian frontier, thousands of
them volunteered to go. The wages offered to them were
low, but something was better than nothing. As a part of
Its campaign to persuade the Egyptians to accept a treaty,
the Wafd claimed that this difficult economic situation
was primarily because Egyptian politics were centred on
^nglo-EgyptIan affairs and totally neglected the internal
problems cf the country. Even Zaghlul, the idol of the 
/
people, disregarded the domestic problems of Egypt. In 
nearly all his speeches, he touched only slightly on social 
and. economic problems, and then only if they were related 
to British rule in Egypt. In fact, it was asserted, the 
Egyptian parties differed from one another only in their 
attitude towards the British occupation. The attitude of 
the Egyptians towards them was determined by the degree of 
vigour with which they supported or opposed the foreign
47
1occupation It was felt that the party making the greatest
demands from the British made the greatest appeal to the
Egyptian electors.
To the Wafdist press, the entire preoccupation
of the Egyptians with the treaty issue was also the reason
for their neglect of other* pressing domestic problems.
While the miserable conditions of the fallahin needed
immediate care, Egypt was in urgent need of reform in many
other directions: education, health, irrigation and the
maintenance of public security. It was felt that she could
not achieve this unless she rid herself of this ever-
p
recurring Anglo-Egyptian question.
The Wafd asserted that the continuation of the 
Anglo-Egyptian dispute meant the retention of the office 
of the High Commissioner in Egypt. He enjoyed vast powers 
and privileges. He knew everything about Egypt and inter- 
feiGd in her internal affairs whenever he liked. On behalf 
of G-reat Britain, he had often used or threatened to use 
force to suppress attempts to obstruct British policy in 
Egypt. He did not usually find effective opposition from 
the disunited Egyptians. This continuous humiliation and
Al-Ahran, 20 August 1936.
2. Newman, P.: "Egypt, a New Phase", Nineteenth Century
and After, 110, 1931 > 27•
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interference in Egypt1s domestic affairs* it m s  asserted
could only be ended by an agreement v/ith Britain which.
1would aoolish this post.
 ^° Al~Ah.rs.7j * 24 September 1938.
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Egypt and the Capitulations:
The Capitulator?/ regime in Egypt involved res­
trictions of two different kinds upon the powers of the 
Egyptian government with regard to foreigners; namely the 
Judicial and legislative Capitulations. Under the former, 
foreigners were exempt from the Jurisdiction of the Egyptian 
courts and were subject to two sets of tribunals: the Mixed
and Consular Courts. The Mixed Courts, which were formed 
in 1875 and had a majority of foreign Judges, had civil 
Jurisdiction over all cases where a foreigner was involved, 
except cases between foreigners of the sane nationality, 
and an extremely limited criminal Jurisdiction. The 
Consular Courts had Jurisdiction in respect of civil cases 
between two of their own nationals, and a nearly exclusive 
criminal Jurisdiction. Under the legislative Capitulations, 
foreigners were exempt from the operation of the Egyptian 
legislation unless it had been made applicable to then
either by the assent of the Capitulatory powers or of the
1general assembly of the Court of Appeals. Most of the
1. The general assembly of tlio Court of Appeals was formed 
in 1906. It consisted of 18 members: the 17 Judges of 
the Court of Appeals, of whom 11 were foreigners and 6 
Egyptians, and the foreign Procureur-General. Its scope 
of action was "limited to an examination of the question's 
of uniformity of application, compliance with capitu­
latory and treaty rights, and restriction to police 
penalities", a limitation which suggested that its 
functions "was rather more Judicial than legislative". 
Brint011, J . Y : The Mixed Courts of Egypt, p . 176.
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Egyptian legislation which be car. a applicable to foreigners 
did so by reason of the approval of the Mixed Courts. They 
had* however* no power to approve certain types of legisla­
tion , in particular the inposition of new taxation, for
1
which the assent of the Capitulatory powers was necessary.
The nationalists claimed that to try foreigners
by one code and nationals by another gave the Egyptians a
feeling of inferiority. It implied that their Courts were
2
neither efficient nor just. Though the Mixed Courts were 
only to deal with cases in which foreigners were involved, 
they had in fact dealt with all financial (and particularly 
bankruptcy) cases including those of many Egyptian institu­
tions, such as Banque Misr, whose constitutions forbade 
them to have non-Egyptian shareholders or to do business 
with any but Egyptian clients. These institutions had 
managed to avoid the Native Courts and brought their cases
be ore the Mixed Courts by intentionally employing for-*
3 c —eigners. Abud Pasha, a distinguished Egyptian contractor, 
claimed that it would be impossible for him to carry on his
I. Cab. 24/262, A.E.C. (36)3, Annex II to C.P. 184(36),- 
Memorandum by the Foreign Secretary on Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty Conversations, the Capitulations, 14 May 1936.
2- Al-Musawwar, 26 June 1936.
3. Merton, A.: "The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance",
Nineteenth Century and After, 120, 1936, 394.
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l
business properly unless the Mixed Courts remained.
Foreign circles in Egypt asserted that in spite of their 
Capitulatory origin, these Courts had won favour in 
Egyptian eyes. The explanation of this was the remarkable 
success with which they reconciled the protection of foreign 
interests with the claims of Egyptian nationality. By 
guaranteeing security to the foreign capital and enterprise 
upon which the modern development of Egypt so largely 
depended, these Courts had contributed to her national 
prosperity. Moreover, it was felt, the "wider use of their 
services offered the most practical means of getting rid.
p
of the remaining jurisdiction of the Consular Courts".
The Capitulatory privileges were sometimes 
exploited by dishonest foreigners in connexion with drug- 
smuggling, prostitution, the drink trade and gambling 
houses. The consular regime left the Egyptian government 
powerless to enforce laws to check such evils which were
1. F.O. 271/20097  ^ * 80 (l/29/56)» Despatch from the
Consul-Gengral at Alexandria on a Conversation with
Sidqi and Abud, 21 January 1936.
2. Brinton, J . Y. : The Mixed Courts of Egypt, p . 193•
A spokesman for the Mixed Courts, Sir Maurice Amos,
the Judicial Adviser, said in his farewell address at 
Alexandria on 25 March 1925, MI have often taken occa­
sion to remark that next to the church, the Mixed Courts 
are the most successful international institutions in 
history". Brinton, J.Y.: "The Mixed Courts of Egypt"
American Journal of International Law, 20, 1926, 670.
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harmful to the health, and order of the country*
The economic grievances of the Capitulations were
a major source of annoyance and complaint in Egypt. Under
the Capitulatory regime, direct taxation on foreigners was
only possible by the unanimous agreement of the powers. In
practice, the preliminar3r negotiations involved meant that
it was not imposed on foreigners; and the Egyptians also
escaped since they would not pay a tax from which foreigners
were immune. While the only direct taxes were the land-tax,
the house-tax, and the ghafar-tax, the government’s major
source of revenue was from indirect taxation of which the
2
customs duties formed the largest proportion. Faced by a 
severe economic crisis, Sidqi Fasha, an efficient financier, 
tried in 1953 to circumvent the Capitulations by imposing 
new taxes on foreigners, but he was forced to give this up 
because of official protests from the diplomatic repres- 
en atives. It was unfair for Egypt to be debarred, "from 
broadening the basis of her revenue as all other modern
1. Brinton, J * Y. : The Mixed Courts of Egypt, p . 124-.
2. Marlowe,J.: Anglo-Egyptian Relations « p. 310.
3* Merton, A.: "Egypt Today", The Fortnighly Review,
a.34, 1933> 438*
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states liave long since found necessary1'.
Foreigners controlled the economic life of Egypt,
Sir Bertram Hornsby, the first Director of the National
Bank of Eg3rpt alter the First Vorld tar, estimated that
nine-tenths of the economic life in Egypt was in foreign 
2
hands. By 1930 the foreign capital invested in Egypt was
about £4-00,000,000, i.e. approximately two-thirds of the
%
total value of Egypt's cultivable land. Even in land where 
Egyptians had a namural interest, they were sometimes unable 
to compete with foreigners. Owing to the scarcity of 
Egyptian capital, it was only by European capital that 
thousands of acres of land had been reclaimed from the 
sandy desert or the salty marsh.^ All the important 
industries and public utility services, gas. elecbricity 
and trams were controlled by foreigners. In commerce and 
trade, they dominated almost every concern of importance. 
Hotels, cafes, and restaurants were controlled by them.
Many Greeks and Italians "were small shop-keepers, shop-
1. E.O. 371/20099, No. J. 14-25/2/16, Note by Ronald Campbell
on the Possible Results of a Failure to Conclude a
■Treaty with Egypt, 12 February 1936,
2, Untitled Note by Hornsby, P.5*
3- Toynbee, A . : Survey of International Affairs, 1937*
Vol. 1, p. 581. “
4-. Untitled Note by Hornsby, P. 5*
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ass i s'tant s and even artisans . ^
The reason for this foreign control of the 
nation's economic life was that Egyptian capital was at 
first too limited to finance large production units in 
commerce and industry, and evon when it had increased, its 
owners preferred to exploit it in buying lands and construc­
ting buildings. After the First World War, however, there
was a gradual realization that commerce and industry were
2important fields of profit. Some graduates, who did not 
find posts in the government service or in the Banque Misr 
and its subsidiary companies, tried to set up commercial 
enterprises. But they found the way largely blocked by the 
privileged situation enjoyed by foreigners. Even if 
Egyptians had. the same business capacity and the sane 
capital resources, it was extremely difficult for them to 
enter into competition with the foreigners, because of the 
relatively light taxation and the judicial privileges 
enjoyed by the latter. It seemed "incongruous and unfair 
to impose rules upon Egyptian enterprises not applicable
1. Earl Winterton: "England and Egypt", Nineteenth Century 
and After, 107* 1950, 766.
2. For__the reasons of this new; tendency see: Rashid al~
Barawi and Muhammad Hamza ulaysh: AI-Tatawwur al-
m i  sadi fi Misr, pp. 195-94-.
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1
to their foreign rivals".
The manage::;ent of nearly all the industrial and
cornnerci.nl firms in Egypt was controlled by Europeans. The
only chance for Egyptians to work in these- firms was in
humiliating posts such as servants. The heavy burden of
tne Capitulations was especially felt after 1929 when Egypt
was suffering from an economic crisis due mainly to the fa]1
in the price of cotton. Unemployment spread among the
working class and particularly anong the graduates of the
2secondary schools and colleges.
The retention of these "oppressive servitudes", 
as Sir Valentine Chirol called the Capitulations, greatly 
affected Egyptian amour-propre. Other nations had been 
able to put then aside. The Republican government of Turkey 
abolished then, and its action was recognised by the Treaty 
of Lausanne in 1923. In Syria-Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine aud 
Tr; asjordan they existed no more. They had ceased to run 
in Tripoli when Italy annexed that Turkish province. They 
did not apply tc the Sudan which had been juridically an
1. 0 ’Brien, P .: The Revolution in Egypt 1s Econonic System , 
p. 64.
2. I,ialpud Zayid: "Tanhid li °Aqd MuCahadat Sanat 1936
bayn Misr wa Biritania", Al.~Abh.ath, 16, 19&3 ? 330-31 •
3- Vatikiotis, P.J.: The Modern History^of Egypt, p. 287.
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A n g l o - E g y p C o n d o m i n i u m  since 1899- They were abolished
even in Arabia, which the Egyptians had always regarded as
"far behind their own half-occidentalised country in civi-
1
lisation and development". Yet Egypt, which in wealth
and general standard of living was more foavoured than any
of these former dominions of the Ottoman Empire was still
"shackled by these anachronistic survivals of the Islamic 
2
middle ages".
The existence of this obsolete system was also
resented In Egypt because it had often been the excuse for
foreign intervention, particularly by Britain, A speci?,l
3European Department under European chiefs in the Egyptian 
Ministry of the Interior handled natters where foreign 
personal interests were involved. This Department sometimes 
directly contacted the provincial governors and conveyed to 
then the instructions of the High Commissioner with regard 
to the security of foreign lives.^ TheFinancial and 
Judicial Advisers were retained in Egypt in 1922 to safe­
guard Britain's financial, and judicial responsibilities as
1. Cnd. 1151, Egypt No. 1 (1921), p. 13.
2* Daily Telegraphy 26 February 1936.
3. See below, pp. 286-87.
4. Shaflg Ghurbal: Ta'rikh al-Mufawadat al-Misriyya al-
Baritaniyya „ Vol.“T , p . 15Zf. "
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provided for in the Capitulations, With the Director of 
the European Department, they enjoyed vast powers which 
they often used to interfere in the internal administration 
of the countryc
Among Lord Lloyd's reasons for preventing Zaghlul 
iron becoming Prime Minister in 1926 was that his return to 
power would endanger foreign life and property. ' Britain 
prevented the Assemblies Bill from becoming lav; in 1928 on 
the grounds that ±z would be likely to endanger the mainten­
ance of order and the protection of foreign life and property 
in Egypt. After the violent clashes between Sidqi's govern­
ment and the opposition parties, the High Commissioner sent 
on 17 July 1930 similar notes to Sidqi and Fahhas which held
them responsible for the security of foreign life and 
2property,
Italy protested vigorously when Egypt decided to 
apply economic sanctions because of Italian aggression in 
Abyssinia. The Italian government argued that Egypt had 
no right to do this because of the existence of the Capi­
tulations. The Egyptian government appointed a committee, 
consisting of uhe Ministers of Finance, Justice and Commerce,
1. Lord Lloyd: Egypt since Cromer, Vol. 2, pp. 160-61.
2. Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi i: Fi A qab al-Thawra al-
Misriyya, Vol. 2, pp. 122-23.
and the Judicial Adviser* £ir Arthur Booth* tc see how far
sanctions could he applied in view of the obstacles found
in the Capitulations.^ It concluded that they would not
put any obstacle in the way. ’’The terns of the original
treaties handed down fron the Turkish Sultans clearly
reserves the Egyptian Government1s right to control imports
2and exports on grounds of public policy”.
The abolition of the Capitulations had not been 
openly demanded in the original programme of the Wafd in 
1918. On the contrary, Zaghlul and other leaders of the 
Wafd had frequently shown their willingness to respect them. 
On behalf of the Wafd, Zaghlul declared on 10 January 1919 
that it would be in the interests of Egypt to encourage
-*-• ^ November 1935-
2. Ibid., 11 November 1935- 
c *~
3- il“ Aqqad tried to justify this policy by claiming that 
it would have been unwise for the Wafd to ask for the 
removal of the Capitulations at a tine when it was de- 
nan^ingybhe abolition of the Protectorate. This, in 
al- Aqqad's view, would unite the Europeans with the 
British, and would give the latter support for their 
allegation that the Egyptian nationalist movement was 
against European civilisation.
Egypt decided to depend 011 America and the European 
powers to support her in the Peace Conference in her 
dispute with Britain. It was felt that they would not 
sympathise with the nationalists if they demanded the 
abolition of the Capitulations. Thus the Wafd decided 
to concentrate, for the tine being, on the abolition of 
the Protectorate. If it succeeded, al- Aqqad continued, 
it would then seek to modify thg Capitulations, as other 
countries did, by bargaining. Abbas Mahmud al-cAqqad: 
Sa a Zaghlul, pp. 265-66.
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foreigners to stay “by maintaining and securing the Capi­
tulations .
In the 1930's, however, the f'afd emphasized the
unpopularity of the Capitulations and often exaggerated
their harnfulness to Egypt by claiming that they were the
chief obstacle tc her economic development. Though Egypt
had a good legal case to follow the Turkish precedent and
1abolish the Capitulations by unilateral action, the v/afd 
claimed that they eould only bo removed with the support 
of Great Britain. In all the previous abortive treaty 
negotiations, the British government had declared that they 
were no longer in harmony with the development of Egypt.
It undertook to use all its influence to modify them and 
make them conform more closely with the spirit of the times. 
But to Britain, the Wafdist press claimed, the question of 
the Capitulations was closely associated with the whole 
trcaty issue. The British government had always been 
reluctant to help Egypt to end or modify the Capitulatory 
regime before securing and guaranteeing its own interests 
in Egypt. It would not lose this unique and valuable 
bargaining weapon before regularizing its position in 
Egypt. Consequently, it was felt, the only way for Egypt 
to rid. herself of this humiliating system was by concluding
1. See below, pp. 266-67.
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i
an agreement with Great Britain,
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—  c  —  —
Dr. Hafiz Afifi and the Anglo-Egyptian relations :
Since the Declaration of Independence, relations 
between Egypt and Britain had continuously deteriorated. 
Few Englishmen had a personal knowledge of Egyptians.
There was a general disinclination in England to respect 
Egyptian feelings. This attitude, however, was gradually 
changing in the 1930’s, when an increasing number of 
British people had begun to understand Egypt and realize 
the importance of a friendly and satisfactory solution of 
the Egyptian question. This understanding in Britain of 
Egyptian grievances and aspirations, and the narked 
improvement of the Anglo-Egyptian relations was partly 
due bo the activities of a number of Egyptians. Chief 
among those was Dr. °Afifi.
Dr. cAfifiv a distinguished surgeon, entered the 
Egyptian political field in 1918 when Zaghlul chose hin
ancL Hahhas as representatives of the Nationalist Party.
c ~ 7* c —But Afifi soon gave up extremism, and supported Adli
after his conflict with Zaghlul in 1921. In January 1922 
c ~ —
Afifi decided to give up politics and concentrate on his 
profession. But he soon returned to the political field 
and joined the Liberal Constitutional Party. Though this 
Party decided in 1930 to oppose Sidqi’s government, cAfIfi 
cooperated witli it and became its Foreign Minister. 
Following this conflict CAfifi resigned from the party
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and be cane an independent. Pie was familiar with the
Egyptian question. He had boon the Foreign Minister in
Mahmud's ministry 1928-29> and was a member of the Egyptian
delegation in the Sidqi-Simon conversations in 1932.
There were also a few British people who helped
to improve Anglo-Egyptian relations. Most important of
those were J.A. Spender, a member of the Milner Mission,
and Gerald Delany, Reuter’s correspondent in Cairo for
about thirty years. In his continuous writings in the
British press, Spender advocated the necessity of a treaty
based on Milner's suggestions. Delany was trusted in
Egypt. Hi;: writings and contacts with the British politi-
1cians helped to explain the Egyptian point of view.
During the four years, 1930-34-, which cAfifi
2had spent in Engiand as Egyptian Minister, he showed an 
understanding of England and the English people, v/hen he 
returned to Egypt after his period of duty, he wrote a 
book entitled 11 - Intj i 1 i z fi B.i .1 ad 1.hin . He made frequent 
contacts with commercial and Economic circles in Britain,
1. Eor more information on the role of Spender and Delany 
in improving the Anglo-Egyptian relations see: Delany,
G.C.: Spender and Egypt, and Delany, G.C.: Lord Lloyd
of Dolobran.
0, —  _
2. -lien Afij.fi was chosen as the Egyptian Minister in
London., _ 'Abd al-Eattah Yahya became the Foreign Minister 
in SidqI's Cabinet in July 1930-
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1
and had an extensive knowledge of -mglo-Egyptran trade*
All uhis qualified hin to be the head of the econoraic
mission which visited Britain in April 1955* He rendered
invaluable service as an intermediary between the Egyptian
parties v and was one of those who persuaded the Egyptian
2
leaders to form the Unite! Front. In recognition of this,
his experience as Minister in London, and his reliable
knowledge of the Egyptian question, cAfifr was chosen as
a member of the Egyptian delegation in the 1956 negotiations*
'Through his political, economic and social 
c — —
activities, Dr. Afifi contacted a number of distinguished 
persons. His knowledge and social gifts won him the 
highest respect of politicians, businessmen, and all who 
came in contact with him. He was considered by the Besi- 
dency and the Foreign Office as the most reasonable an! 
balanced member of the Egyptian delegation, and his views 
wo: e given every consideration.^ His appointment, after 
the ratification of the 1956 rreaty, as the first Egypt ia3i 
ambassador in Great Britain was welcomed, by the British 
press. The Manchester Guardian introduced him by saying,
1. Financial Hews, A April 1955•
2. F,0. 571/20096, Ho. J 18/2/16, Personal Message from 
Cecil Campbell to Sir Vansittart, 18 December 1955*
5. F.O. 571/20109? Ho. 488, Lampson to Eden, 28 May 1936.
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Tlie title will be new, but the nan will be welcome
and familiar..... Dr. Afifi Pasha's social and diplomatic
gifts have previously made a strong impression in London
and he understands Britain and the British people as few
1
foreigners do".
C — “  T-lDr, afifi trie 1 to convince the British that the
Egyptian nationalist movement was not, as had been generally
believed in England, anarchic. He showed, that the Egyptians
had a genuine cause of grievance. He claimed that they
were not anti-British and they desired the friendship of
Britain, provided that she would respect their aspirations.
He had, in fact, devoted several years' hard work, both
during and after his period as Minister in London, to
fostering a spirit of friendship and understanding between
the two countries. Ho doubt his :,incessant labours, on
the economic side as well as politically, did a great; deal
2to prepare the way for the conclusion of this Treaty"„ 
Cooperation between the Egyptian political 
parties was a primary condition for the success of the 
1936 negotiations, To secure this, the Wafd agreed to 
leave fifty-eight seats for the minority parties in the
Man ch e ster Guardi an, 18 December 1936.
2. Hewman, P., "Egypt and the Treaty", The Contemporary 
^vi_ew, 150, 1936, 412-13.
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C — —
general elections, v7ith some of his colleagues, Afifi
tried, without success, to effect an agreement with regard
to the distribution of those seats, 
c — —
Afifi's desire for a settlement of the Egyptian 
question was clear during the actual course of the 1936 
negotiations, V.hile he believed that the Egyptians should 
make some military concessions for the sake of a friendly 
Britain, he sought to persuade the British to be reasonable 
in their demands *
1. Timesv 51 January 1956.
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CHAPTER T'T0
FACTORS FEAT LED 10 TES 1956 KEGQTIATIONS (2)
THE ABYSSINIAN CRISIS
Britain ana the Abyssinian crisis:
The British assessment of the Italian danger in 
the raid-1930 1 s passed through various stages. To give a 
complete picture, it may be better to deal with the 
situation up to the end of 1937, though this goes well 
beyond the conclusion of the 1936 treaty.
Being particularly vulnerable from hoth the 
naval and the economic point of view, Italy constantly 
adapted her foreign policy to changing* circumstances. 
Nevertheless, before the Abyssinian crisis, "the only 
matter in which Italian policy had shown any consistency 
was with regard to the United Kingdom with whom she had 
steadily maintained friendly relations over a large number 
of years1'.'1’ Britain's control of both exits of the Medi­
terranean, at Suez and Gibraltar, put Italian sea-borne 
trade with countries cutside the Mediterranean at her 
mercy. The British assumed in 1933 that Italy was one 
of the great powers with whom there were no present or
1. Cab. 4-/29, C.I.D. Fo. 1305-B, Reviev.1 of Imperial 
' Defence (1937) by C.O.S., 22 February 1937-
prospective difficulties likely to create serious tension.
Consequently, as was the case with France and U.S.A., no
expenditure v:as to be incurred on measures to provide
against attack by her. The first rearmament programme,
which was drawn up at the end of 1935? was directed to
the defence of the British possessions and interests in
the Far East, European commitments, and the defence of
1India against possible Soviet aggression. When suggesting
in Ray 1S3A that drastic action should be taken by Britain
to seize the Suez Canal in the event of a threat of war,
the Chiefs of Staff felt that Mussolini was not likely to 
P
impede thnru Italy was considered friendly as late as 
8 August 1935 when who Cabinet gave the I).B.C. its terms 
of reference to re-examine the question of the defence 
requirements.
British interests in the Mediterranean-Reu Sea-  ^
MdJLdle East area ?/ere extremely vulnerable. British
1. Cab. A/22, C.I.D. ho. 1113-B, Annual Review (1933) of 
Defence by C.O.S., 12 October 1933*
2. Feeling that Japan might attempt to block the Suez 
Canal in time of strained relations with Britain or 
even in time of peace, the C.I.D. agreed to this 
recommendation and instructed the Chiefs of Staff to 
consider the necessary measures. It was, however, 
left to the government of the da3?‘ to declare a state
of emergency in the Canal gone if the situation required 
this. ^
Gab. 2/6, Minute 3 on the Defence of the Suez Canal, 
267th Meeting of the C.I.D., 18 December 1934-.
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defensive arrangements in the Mediterranean were in many 
respects obsolete, and had not nbeen adjusted to the 
development of the French and Italian navies, and the 
increasing range and strength of the French and Italian
■j
military aircraft1 „ Ihc British military position in 
Ibgypt was unsatisfactory, particularly as regards the 
defence against air attack and the protection of Alexandra; 
Ihero v/ere no fighter aircraft, ground anti-aircraft 
defences, or searchlights, and in wartime no such rein­
forcements could arrive in less than six weeks. Cairo, 
Alexandria, and the Cuez Canal were all within range of 
Italian aerodromes in Libya. Neither Gibraltar nor Malta 
had sufficient dockang and repair facilities for damaged 
ships, and the latter was so inadequately defended that 
it would have to be evacuated in case of war with Italy.* 
Moreover, Britain’s Mediterranean and Middle Fast army and 
ai-r garrisons were restricted to the minimum necessary for 
internal security. All these factors of weakness had 
existed for years, but were considered of secondary 
importance so long as Italy showed no sign of aggression
1. Cab. h/22, C.I.D. No. 111J-B, Annual Review (1933)
of Defence by C.O.3., 12 October 1933*
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1
or hostility tov/ards Great Britain. It was in fact ^
mainly because of friendship with Italy that Britain
maintained a predominant position in the Mediterranean
Pbefore the summer of 1955-
The Abyssinian crisis showed the British govern­
ment that if was too optimistic in assuming Italy to be a 
friendly power. Hefusing any compromise solution and 
dissatisfied with anything less than the complete control 
of Abyssinia, Mussolini was gradually and constantly 
building up his forcos in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, 
while formidable Italian forces were concentrated in 
Libya. Though British interests in Abyssinia v/ere quite 
secondary,^  Britain, owing to her obligations under the 
Covenant and as tho one great naval power remaining in the 
League, was bound to play a leading part in stopping 
Italian aggression. This inevitably led to a serious 
setback in Anglo-Italian relations. While the Italians 
had taken several defensive measures in the Sicilian ports
1. Cab. 4-/25 ■> C .0. S . 506, Enclocure 2 to C.I.D. No . 
1261-B, Deport by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee 
on the Eastern Mediterranean, Understanding with 
Turkey and Greece, 21 July 1950.
2. r,ther factors were friendship with Prance and the 
weakness of Spain.
3. This was shown in the Maffey Deport. See Cab. 24-/256 
C.F. 161(35)v British Interests in Ethiopia: Report 
by an Inter-Departmental Committee, 16 August 1935-
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and despatched surface and submarine craft to the Red Sea, 
they "began to cherish ideas of dominating the Mediterr­
anean and establishing a predominant position in the hear
1 —East to the detriment of British interests". Italian
2propaganda was most active in Egypt, Palestine and Malta, 
and in the latter it became necessary to enact an 
ordinance against seditious propaganda.
The British government suspected that Mussolini 
might attempt a ’mad dog' aou particularly after the 
imposition of sanctions in October 1935- Sir Eric 
Drummond, the British ambassador in Italy, warned In early 
September ’.933 that "In their present mood, both Signor 
Mussolini and the lualian people arc capable of committing 
suicide if this seems the only alternative to climbing 
down. Rome today is full of rumours of an impending 
declaration of war on Great Britain". The Chiefs of 
Etivff had repeatedly pointed out that if sanctions proved 
in any way effective, they were "liab3e to result in war" ^
1. Cab* 4/25* C.I.D. ho. 1305-B, Review of Imperial 
Defence (197'7) by C.O.S., 22 February 1937*
2, See below, p p 132-34*
3* Earl of Avon, Eden Memoirs, Pacing the Dictators,
p. 262. “ *    *
4. Cab. 4/22, C.I.D, ho. 1192-B, Memorandum by the Secre­
tary of the C.I.D. on the Machinery of Sanctions,
11 October 1935-
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To meet the contingency of vnr with Italy, the Cabinet 
agreed to despatch coneIdarable naval, military, and air 
reinforcements to the Mediterranean, While a large part 
of the Home Fleet arrived at Gibraltar on 11 September 
1935v "frhe Mediterranean Float was reinforced and left 
Malta for Alexandria late in August 1935* Naval base 
defences and additional 6-inch and 4-inch guns and search­
lights were sent to Alexandria. Defences were- also 
installed In Port Cudan and Haifa. The Commander-in- 
Chief (Mediterranean) was instructed to malce certain 
precc.utionary naval preparations to enable the Suez Canal
Defence plan to be put in operation in the event of hosti- 
1
lities. In Egypt the establishments of the Royal Air 
Force were reinforced. With the approval of the Egyptian 
government, the British garrison in Egypt, which numbered 
about 10,000 men in normal times, was reinforced by about 
10, >00 men, and further strengthened by tanks and mechan­
ized units. To face a possible Italian attack on Egypt 
from Libya, British and Egyptian troops were sent to the 
“'estern Desort where advanced aerodromes were also
1. Cab. 4/24, C.P. 176(35), Enclosure to C.I.D. No.
1193-B, Summary of Precautionary Measures Taken since 
the Cabinet Meeting of 22 August 1935 by P.A. Hankey, 
Secretary of the Cabinet, 20 September 1935-
./
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1
established. Moreover, the British government agreed toc
the adoption of sanctions only after specific guarantees 
of military cooperation between the League members, 
especially Franco, Yugoslavia and Greece, if Italy attacked 
any of thorn.
Tension between the two countries continued In 
1936 particularly after Britain’s decision on 26 February 
1936 to impose oil sanctions if other members of the 
League did likewiss, and her unsuccessful attempts to 
persuade France to agree to this. In spite of the weak 
naval position In Homo Haters, the C.I.D. refused on 3 
April 1936 to withdraw somo naval forces from the Mediter­
ranean because it considered the situation vis-a-vis
2
Italy still uncertain. The Cabinet instructed the Joint
Planning Sub-Committee of the C.I.D. on 23 June 1936 to
proceed in examining the Fo?'>eign Office suggestion for an
Fas bern Mediterranean understanding with Turkey and 
3Greece "on the assumption that an understanding with Italy
1. P.O. 371/20131? Ho. 54-5 (4-35/4-/36)? Lamps on to Eden,
13 May 1956.
1
2. Cab. 2/6 , Minute 2 on the Strategical Situation In the 
Mediterranean, 276th Meeting of the C.I.D., 3 April 
1936.
3< This proposal is discussed in Cab. 4-/25? Enclosure 1 to 
C.I.D. No. 1261-B, Memorandum by the Foreign Secretary 
on Problems Facing His Majesty's Government as a Pcsult 
of the Italo-Lcague Dispute, 10 Juno 136.
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w as no t a chi eve dM."
Paced by dangers from Nasi Germany in the West 
and aggressive Japan in the hast, it was strategically 
most important for the British government to secure its 
sea communications through the Mediterranean. This could 
be achieved either by maintaining friendship with Italy or 
by the establishment of such military strength as would 
permanently deter Italy from embarking on war against 
Great Britain. If the military basis were to be adopted, 
far-reaching development would be necessary: major
increases in Britain’s naval strength and her Mediterranean 
and Middle East army and air garrisons, the strengthening 
of the defences of the existing bases, the construction of 
an additional naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean, and 
the development of overland communications from the south 
and East to the Eastern Mediterranean. While the develop­
ment of these measures would take several years, Britain 
could not afford them at a time when she was already 
rearming on a very large scale to meet other more urgent 
and important liabilities* The I).E.G. emphasized this 
fact by reporting in 'November 1955v "Our* defence require-
1. Cab. 4/25, C.O.S. 506, Enclosure 2 to C.I.D. No. 
1261-B, Bcport by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee 
011 the Eastern Mediterranean, Understanding with 
Turkey and Greece, 21 July 1936.
74
meats arc go serious that it would be materially impro­
bable, within the period with which this report deals,
[i.e. three years] to make additional provisions for the
1case of a hostile Italy1' . ihe Chiefs of Staff asserted
in their Annual Review for 1935 that Britain could not
fight by her own mean:, a s uccecsful war against Japan and
Germany simultaneously and might have to depend onallies
2for assistance« The embarrassments and dangers to which 
she weald bo exposed in the event of war with either of 
them "would be multiplied by the possibility of a hostile 
Italy". 'Anils strained relations with Italy during the 
Abyssinian crisis had produced reactions on BritainTs 
security for which she was totally unprepared, it left 
her exposed both in the West and the Bar East, as a large 
proportion of her very limited forces wore concentrated 
in the Mediterranean. Consequently tho British government 
corvsidered it vital to make every diplomatic effort to 
restore the close relations it; had deliberately cultivated
1. Cab. 4/24, D.R.C. 37, Enclosure Nc, 2 to C.I.D. No.
1215-B, Report by the D.R.C. on the Programmes of the
Defence Services, 21 November 1935* Ihe same .Report 
may also be found in Cab. 24/259.
2. Cab. 4/23, C.I.D. No. 1181-B, Annual Review (1935)
of Defence by C.C.S. 29 April 1935.
3* Cab. 4/26, C.I.D. No. 1347, Report by C.O.S. on Anglo*
Italian Relations, August 1937-
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with. Italy before the autumn, of 1955* Even in the midst 
of the Abyssinian crisis, the Cabinet excluded Italy from 
the list of possible enemies.
The collapse of Abyssinia and the withdrawal of 
sanctions on 1 5 'July 1936 created a more favourable atmos­
phere for the British government to reduce tension in the 
Mediterranean and to try to restore the previous cordial 
Anglo-Italian relations. In late July 1936 it withdrew 
some cf its reinforcements sent to Egypt in the- autumn 
of 1935. Some were transferred to Palestine where the 
situation was deteriorating continuously, and the British
government ended all the precautionary measures it had
1taken at that time in the Mediterranean. The Roreign 
Secretary declared in the House of Commons at the end of 
July 1936 that Britain non considered the period of 
Mediterranean tension at an end.
Now that Britain no longer intended to rob 
Mussolini of the victory he had won in Abyssinia, military 
circles in Britain asserted that he needed better relations 
with the United Kingdom„ Peeling that the Abyssinian war 
had rendered Italy in some respects more vulnerable than 
before, the Chiefs of Staff reported, in their .Review to
1. Cab. 2/6^, Minute A on Probability of War with Italy, 
295th Meeting of the C.I.B., 1 July 1937-
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the Imperial Conference ox 1937s
1 By establishing an "Empire1 on the f or side 
of the Suez Canal, Italy has given a hostage 
to fortune and this increases her nervousness 
as regards future British policy in the Mediter­
ranean and Bed Sea. The development of this 
new Brrpiro will take time and cost a great 
deal of raoney, and meanwhile her economic 
and financial situation has been severely 
shaken by the war and chows promise of con­
tinued deterioration. This again has tempor­
arily increased her vulnerability".
In these circumstances they felt that Mussolini realized
the danger of being on bad terms with Britain who had the
power to threaten his lines of communications to Abyssinia*
It was probably mainly on this account that ho had shown
an incrcasing desire for a settlement with London after
the Abyssinian war. Moreover, Italy might have been
impressed by Brirain's determination to rearm, and probably
also disliked being, "so to speak, left alone with Germany,
p
with no alternative friendship to fall back on".
Since July 1936 attempts to obtain an Anglo- 
Italian understanding had begun. A serious effort, 
however, to outer into confident friendship began In 
November when British public opinion had cooled down and 
a better atmosphere prevailed. Mussolini's offer of
No.
1. Cab. 4/25, C .1.D./1305-B, Review of Imperial Defence 
(1937) by C .0.S ., 22 February 1937*
2. Ibid.
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friendship made in a speech in Milan on 1 November was
welcomed by Eden's public reply on 5 November in which
he declared that? Britain had no intention to threaten or
attack any Italian interest in the Mediterranean. Arising
out of this interchange of ideas, negotiations started in
home in early December between Sir Eric Drummond and Count
Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister. The result was the
exchange of notes on 31 December and the Anglo-Italian
declaration of 2 January 1937- “-hilo the notes provided
for Italy's undertaking to maintain at all times the
1integrity of Spain, the Gentleman's Agreement included a
statement that "freedom of entry into, exit from and
transit through the Mediterranean is a vital interest both
to the different parts of the British Empire and to Italy,
and that these interests are in no way inconsistent with 
2
each other". This agreement did not achieve complete
1. It was essential for the maintenance of British interests 
in the Western Mediterranean, particularly the security 
of her base at Gibraltar, that Spain should be friendly, 
or, at worst, strictly neutral. Consequently the British 
government did not want the struggle following the 
Spanish Civil War to emerge in a government "inimical
to Britain, whether Fascist or Communist".
Cab. 4/24, C.I.D. No. 1259-B, Report by the C.O.S. on 
the Western Mediterranean: Situation Arising from the
Spanish Civil liar, 24 August 1956. The same Report is 
found In C-b. 24/264.
2. Cab. 4/26, C.I.D. No. 13.32-B, Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on the Probability of Far with Italy, 15 
June 1937- -*-t is also found in Cab. 24/270.
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rapprochement, partly bo cause the British government v/as 
not read3r to accept any liabilities or to grant concessions 
to Italy. It vigorously opposed Italy's demand .for an 
agreement in advance for a general international convention 
to ensure military-, naval and air limitation in the Medi­
terranean c The main Italian desideratum, the recognition 
of her de.jure sovereignty over Abyssinia, v/as not accepted 
at that time because it was expected to excite immense 
criticism in Pritarn, particularly among the devoted 
adherents of the League.^ The British government, however, 
hoped that the more friendly atmosphere created by this 
agreement would ''bring about a certain degree of coopera­
tion between Italy and the United Kingdom not only in the
p
Mediterranean but elsewhere".
Even though friendly 3?olationc were restored by 
the Gentleman's Agreement, the British government felt it 
unwise to count on their continuance. The Fascist regime 
had given modern Italy ambitions in the realm of foreign 
affairs, and she was expected to embark upon a policy of
1. Italy needed, such recognition for reasons of prestige 
and as a means to assist her pacification of the 
country. So long as the idea prevailed that the 
Emperor might one day be restored, the Italians would 
have difficulty in maintaining peace and order.
2# Cab. 4/25, C.I.D. Uo. 1305-B, Heview of Imperial 
Defence (1937) By C.O.S,, 22 February 1937-
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expansion in the Mediterranean, as her future as a groat
power depended upon the relative degree of sea and air
power which she could exercise there as compared with
other nations. The Chiefs of Staff reported in February
1937 •> ,,fThe days are past when we could count automatically
on a friendly and submissive Italy. From henceforth we
will have to look to a rival, though circumstances may
periodically make it necessary for her to put her rivalry
1in the background’. The Cabinet decided on 24 February 
1937 that Italy could no longer be counted on as a reliable 
friend, but in the present circumstances need not be 
regarded as a probable enemy.
Mussolini, however, did not disguise his inten­
tions for long, and early in 1937 be again started to 
challenge Britain’s special position in the Mediterranean 
and the Hear East. The Fascist Grand Council passed a 
resolution on 1 March adumbrating increased military 
expenditure, and the greatest possible measure of economic 
self-sufficiency, which was justified on the grounds that 
"only with the aid of science, courage, and a spirit 
ready for any development can peoples less richly endowed 
resist the possible aggression of countries richer in
1. Ibid.
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money and possessors of greater natural resources". On 
10 April Italy decided to institute a High Command for 
North Africa, with control over land, sea, and air forces? 
and to constitute a white metropolitan army coi'ps in Libyd, 
where first-class communications were to be developed. In 
spite of her most positive assurances that it would not 
take any action which might upset the existing balance in 
the Western Mediterranean, Italy's intervention in .Spain 
had sharply increased in early 1957* While Mussolini 
remarked at the end of April that "he would match with 
the United kingdom gun for gun, ship for ship, areoplane 
for areoplane"„ the Italian naval forces were reported to 
have been considerably increased and her air bases in the 
Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean strengthened. 
Mussolini claimed to be the protector of Islam. He 
intensified his propaganda in the Near and Middle East to 
impress local opinion with the value of Italian friendship 
and to represent Britain as treacherous and effete. 
Moreover, close reciprocal relations continued to grow 
rapidly between Home and Berlin, and the government- 
controlled Italian press showed bitter hostility towards 
the United Kingdom. Eden, the Foreign Secretary, was so
1. Cab. A/26, C.I.D. No. 1332-B, Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on the Probability of War with Italy, 15 
June 1937-
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worried by the Italian danger bloat ho asserted in the 
meeting of the C.I.D. on 1 July 1937 that "it vrould he
1only right to xolace Italy In the same category as Germany'1.
By mid June 1937* the Foreign Office held the
view that Italy was definitely hostile to Britain and that
adequate defensive preparations should he provided against
her. In a memorandum presented to the C.I.D., Eden argued
that there was definite ill-will in the whole trend of
Italia?a policy which might amp el her to declare war on
the British Empire* particularly if it were involved in
strained relations with Germany or extensive civil
2disturbances in Palestine or India. While the C.I.D.
and the Cabinet agreed that Italy should now be regarded
as a potential enemy, it was considered improbable that
she v/ould attach without Hitler’s support, hs the Prime
Minister, Heville Chamberlain, put it to the C.I.D. on
1 Jvily 1937,
"We need not be afraid of attack by Italy, 
either in the Mediterranean or elsewhere 
unless she was sure of German support. If 
Germany were contemplating hostile action or 
became engaged in hostilities against us,
2
1. Cab. 2/6 , Minute 4- on Probability of War with Italy, 
295th Meeting of the C.I.D., 1 July 1937.
2. Cab. 4/26, C.I.D. Ho. 1332-B, Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on the Proabability of War with Italy, 15 
June 1937*
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uhere was little doubt that Italy would join 
in and take the opportunity to fish in troubled 
waters".^
The British government decided that the first priority 
should be given to Britain's defensive preparations 
against Germany., and that no action should be taken to 
diverc Britain's very limited resources from this main 
objective. Because of this, Eden's suggestion of including 
Italy in the rearmament programme was not accepted, and 
it was considered inevitable to accept some risks in the 
Mediterranean. The Prime Minister supported this by 
saying,
"The ideal, no doubt, was to be prepared to 
fight Italy, Germany or Japan, either separately 
or in combination. That, however, was the 
counsel, of perfection which it was impossible 
to follow. There wore limits to our resources, 
both physical and financial, and it was vain 
to contemplate fighting single“handed the 
three powers in combination".2
Prance, Britain's only reliable ally, was too weak at 
tnat tine to give any effective support. By her own 
action, Britain did not want to provoke Italy to attack 
her in the Mediterranean, which might lead to a world­
wide war at a time when Britain's defensive resources
21. Cab. 2/6, Minute 4 on Probability of War with Italy, 
295th Meeting of the C.I.D., 1 July 1957*
2. Ibid.
were still far below thelevel required for the fulfilment 
of her defensive liabilities. The Service Departments 
needed at least another two years to complete their 
rearmament. Consequently, while some measures were to 
be taken to improve the British defences in the Mediter­
ranean, the Prime Minister emphasized at a meeting of the 
Defence Plans Sub-Committee on 23 July 1937 the importance 
of "doing nothing which could arouse Italian suspicion or 
be construed os provocative".^ On this account it was - 
decided to send net defences to Alexandria, and to provide 
the British garrison in Egypt with sufficient military 
stores to enable it to operate for two months.
In spite uf the Prime Minister’s initiative to 
improve relations with Mussolini in a letter to him on 
27 July 1937i the situation rapidly deteriorated in the 
Mediterranean in late 1937 mainly, in the view of the 
Bo'reign Office, owing to the Italian activities in Spain. 
The British local commanders wore extremely worried about 
the safety of Egypt and the Suez Canal, particularly after 
Italy's decision in October to send a. further three
” —  ~  * ~ ~ No™ " “
1. Cab. 4/26, C.O.S. 631, Annex 1 to C .I.D./I364-B,
Peport by the C.O.S. on the Situation in the Mediter­
ranean and the Middle East, 19 October 1937*
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]
divisions bo Libya# Instructed by the Chiefs of Staff,
they riot in Cairo in early October to examine detailed
plans in the event of a single-handed war with Italy.
They expressed their anxieties in a telegram to the Chiefs
of Staff on 3 6 October in which they claimed that the
international situation had deteriorated considerably
during the last few days, and suggested that immediate
measures should be taken to strengthen Britain*s armament
position vis-e-vis Italy. They particularly requested
the development of Egypt’s air defences by the despatch
from the United Kingdom of a complete anti-aircraft
brigade and the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Glorious, or the
.retention of her aircraft at Alexandria# They were
supported in this by Kelly, the acting Ambassador in
Egypt• Anxious not to weaken Britain’s position vis-a-
vis Germany, the Chiefs of Staff refused thrs arguing,
"From a purely military point of view we are 
aware of no new factor in the situation which 
leads us to consider that the military situation 
is such to justify a change in our existing 
instructions that no obtrusive measures should 
be taken In connexion with the defence of Egypt 
or the projected movement of the fleet".^
1. The local commanders also showed anxiety about the 
appointment of Par ini as the Italian Minister in 
Egypt.
No.
2. Cab# 4/26, C.O.S. 651, Annex 1 to C . I .D./1J64-B, 
Report by the C.O.S, on bhe Situation in the Mediter­
ranean and the Middle East, 19 October 1937*
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It was felt that Italy was not prepared at that time to 
embark single-handed on offensive action against Egypt 
because of her commitments in Abyssinia and Spain, her 
adverse economic position, and tho unpreparedness of her 
ground forces In Libya, The Foreign Office, however, 
persuaded the C.I.D. to agree to take some unspectacular 
measures to increase Britain's prestige in the hear and 
Middle East.1
o
L  For a good summary of these measures see Cab. 2/6 , 
Minute 6 on Situation in the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East, 500th Meeting of tho C.I.D. on 28 
October 1937*
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Legal and Politic:il Factors for a treaty:
The British government wanted to conclude a 
treaty with Egypt in 1936 for both temporary and more 
permanent reasons. The temporary aim was to secure the 
safety of its recent military precautions in the Eastern 
Mediterranean from being jeopardised by an uprising which 
would divert its forces to the suppression of internal 
disorder0 hut the permanent object was to place the 
British position an Egypt., whose stro.tegic importance was 
emphasised by the Abyssinian crisis, on a firm unchallenged 
legal basic*'*' Since 1922, it had been the policy of the 
British government to seek to settle tho Four Heserved. 
Points by a political agreement with Egypt. In spite of 
the previous unsuccessful attempts, this policy had never 
been ab and one d .
With strong popular support, successive British 
gc comments had considered the upholding of the League as 
the basis of their foreign policy. Britain opposed 
Japanese aggression on Manchuria in 1951 nnd the Italian 
conquest of Abyssinia as being against tho principles of 
the League. But she had been holding Egypt and practically
1 .  P . O . . 3 7 1 /2 0 0 9 9 *  No. J 1 2 9 7 / 2 / 1 6 ,  Minute by Campbell 
on "Some Random and Eirst-sight Comments on the 
Recent Course of Events with regard to Anglo-Sgyptian 
Relations", 5 February 1936.
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controlling her liberty fo.r more than half a century by 
means of military occupation and without a completely 
secured legal title.**" Egypt had never recognised the 
Declaration of 1922., nor had foreign governments, though 
they never questioned it. Therefore it was possible that 
some foreign power, e.g. Italy, night raise the question 
of tho British position in Egypt end tho presence of its 
troops before the Council of the League of Nations, with 
or without the connivance of Egypt. If tho Council of 
the League at the moment was Ill-disposed towards Britain, 
said the Chairman of the C.I.D. in a memorandum to the '
p
Cabinet, Man awkward situation might ariseb"
Llorcover, there was the question of Egypt's
1* According to Sir J. Hcadlan Morley, a former historical 
adviser to the Foreign Office, the Deserved Points were 
not in law a sound basis for the British government's 
claims in Egypt. His argument was that "the British 
protectorate over Egypt [had] never been legally 
established, because a protectorate could only be 
established over a self-governing civilian community 
if the latter [came] to an agreement to this effect 
with the protecting state. Egypt in 19-14 was such a 
community and never agreed to the British protectorate. 
Therefore His Majesty's Government when they purported 
in 1922 to release Egypt from the protectorate, could 
not legally reserve anything for themselves except by- 
agreement with Egypt and this they had never obtained". 
P.O. 371/20100, Ho. J 1816/G. Minute by Beckett on 
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty: H.M.G.'s Legal Rights for the
Protection of the Suez Canal, 27 February 1936.
2. Cab. 24/259> C.P. 25(36), Memorandum by the Chairman 
of the C.I.D, on the Egyptian Treaty, the Political 
Aspects, 7 February 1936.
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desire foe? membership of the Longue of fictions, which sho 
had oont;inucusly de,landed since 1926. Britain liad, 
however, resisted this claim on tho grounds that, owing 
to the Reserved Points, Egypt was not sufficiently 
independent. But it had heen increasingly difficult for 
Britain to argue this case when countries such as Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Abyssinia, 'Turkey and Iran were members of 
the League. In both the last two, as In Egypt^ a capitu­
latory regime existed. In fact Britain allowed Egypt to 
send an observer to the League of Nations during the 
Italo-Abyssinian dispute. So long as Egypt was not a 
member of the League, she could not bring Britain before
the Permanent Court of International Justice under the
1
optional clause." But once she became a member, she 
might bring the matter of the Sudan before It, and could 
also take Britain to the Council of the League. In view of
h  This is article 36(2) of the statute of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice which states that members 
of tho League might "at any time declare that they 
recognise as compulsory ipso facto, and without special 
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting 
the some obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in 
all legal disputes concerning" the interpretation of 
a treaty, any question of international law, the 
existence of any fact which, if established, would 
-onstitute a breach of international obligation, and. 
the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for 
the breach of an international obligation.
Bowett, I) .V/. ; The Law of International Institutions , 
p. 224.
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the paramou3.it importance to Britain of her imperial 
communications and the vulnerability of the Suez Canal, 
it was felt that this dangerous and weak position should 
be regularized by a treaty,' which would also relieve 
Britain from the heavy burden of being responsible for 
the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt.
Without a treaty of friendship, Britain could, 
only secure her vital interest, as experience had shown, 
by direct interference in Egyptian internal affairs, i.e. 
by creating and supporting autocratic governments.
Besides requiring a largo further addition to the British 
occupation forces, this became most difficult after the 
death of King Pud ad, which, in the view of the Foreign 
Office, had "removed not only a factor of general stability 
from the political scene in Egypt, but the chief element 
in Egyptian political life which could successfully 
baLance and restrain the extremism of the Wafd". Such 
a policy would lead to a complete destruction of the 
parliamentary system which England had fostered since the
1. Cab. 24-/259, C.p. 25(36), Memorandum by the Chairman 
of the C.I.D. on the Egyptian 'Treaty, the Political 
Aspects, 7 February 1936.
2. Cab. 21/262, C.P. 131(36), Memorandum by the Poreign 
Secretary on the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Conversations, 
8 May 1936.
1
beginning of the occupation. Moreover, it would not be 
indefinitely tolerated and supported in Britain herself. 
Since 1914 the British nation had been pledged to the 
principle that peoples who were fit for self-government 
were entitled to it. If Britain failed to conclude a 
treaty, its difficulties in Egypt would inevitably be 
increased by a tendency, of which there were marked signs 
on the part of tho Egyptians, to turn their eyes towards 
Italy,^
Tho influence of events and opinion in Egypt 
on the rest of tho Arab Hoar East was great. Egyptian 
newspapers and magazines were widely read in Syria, 
Palestine, the Arabian states, the Sudan and most regions 
where Arabic was spoken. Hostility to Egypt meant hos­
tility to the whole East. Consequently it was essential 
for Britain to securetho alliance of Egypt. In a memo- 
rouadum to the Cabinet, Eden emphasized this by saying,
"Failure to negotiate a treaty with Egypt, 
followed by disturbances in that country, 
their suppression by British force ......
would be represented throughout the Arab Hear 
East possibly as a sign of British bad faith, 
certainly as a proof of British imperialism
1. Amos, M.A.: "England and Egypt", Nineteenth Century 
and After, 105, 1929* 314.
2. Cab. 24/262, C.P. 156(56), Memorandum by the Foreign -- 
Secretary on tho Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Negotiations,
8 June 1936.
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pursued at the expense of a weaker Mohanedan 
country. It night well be that, faced with 
what they regarded as a proof of British 
hostility to Arabian aims and aspirations, 
it would bo tho signal for an outburst in 
Palestine and Syria. It could hardly fail 
to have serious repercussions in Ii'aq and 
in Saudi Arabia".
In 1936v £-s on previous occasions, Britain
night have lost the chance to regularize her position in
I'gypl had Anthony Eden become Foreign Secretary in
Lecomber 1935* Some leading Conservatives were not willing
to make concessions to Egypt;. This was clear from their
violent attack on the Nahhas-Henderson draft treaty of
# #
1930. Winston Churchill attacked the suggested movement 
of the British troops from Cairo to the Canal Zone. He 
said,
’’The departure of the British troops from 
Cairo would be a nomenbous event. If and 
when it occurs, it will resound through all 
Asia. It will be noted by history like the 
recall of the legions many centuries ago.
It will mark the point whore great organisations 
slowly built up, exercising an immense paci­
fying and unifying influence upon the world, 
have reached their culmination and have begun 
the course of decline".
Austen Chamberlain viewed the return of an Egyptian
1. Cab. 24-/262, C.P. 131(36)* Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Conversations, 
8 May 1936.
2. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Vol. 233 
Col. 2003*
battalion to the Sudan with great apprehension by saying,
"There is a contingent promise to allow an Egyptian
battalion In certain circumstances, to return into the
country [i.e. the Sudan]. I regard this as a. dangerous
1
and retrograde stop".
Unlike some of* his colleagues in the Party and
the Cabinet, Eden understood the importance for Britain
of a treaty with Egypt. In spite of the urgent European
problems which demanded his constant and immediate
attention, he devoted some of his time to considering the
Egyptian question, and was ready to make some concessions
to Egypt.. In his own words, "I was myself ready to
forgo some paper safe-guards for the sake of a helpful
2and friendly Egypt". On more than one occasion* Eden 
had difficulty in persuading his colleagues of the 
importance to Britain of a treaty with Egypt, which had 
a oriumphant Fascist neighbour. Like Lord Milner sixteen 
years previously,^ Eden realized that any treaty would
1. Ibid., Col. 1957-
2. Earl of Avon: Eden Memoirs, Pacing the Dictators,
p. 391.
3. It was said in the Milner Report that Zaghlul and his 
associates were the most powerful leaders of public 
opinion. No "scheme to which they were definitely 
hostile stood any chance of favourable consideration, 
much less of general acceptance",.
Ciad. 1131 * Egypt No. 1 (1921), p. 21.
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not be worth, the paper it was written on if it was not
negotiated by the haid. Unlike some of his predecessors,
he had confidence in the Wnf d 5 and particularly in Uahhas,
Coonoration between Nahhas and Eden continued after the• #
conclusion of tho treaty especially during tho Second 
dorId War, Eden wrote in his nenoirs, "Even in the 
darkotst hour of our Joint fortunes9 Hahas and I exchanged 
messages of confidence which brought against ne foolish 
and irtch apple uded charges of complacency in Parliament".
1. Earl of Avon: Eden Memoirs, Pacing the Dictators
pp. 3S3-94.
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Sir Miles Lamp son and Any la- Eyre 11 an relations :
It was fortunate for the Anglo-Egyptian question 
that Sir Miles Lanpson took up in January 1934- the office 
of High Connies rone re in succession to Sir Percy Lorane. 
Lanpson played a major role in the resumption of nego­
tiations and the solution of the whole Anglo-Egyptran 
dispute. This nay be demonstrated by comparing him with 
Allenby and Lord Lloyd, the two High Commissioners who 
were in office when five out of tho six previous nogo~ 
t i at i o n s f ailed.
When ho was appointed as Special High Ccmnis- 
siorer to Egypt in 1919, Allenby had no previous diplo­
matic experience, and his knowledge of the East and Egypt 
had been obtained only as 0omnander■-in-Chiei of the Expedi- 
tionary Force in Egypt and Syria.~ Lanpson arrived in 
Egypt with much experience in administration and diplomacy
p
accrued from his long service in the Foreign Office.
When he was British Minister in China, he managed to
1. Chirol, V.: The Egyptian Problem, p. 219*
2. Lampson entered the service of the Foreign Office in 
1903* He became tho Secretary to Grater Mission in 
Japan in 1906. Between 1908 and 1910, he was the 
Second Secretary in Tokyo. In 1911? he was the Second 
Secretary in Sofia. He became the First Secretary in 
Peking in 1916. In 1920, he was tho Acting British 
High Commissioner in Siberia. In the period 1926- 
1933* Ee vo.3 the British Minister in China.
Hho f s J7ho, 1965-, p. 1693*
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roDovo the serious obs bades which British influence was
1facing in the Bar East. The complete reversal of China’s
hostile attitude towards Britain was partly duo to his
efficiency- Erom his long service in the Ear East, he
understood the East and its people- Ho was "a charmor,
2a conversationalist, a good diplomat for the East”.
Lord Lloyd had arrived in Egypt in 21 October 
1925 with a strong belief that Britain should not show 
any eagerness to open negotiations with Egypt, Ee felt 
that any such attempt would be impolitic and unsoless. 
lie opposed MacDonald ’ s invitation to Zaghlul to resume 
negotiations as being a hasty, unfortunate, and unnecessary 
sbep. Hq was against the Tharwat-Chamberlain negotiations. 
Lampson, on the other hand, believed that the Anglo- 
Hgvntian dispute could only be solved by friendly nego­
tiations , and had, in fact, persuaded and pressed the 
Eo-reigr Office to do this. In early January 1936, before 
the British government had finally decided to respond to 
the demand of the United Eront, Peterson, an official at 
the Eoreign Office, realized, "We appear to be committed 
to a renewal of the attempt to achieve an Anglo-Egj^ptian
3-* The Observer, 7 April 1936.
2. Viscount Montgomery: Alamcin and the Desert War,
p. 188. ~
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settlement. In actual fact the Cairo telegrams have for
1
some tine past road as though negotiations had beg;unM .
With a strong belief that Britain should not lose the
chance to legalize her position, Lanpson telegraphed Eden
on 13 Hay 1936 at a tine when the treaty issue was facing
serious difficulties in the British Cabinet,
21 Broadly we all feel that a special opportunity 
is offered which should be grasped in a bold 
rand constructive spirit. Whereas in previous 
negotiations, tho Egyptian side were thinking 
only in Germs of nationalism and were willing 
to accept alliance as the price insisted on 
by us, they now themselves sincerely (at least 
bo we believe) desire alliance, and at present, 
at any rate, really seem to intend to work it 
whole-heartedly, provided always it is an 
alliance and not a camouflage; perpetuating 
existing regime, os we see it, a loss of 
present opportunity would not be regrettable 
so much on account of consequent disorders,
• • but rather on account of loss
perhaps for years of this new elemept of 
goodwill and anxiety for alliance“.^
dllenby haul the support of the moderates in
Eg^pt in 1922 for his insistence on the Declaration of
Independence. But he became unpopular after his famous
ultimatum to Zaghlul in 1924. Lord Lloyd was extremely
1. P.O. 371/20096, Dote by Peterson to Vansittart, 6 
January 1936.
2. ajy "we" 5 Lanpson meant beside himself, the three 
service advisers, the three civilian advisers, his 
counsellor, and the Oriental Secretary,
3. P.O. 371/20107? lei. ITo. 418, Lanpson to Eden, 13 
May 1936.
unpopular in Egypt. He had favoured annexation instead
of a protectorate in 1914, and considered that Alleny
had "sold the pass” and created a situation of legal
chaos in Egypt by his Declaration in 1922. He cane to
Egypt with the determination to cede nothing xaore to the
Egyptians# Ho said to Sir Roderick Jones, chairman of
Reuters, ”1 am determined to show these people who is 
2master”.
Both Allenby and Lord Lloyd mistrusted the Wafd.
They thought that it was not beyond its leaders to
attempt a military coup similar to that of cUrabi. While
Allenby hated Zaghlul and used to refer to him as "that
3wicked old nan”, Lord Lloyd had no confidence in Nahhas 
whom, he regarded as an extremist standing for a policy of 
uncompromising hostility to Britain and the British 
connextion.^ With his strong belief that the Residency 
should be kept aloof from the usual and frequent intrigues 
in Egypt, Lampson had good relations with most Egyptian 
politicians. In a telegram to Eden, he said, ”1 remain 
convinced .......... to doal with Egypt as a whole on
1. Delany G.C.: Lord Loyd of Dolobran, p. 1*
2. Ibid., p. 1.
3# Viscount Wavoll: Alleny i.n Egypt, p. 17.
4. Lord Ei0ycL: Egypt since Cromer, Vol. 2, p# 169#
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general lines dictated by our fundamental interests and
1I’easonable moderation” . He was r>articularly anxious that 
the question of the treaty should not he dragged into tho 
arena of internal politics for which, in his view, there
p
was absolutely no justification. Unlike Allenby and 
Lord Lloyd, Lampson had confidence in the Wafd and its 
leaders, particularly Nuhhas. The cooperation between 
Hahhas and Lanpson and the confidence which they had in 
each ether was a vital factor for the success of the 1936 
negotiations. It was partly because of Lampson that, 
in contrast to tho attitude so often adopted in British 
quarters in the previous decade, the Wafd's good faith 
and goodwill were accepted in 1936 in Britain as beyond 
doubt.^
Lampson understood the realities of the situation 
in Egypt where the tide of nationalism had swept in so 
stccongly. He showed considerable understanding of and 
sympathy towards Egyptian aspirations. He believed that 
their amour-propre ’would be satisfied by some concessions. 
While Lord Lloyd opposed the Constitution of 1923 as being
1. E.O. 371/20097v . 59, Lampson to Eden, 21 January 
1936.
2. E.O. 371/20097, Eo. 84, Lampson to Eden, 27 January 
1936.
3. Manc-he st er Guardian ^ 23 July 1936.
"utterly unsuited to the nature ox tne people", Sir Miles
persuaded the British government to restore it in 1935*
Both Allenby and lord Lloyd lacked the confidence
of the Foreign Office. The British government imposed
Neville Henderson on Allenby as political adviser. Sir
William Tyrell, the permanent under-secretary at the
Foi'eign Office, visited Egypt in early 1927 to investigate
matters for himself. He charged Gerald Delany, head of
Reutei’s agency in Egypt,
"to go to AGly, the Prime Minister, and to 
Zaghlul, the Wafd leader, and on his authority 
to tell them that the Foreign Office had no 
intention whatever of going hack on British 
policy as embodied in the 1922 Declaration, 
and that if Lord Lloyd for any reason found 
himself unable£to carry out that policy, he 
would resign".
In fact botn Allenby and Lord Lloyd resigned because they 
had no support from the Foreign Office.
Lampoon had the full confidence and support of 
tne Foreign Office, particularly of Eden, the Foreign 
Secretary. For example, though some officials at the 
Foreign Office opposed the inclusion of Ahmad Mahir in 
the Egyptian delegation, Eden overruled them and agreed
1. Lord Lloyd: Egypt since Cromer, Vol. 2, p. Id-2.
2. Delany, G.C.: Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, p. 5*
3- See below, pp.. 151-53*
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with lanpson to allow thin. It was because of Lamp son's 
prestige and influence with his own government that he 
was able to persuade it to make some concessions to Egypt
i
during his visit to London in June 1936.
As the leader of the British delegation in the
1936 negotiations , Lanpson ” showed much skill in keeping
p
the wheels of negotiation oiled and always moving”.
The conclusion of the treaty was partly due to the opti­
mism, skill and pa Lienee which he displayed through the 
negotiations, Eden praised him in his speech in the House 
of Commons on 22 Wovenber 1936 by saying, we do
owe a very special debt of gratitude to his untiring
labours. We could have had no more patient, no more 
persistent, no more trusted negotiator”.
Lampson improved economic and commercial 
relations between Britain and Egypt. Eor the previous 
f if cy years both countries had tended to treat their 
relations as purely political problems, ITo serious 
attempt had been made to assess the great benefits which 
had accrued to both through their economic ties. Lanpson 
made a genuine attempt to strengthen commercial relations
1. See below, p. 187*
2. Earl of Avon: Eden Memoirs, Facing the Dictators,
P . 391. " ‘
3. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1936-37-* Vol. 318, 
Col. 252;
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between the two countries and to explain to the two
peoples the material ties between Egypt and Britain.^
On his initiative, the British government invited ohe
Egyptian government to send an economic mission to England
to explore tho possibilities of strengthening trade
relations between the two countries. This mission arrived
in Britain on 4- April 1935* It was headed by Hafiz, 
c — —
Afifi and included leading financial experts such as 
Talcat Harb Pasha.
4 v
The mission created an atmosphere of cordiality
betweeia the two countries. After its return to Egypt, 
c ~Dr. Afifi and Lieutenant-Colonel J. Colville, from the
British Department of Overseas Trade, exchanged friendly 
2letters. In its report the mission realized that Britain 
was Egypt’s best customer, and suggested the necessity of 
improving relations between the two countries. It advocated 
th formation of an Anglo-Egyptian standing committee to 
meet annually and study questions of interest to both 
sxdes. ^
Signs of improvement in the commercial relations
1. The Observer, 7 April 1935*
2. The texts of these- letters are in Cnd. 4-896, Egypt 
Ho. 1 (1935)*
3* Times, 9 July 1935*
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between the two countries ijaneci.i0.tel7 appeared. In July 
1935, the Egyptian gc-vernnont reduced the customs dues 
on British goods, especially textiles. This new commercial 
friendship, no doubt, helped to clear up the political 
situation and to improve the general relations between 
the two countries.
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Egypt and the Abyssiniant crl s is :
Though signs of the Aascis u imperialist aims had 
bcgun to appear in the nid-1930 1 s, halihao .and his colleagues 
clc not appear tc have- been convinced of a real and inrae- 
dinte Italian clangor to Egypt. They suggested that the 
1930 military clauses should be accepted In principle in 
19.36* arguing that there was 110 justification for any major 
departure fror then. Sidqi was reported to have openly 
told the British Consul in Alexandria* C.E* Heathcote-Smith, 
on IS January 1936 that in ,!his view Great Britain had 
mistakenly exaggerated the supposed Italian menace, which 
she had taken too seriously. Mussolini, with his forces 
exposed in Eritrea, could never have intended to attack
p
Great Britain, and nothing of this nature would occur'1. 
Though the G.O.C. tried in an informal meeting with 
Bahhas before the beginning of the conversations to explain 
to him the realities of the military situation, he 
remained adamant. A memorandum handed by I'Tahhas to 
Lampoon on 16 March 1936 stated that no power would dare 
to attack Egypt since by doing this it would be attacking 
Great Britain and her allies, and consequently would be
1. B.C. 371/20097? t!o. 80 (1/29/36), Despatch from the 
Consul-General at Alexandria 011 a Conversation with 
Sidql and Abud, 21 January 1936.
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exposed to the nest severe reprisals. Hence, although 
Italy had a vast predominance of forces in Libya, it would 
never attempt or plan this. International agreements and 
world public opinion would prevent any power from doing 
this. Moreover, the financial and social interests of 
most of the powers in Egypt would deter them from attack­
ing her. The memorandum described any external aggression 
on Egypt as "distant and hypothetical" and cited the case 
of Belgium "as .analogous to that of E g y p t T h e  British 
service advisers spent long hours at the early stages of 
the negotiations trying to convince Nahhas of the "folly"
of bis arguments, but "their appeal to facts ...... had
2
fallen on deaf ears**.
The Foreign Office felt that the Egyptian
delegates were not qualified to grasp the basis of the
British proposals nor to look at the situation in a
reodistic way. Perhaps this was because they lacked the
advice of an Egyptian military expert with a realistic
view. Lampson was in fact instructed in mid-March 1936
c _ c —to explore the possibility of appointing Aziz Ali al- 
Misri, a distinguished Egyptian and Arab nationalist who 
was then attached to the person of Prince Paruq in
1. Adn. 116/3588, Tel. No. 222(H), Lamps;on to Eden, 17 
March 1936.
2, P.O. 371/20102, Tel. No. 227(H), Lanpson to Eden,
17 March 1936.
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E n g l a n d a s  a military adviser to the Egyptian delegation.
is a soldier who hod a good reputation among the Egyptians,
it was expected that al-Misri would be useful "if no0
2could secure a hearing fron TTahas and his colleagues".
It seems probable that the Eafd's failure to 
understand the change in the international situation was 
a major factor in its prolonged reluctance to give Britain 
the extensive military d.emands she insisted on. These 
were in fact reluctantly granted after considerable 
pressure from the Residency, Nahhas night not have given 
the most outstanding military concession, the principle of 
perpetual .alliance, had not Lanpson warned him that it 
would be disastrous to his position if he did not suggest 
something "constructive".^ Inspired by the High Conniss-
1. Pgr morg information about al-Misri see Majid Khdduri,
" Aziz Ali al-Misri and the Arab Nationalist Movement" 
St.. Antonyf s Papers: Middle Eastern Affairs, A , 1965•
2. P.O. 57-1/20102, No. J 25A3/2/162 Minute by Campbell 
Reporting a Conversationj?/ith Nuri Pasha who Conveyed 
a Message fron_ Aziz All al-Misri, 17 March 1936.
Through Nuri Pasha, al-Misri*had in fact offered 
his service jp'ovided that Britain would suggest this 
to the Egyptian government. Lampson mentioned this 
idea privately to the Prime Minister, All Mahir, 
but nothing came out of it.
3. 6ee below, p. 189*
A. P.O. 371/20109-> Tel. No. A9S, Lampson to Eden, 30 
May 1936
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ionerv the Prince Regent, Kuhenna! c;jiv spoke earnestly 
to Nahhas at the end of May 193*5 of the necessity to be 
Mconciliatory on the treaty issues in aion of the unlike­
lihood of His Majesty's Government yielding appreciably 
and the danger of rupture to his own position in the 
res t or e d c: ns t i t ut i onal re gin e n . 'L
Arguing that Egypt was a peaceful country, had 
no enenies, and was facing no danger after the Abyssinian 
war, the Nationalist Party and other extremists clained 
that Egypt hnd no need for offensive or defensive alliances* 
Consequently they opposed the resumption of negotiations 
at that tine which, in their view, was the worst to do 
this. Pikri Abaza, a prominent member of the Rationalist 
Party and the editor of a1-Mus a w a r , argued that Britain 
would exploit the international situation to extract 
concessions from Egypt especially on the military side.
She, would regard the 1930 draft treaty as obsolete and 
its military clauses as quite inapplicable to the pre­
vailing situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, \7ith such 
logic, the Egyptian negotiators night be persuaded to 
make concessions. This, in Abaza's view, would make 
Egyptian sovereignty and independence nothing but a
1. Ado. 116/3589} Tel. Ho. 507, Lanpson to Eden, 1 June 
1936.
107
lname.
Though the dafd was probably convinced that the 
Abyssinian crisis was not a real factor in the resunption 
of negotiations, it seemed likely that the pary used it 
as a face-saving irretext. To prex^are the public to accept 
this new development, the Tafd clained before the begin­
ning of the negotiations that Egypt was involved in a 
very serious international situation to which she should 
give a31 her attention., while internal affairs should be 
allowed to wait, hliile supporting Naslm's government 
actually because of its pro-V7af&ist policy, Hahlias clained 
that this was due to the grave international situation.
The 1/afd inspii*ed the Residency to persuade a number of 
Arabic and British newspapers to launch a campaign 
asserting that Egypt was facing a real Fascist danger for 
which the only remedy was a friendly Britain. This 
heLped the Wafd to persuade the xoublic to accept the 
extensive military concessions it gave to Britain, without 
which no treaty was possible. Al--Jihad, Kawkab al-Sharq, 
al-Ahraav Daily Telegraphv TTews Ghronic1e , Manchester 
Guardian and others participated in this campaign. But 
the most important of all was a series of articles in the 
Times by its special correspondent, Philip Graves.
!. Al-Husawwar, 1? July 1936.
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Egypt had ^ital interests in Lake Tana iron
which seventy per cent of the Nile waters cane by the way
of the Blue Nile and Sobnt rivers.^ Since 1902 there had
been a general understanding between Britain, Egypt, and
Abyssinia to construct a clan at this Lake to regulate the
flow of its waters for tie benefit of agriculture in Egypt
2and the Sudan. This was ajopreciated in Egypt. The 
Egyptian Cabinet approved in May 1935 the five-year plan
G «sponsored by the I inane e Minister, Ahn ad. Abd al-Wahhab, 
which set aside £21 million for irrigation projects, 
amongst then the building of this dam. On 10 May the 
Abyrsinjp-- government invited the British, Egyptian and 
Sudan governments to a conference at Addis Ababa to 
conclude an agreement on this scheme. It was not held, 
however, as the British government, anxious to avoid any 
step that might aggravate the controversy between Italy 
and Abyssinia, suggested its postponement. While empha­
sizing that Lake Tana was absolutely secure under Abys­
sinian control, the \Vafdist press clained that it would 
be in real danger under Italian rule. In spite of Italian
1. Muhammad Lutfl JunCa : Bayn al-Asad al-Ifrlqi wa al-
Nanir a1-Itall, p. 34.
2* Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Vol. 318, 1938-37i 
Col. 2887“
3* Times, 10 July 1955-
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1assurances, a1~Jihad clained that Italy intended to
divert its waters to irrigate Abyssinian lands. This,
the newspaper continued, was the nost serious danger to
2
the Nile Valley in modern tines.
Since early 1935 the 'laid had conducted a strong 
press campaign asserting that the Italian danger was real 
and immediate. Al-Ahram clained that this was the nost 
direct danger which Egypt had faced since the end of the 
Roman occupation tnirteen centuries before. Because of 
this danger, the Wafd demanded that Egypt should settle 
all her differences with the Arabic-speaking nations of 
the Near East. Consequently it welcomed cAli Mahir’s 
initiative to end Egypt’s ten-year long dispute with
4
Saudi Arabia b3^ concluding a treaty with Shaykh Eu’ad 
Hamza, the Saudi under-secretorof state for foreign 
affairs, on 8 May 1936.^
1. The Egyptian and Italian governments exchanged notes 
in April 1936 guaranteeing the safety of Lake Toma.
Al-Jihad , A April 1936.
3* Al-Ahram, 7 August 1936.
4. Bor reasons of this dispute which started in 1926^ 
see Muhammad Husayn Haykal: Mudhakkarat fi * 1 Siyasa
al-Misriyya, Vol. 1, pp. 401-3". ~J
5. The terms of this treaty are found in the Times 
11 May 1935-
The sharp Italian pretest against the Egyptian 
decision to apply sanctions^ was well exploited hy the 
wafdist organs to arouse Egyptian fears of the possibility 
of an Italian attack, ''"hen an Italian aircraft crashed 
on 6 April 1935 near a 1-Masa airport, it was clained that 
plans for an Itali.an attack were found among the wreckage. 
By continuously reinforcing her defences in Libya, Italy, 
it was asserted, was preparing for an invasion of Egypt, 
and her troops had sometimes actually crossed the fron­
tiers, ostensibly because Samisi refugees were assembled 
on the Egyptian-Cyrennican frontier and were in contact 
with the Anglo--Egyptian authorities to f onent trouble.
In spite of the categorical denial of the British and 
Egyptian governments, Gayada, Mussolini’s chief propa - 
gandist, clained that Sayyid Safi al-Din al-Sanusi, 
former chief of the arned Snnusiyya in the guerrilla, war 
against Italy, had net the Egyptian Minister of Mar .and
the British Inspector of the Egyptian army at Marsa 
- 2 cMatruh. Abd al-Jalil Sayf al-Naor, another well known* • a *
1. The Co-ordination Committee of the League of Nations 
reconnended to the member-states of the League the 
app lication of economic and financial sanctions 
against Italy. Egypt was the only non-member of 
the League which agreed to this.
2. This was in a long article in Voce d 1Italia on 15 
September 1935*
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head of the rehel Sanusiyya, had also offered his services, 
Gayada continued, to the Anglo-Egyptian authorities.
hofdist propaganda asserted that the
tension between Italy and Britain resulting fron the 
Abyssinian crisis would definitely load to war. Apse 
a1-Yusuf claimed that it had had an interview with a 
distinguished foreigner who was well acquainted with the 
international situation. He asserted that war was at 
the gate, and that both Italy and Britain were ready to 
face it. The sane magazine alleged that the British 
government had sent the Duke of Restrains ter to Egypt tc 
negotiate .agreements with the Arab Shaykhs to secure 
their co-operation to. repel the expected Italian attack. 
Lord Lloyd, the ex-High Commissioner who had friendly 
relations with those Shaykhs, was sent to Egypt in early 
1936, Rose al-Yusuf continued, to complete the agreements.^  
Some states proposed the closure of the Suez 
Canal to Italy,^ while in Britain Attlee, Sir Norman
1. Times, 16 September 1935*
2. Neekly Rose al-Yusuf, 15 January 1936.
3. The Geneva Research Centre published 011 28 August 
.1.935 0, paper on the closure of the Suez Canal by 
Raymond Leslie Buell, President of the American Foreign 
Policy Association. He said that this question was 
controversial. Article 16 of the Covenant imposed
F/noto contdo on next page
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Angel 1, and 3one members of the House of Commons strongly
supr-orted this, especially since Italy "had used poison
gas and had broken all the conventions of the nod c m  
1world" . The Oaidist press cleaned that the Canal would
„ 2
definitely be closed to Italy, to which she would react 
by entering into war with Britain. Even if war broke out, 
cAbc? al-Kahnan cAzsam, an independent Egyptian politician 
and journalist, argued that Egypt could stay neutral. 
However weak Egypt was, the dafd emphasised that Egypt 
could not afford this, fox1 she would actually be the 
theatre of war, as Italy would immediately attack Egypt
— 7
to destroy Britain’s inrerial communications.^
Eootnote 3 contd. iron previous page
upon the League members an obligation to institute 
a compile te embargo on the conn ere e of a state which 
went to war in violation of the Covenant. On the 
other hand, the Convention of 1888 provided that the 
Sues Canal should always be free and open in tine of 
war as in tine of peace to every vessel of commerce 
or of war.
Times, 28 August 1935*
1. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Vol. 311, 1935-36,
Col. 1787T ~ - " “ —  - - - —
2. Britain had in fact strongly opposed the suggestion
of "some hot-headed states" to close the Sues Canal
to Italy. This would entail military action and 
would amount in practice to a declaration of war, 
which Britain was trying to av0id.
Visc0unt Temp1ewo0d : Nine Troubled Years, p . 171 *
5* Al-Jihad, 7 August 1935*
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The \7nfcl clained that Mussolini's assurances 
that he threatened:. no danger to Egypt should not bo taken 
seriously.,, and that, as with Abyssinia, ho would not 
respect any non-aggression treaty with Egypt.^  It was 
felt that the Egyptians should not place any confidence 
in the promise of a government which in less than twelve 
months had virtually repudiated its signature of the
p
League* Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, of the international 
Convention of 1925 against the uso of poisonous gas in 
war, and. the Italo-Abyssinian Treaty of 2 August 1928.
The first article of the least laid down that "there shall 
be continual peace and perpetual friendship between the 
Ethiopian Empire and the Kingdom of Italy".
In arousing mistrust of, and enmity towards, 
Italy, the WafcL encouraged the campaign in Egypt of 
sympathy and support for Abyssinia against the Italian 
invasion. The llafdist propaganda emphasized that Abyssinia 
was a fellow African country, bound to Egypt by special 
ties. There was a religious and ecclesiastical link 
between the Coptic Christian minority in Egypt and the
1. See below, p. 162.
2. The signatories of this Pact undertook to settle all 
their differences by peaceful means.
5* ffiiaes, 26 May 1936.
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Amharas. They were co-religionists and had acquired
their Monophysite Christianity f ron an Egyptian source."1'
By long established tradition, the Abuna, or Patriarch
of the Abyssinian Church, was chosen from among the Coptic
monks in Egypt. This was "a source of not little grati-
2f ication to Egyptian amoua-propro" . This close relation 
between the Copts and the Anharas heal the effect of a 
general link between the peoples of the two countries.
Pith her deep respect and love of freedom and independence, 
Egypt, Kawkab a1-Sharg c1aimed, shouId help Abyssinia, 
the last African state to preserve her independence.^
In fact this campaign achieved considerable /w
success, and the sympathy with Abyssinia was expressed in 
various ways. On Italian initiative, the Egyptian 
government concluded an agreement with Italy in April 
1935, by which seven thousand Egyptian labourers were to 
be recruited for road-making and other works in Eritrea.
It was clearly stated in the contract that they should not
1. Toynbee, A.J.: Survey of International Affairs,
1935, Vol. 2, p.“95 T “ ' '
2. Gibbs, "The Situation in Egypt", International
Affairs, 15, 1936, 351* ™
3. Beside Abyssinia, there were in 1935 two other inde­
pendent African states: Liberia and the Union of 
South Africa. But both the Liberians and the VThites 
of South Africa were recent arrivals in Africa.
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be employed in military zones, or on any purely military 
works* They were to be repatriated immediately on the 
outbreak of any hostilities. An Egyptian inspector was 
to accompany the Labour gangs to see that these agreed 
conditions were carried out. In spite of these safe­
guards, this agreement met a strong public protest and
1Nasim's Cabinet was forced to cancel it.
Mass meetings were hold in Egypt to support 
the Abyssinian cause. In late July 1955» the Coptic 
Patriarch called a meeting of the Coptic Community Council 
in support of Abyssinia. The Young Men's Moslem Asso­
ciation held o mass meeting of Moslems and Copts to form 
a committee to defend the cause of Abyssinian independence. 
A joint Muslin and Christian committee was formed under 
the direction of Prince CUmar Tusun and the Coptic 
Patriarch. It issued an appeal to the nation to sub-
p
sciibe to a fund for helping Abyssinia. “ Tvhen hostilities 
broke out between Italy and Abyssinia* this committee sent 
an ambulance service with Egyptian doctors and nurses to
T* Times, 10 July 1935-
2. The Prince headed the subscription list with a gift 
of £500 while the Patriarch paid £400.
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1help the Abyssinian vie tins . Many retired Egyptian
officers and some Egyptian volunteers joined the Abyssinian 
2array»
iTahhas emphasized before a. nee ting of Alexandria 
lawyers that Egypt* whether attacked by Italy or as a 
theatre of war* was faced with dreadful calamities. At 
any moment Alexandria night be bombarded from the sea,
Cairo bombed from the air, and. the Delta invaded from the 
desert. The Aswan Dam might be destroyed, and petrol 
stores at Suez burned. With weak armed forces, numbering 
only about ten thousand, Egypt would be incapable of 
defending herself. By arousing and stirring public 
alarm at the results of this danger, the Wafd perhaps 
wanted to cover its own political manoeuvres, ana justify 
its new desire for a settlement with Britain. Consequently 
it launched a strong press campaign asserting that the 
only way to avoid such disasters was by allying with 
Britain, the strongest power in the world.^ Eor those 
who advocated alliance with Italy instead of Britain,
1. This medical help irritated Italy. It was reported 
that the Italian planes bombed the Egyptian hospital 
at Addis Ababa.
2. Times, 8 August 1935•
3* Al-Jihad, 7 August 1935•
4. Ibid., 22 May 1935.
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the Wafa’s answer was: "it is bettor to have the devil
who is we know rather than the devil whom wo do not know" . ^
Toll aware that its previous anti-British policy
was largely responsible tor the deep-rooted hatred in
Egypt to Britain,, the V/afd persuaded the Egyptians to
except Britain’s friendship in 1936 by claiming that she
had radically changed her previous imperialist policy after
the Abyssinian crisis, RTiile before this crisis she
depended on force to suppress small nations, the Italian
success in Abyssinia had weakened her international
position. In that state of weakness, Kawkab a1~Shnrq
clained , Brito,in particularly wanted to befriend the Arab
nations and would naturally be nost eager to do this with
2their leader, Egypt. The uafd asserted that since the 
Italians were a real danger to the Sudan, Britain had
1. Personal information.
2* IfpMcabal-"Sharq, 1 June 1936.
3* The Mo,ffey Report pointed out that the coninuous raids 
on the Sudan by uncontrolled tribes and outlaws from 
Abyssinia was a source of worry to the Sudan govern­
ment. Though the Abyssinian government showed its 
goodwill in this matter, it was too weak to control 
these insubordinate tribes. In these circumstances, 
like neighbouring British colonies, the Sudan would 
obtain advantages from an efficient Italian adminis­
tration in Abyssinia.
Cab. 24/256, C.P. 161(35)? British Interests in 
Ethiopia: Report by an Inter-Departmental Committee,
16 August 1935*
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completely changed her previous policy there, which aimed 
at ibs separation iron Egypt, and was most anxious to co­
operate with Egypt in its administration and defence. It 
was felt that the appointment of Lampson in January 1934- 
as High Commissioner, and that of Eden in Dec ember 1935 eu 
Foreign Secretary, were clear evidence of this alleged
radical change in British foreign policy<, vThilo Eden was
c 1described by the 1/afdist press as Rajul al- Usba, i , e . 
the Man of the League of Nations, who wanted to establish
peace in the whole world, Lanpson was praised as Rasul
2 ~
a1-Salam,w i.e. the Apostle of Peace, who had completely
won the confidence of the Egyptians. After his departure 
to London in June 1936, Lampson was nicknamed by the
~A
Wafdist organs -Rasul al-Istiqlal li-Misr, i.e. the 
Apostle of Egyptian Independence. If the Egyptians lost 
this chance to negotiate, Britain right soon restore her 
coj.-itrol over the international politics, and consequently 
would be unwilling to compromise a The leading part taken 
by Britain to restrain Italy in Abyssinia showed that she 
was a worthy ally, and. the British, yesterday denounced 
as dishonest enemies, were praised today by the Viafdist
1. Al-Jihad , 2 January 1936.
2* Kawkab al-Sharq, 15 May 1936. 
5* Al-Musawwar, 1? June 1936.
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pr e s s as hones t , sincere and str nightfonward.^
rrith its overwhelming control over x^ublic 
opinion, the vfafd in fact succeeded in radically cnanging 
the Egyptian attitude from ennity to admiration and con­
fidence in Britain* Signs of this newly found friendship 
appeared in many directions. The Egyptians now assorted 
that there was no difference between Egypt and Britain 
that could not be solved* what Great Britain required, 
Egypt would willingly grant, and what Egypt wanted, 
Britain would not refuse. Encouraged by the Aafd, the 
Egyptians welcomed for the first tine the presence of the 
British troops, and the general co-oporation of the two 
countries in defence natters. On 11 October 1935 the 
Egyptian premier, Unslm Fasha, and the high Commissioner
reviewed the Egyptian and British units amid the applause
2
of a large gathering.
To stimulate a positive desire in Egypt to 
settle her relations with Britain, the Tafd asserted that 
if she did not do this, she would face, as in 1914, a war
1. Al-Jihad, 22 May 1935,
2. G-ibb, H.A.R.: "The Situation in Egypt", International
Affairs, 15, 19369 351.
hhil'e the minority parties criticised hasin for 
his cooperation with the British without extracting 
some quid pro quo from them, the Aafd encouraged him 
to do this, particularly in defence matters.
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in a position of tutelage to Great Britain„ Hie Egyptians 
would not be treated as an independent nation, able and 
willing to defend their country with the co-operation of 
Britain, but would be regarded merely as the inhabitants 
of an occupied territory. Britain, it was felt, would 
then exploit the Abyssinian crisis to strengthen her hold 
in Egypt without giving her any guarantee for the future. 
She night enforce measures on Egypt by which she would 
ignore her status under the Declaration of Independence 
or even modify it .
-*-• Al "-Jihad, 21 August 1935 >
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CHAPTER THREE
DIFFICULTIES IN THE RAY Off THE 1956 NEGOTIATIONS
Difficultues in Egypt:
It was only because of the sharp hostility 
between the Hafd and the Residency that King Fu’ad, who 
had a natural tendency towards autocracy, was able to play 
then cff against each other and frequently establish his 
own rule in the last fourteen years of his reign. Con­
sequently it was natural that he should oppose any treaty 
negotiated by the Haf d , as this would be followed by am 
undiluted T 'afd government and the Haf d would continue
1indefinitely in power with the support of the British,
Such a situation was also unacceptable to the minority 
parties, for this would mean their pernanent exclusion 
frun power. King Fu’ad had other reasons for refusing 
any settlement with Britain. Ho treaty would be acceptable 
to the Egyptians unless it provided for the removal of 
British troops fron the cities, which might endanger his
1. Major-General Dill, D.M.O. and I., who visited Egypt 
in February 1956, believed that Fu’ad wanted a treaty 
as the surest means of handing over a stable Egypt 
t© his son.
Cab, 24-/260, Enclosure in C.P. 64-(36) , Notes by Major- 
General Dill on his Personal Impressions about Egyptian 
Opinion on the Treaty, 24 March 1936.
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family's rule, as the troops' presence there had boon a 
powerful deterrent against any "afdist attempt to over­
throw the Monarchy. A treaty would inevitably establish 
the parliamentary system which Pu'ad, believing "like 
other old Turks, that the Egyptians understand only the 
Kourbash","*' considered completely unsuitable to Egypt. 
7/ith his deep affections for Italy, where he had been 
educated and had spent most of his early years, Bu'ad was 
likely ;:o oppose any treaty with Britain at that time of 
strained British relations with Italy. He had never
forgiven the British for exiling his loyal servant 
_ p
Aoroshi Pasha, and upsetting his favourite ministry of 
c —Abel ul-Pattah Yahya by imposing on him a pro-Hafdist 
Prime Minister, Nasim Pasha, in November 1934.
Haile joining with the Vlafcl in demanding 
immediate negotiations,^ Pu'ad and the minority leaders
l.Adm. 116/559-1 * Tel. No. 1059» Kelly to Eden, 9 September 
1936 c
2. Abrashi, the director of tho Royal Estates, who had 
been responsible for nost of the unpopular decisions 
made by the King, resigned that post on April 1935 
and was appo int e d Minister at Brus s e1s .
3- "ith its usual slogan of no negotiations before com­
plete evacuation of the Nile Valley, the Nationalist 
Party opposed the 1936 negotiations with Britain.
It asserted that the British were devoid of honour 
and that the Egyptians should, not trust them, but 
should work hard to drive them from their country.
12?
wanted to wreck then. They nay have calculated that their 
failure would be followed by widespread bafdist agitation 
and that the Residency would be compelled, as in the 
previous abortive negotiations, to co-operate with the 
Pale,ce to postpone elections and fora a strong government 
to maintain law and order. Si dpi, Mahmud, and cAli' Mahir 
all hoped to form such a ministry. Following Eoaro's 
declaration of 9 November 1935 that the 1923 and 1930 
Constitutions were unsuitable to Egypt, the Egyptians 
judges submitted a petition to the Minister of Justice 
condemning bhis as British interference in Egyptfs inter- 
nal affairs, ' In showing this political bias, they were 
parly inspired, by cAlI Mahir who was alarmed ty Britain’s 
support for Nasin. If °Ali Mahir was objectionable to the 
Residency because of this, Fu’ad was prepared to choose 
Mahmud as Brine Minister. In spite of the temporary 
nature O f jLi li Mahir !s government in 1930, he embarked, on 
an extensive programme of reform and administrative 
measures, as he may have hoped that the negotiations 
would break down and he would be asked, to continue in 
power♦^
1 . Times, 23 November 1935.
2. cAli Mahir claimed, that the motive behind all this 
activity was to establish his reputation as a good
F/note contd. on next page
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Well awc.ro of this danger of another return of 
Palace dictatorship, the h'nfd insisted that the 1923 
Constitution should be restored before the treaty nego­
tiations and reluctantly accepted cAli Mahir1s new govern-
rent on condition that it held a general election 011 2 
• 1May 1996. The .-,afd, however, embarked seriously on the 
negotiations only after the elections, when it was firmly 
in office. Moreover, it demanded that Britain should give 
a definite undertaking that, even if the negotiations 
failed, the existing situation would be maintained, and 
there would be no British interference in Egyptian consti­
tutional life. Consequently it strongly opposed Lampson’s 
verbal statement (which accompanied the British note 
agreeing to the resumption of negotiations) in which he 
said that in the event of a failure of the conversations, 
the British government might reconsider its policy in 
E^pt. Though it did not intend by this warning any 
drastic change of policy, such as a return to Cromerism 
or a protectorate, the British government refused to give
Footnote 2 contd. from previous page
Prime Minister so that in future, when the opportunity 
might occur, he would be recalled to power.
FcOo 371/20105, Tel. Ho. 333, Lampson to Eden,
31 March 1936.
1. The \7afd preferred the elections to be held under 
the government of its friend, Nasim Pasha.
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the V7afd the assurances it wanted because nit was felt
that, with a view *to prevent an intransigent attitude on
the part of the Egyptians in general and the waff in
particular, it v/oule. probably be a good thing that they
should feel a certain amount of uncertainty about the
1consequences of an abortive negotiation ". The British
government, however, agreed tc address a further note to
the Egyptian government, declaring that while it reserved
its liberty 01 action, the failure of the negotiations
need not necessarily affect the good relations between
the two countries* This statement, however, did not give
the \7afd the impression that all would necessarily be
2
the sane if the negotiations failed*
Since the Declaration of Independence in 1922, 
the minority parties had been well disposed towards 
Britain, as this served their interests in excluding the
1- F.O. 571/20008, Ho* J 1221/2/16, Note by Campbell to 
Eden on the Anglo--Egyptian Treaty Conversations, 10 
February 193b*
2. EoO- 371/20099* Enclosure in Tel* Ho. 113 * Comment by 
Campbell, 11 Eebruary 1936.
Even after the conclusion of the treaty, the ;7afd 
was still afraid that Britain might again co-operate 
with the minority parties to remove it from power. 
Nahhas was particularly worried because of a long 
meeting between Mahmud and Eden in London after the 
signature of the treaty on 26 August 1936* It was, 
however, in the interests of the British government 
that the Wafd should continue in power to implement 
the treaty, and Lampson assured Hahhas of Britain's 
continuing support.
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Y.Tafd from power„ But in 1936 the T‘nf& changed its policy 
and became pro-British for the sake of a treaty.'1' Con­
sequently it seems likely that they too changed thoir 
tactics from moderation to extremism in order to wreck 
the negotiations and thus prevent any understanding between 
the 7‘afd and the British. This policy, they may have 
hoped, would also enable then to steal the nationalist 
thunder of the hafd by showing it as co-operating with 
Britain againsu Egypt's interests,
Before the beginning of the negotiations, the 
minority parties conducted a strong anti-British press
campaign. particularly in al-Siyasa, al-Shacb , and al- 
2Balagh, in which they claimed that Britain never trusted 
Egypt, and did not sincerely intend to conclude a treaty 
with her, but wanted to maintain the status quo. In a 
conversation with G.E. Heathcote-Smith, the British Consul 
at iilexandxi,ia9 Sidqi went further than this, accusing 
Britain of intending to go to her role of before 1922 
when she was directly controlling the affairs of Egypt/'
L  See above, pp. 37~/pO.
Al-Siyasa p s  the organ of the^Liberal Parry, al-Sha b 
of the Sha b Party, and al-Balagh was closely as so- 
ciated with the Palace.
3. P.O. 371/20097, Enclosure in 80 (1/29/36), Despatch 
from the Consul-General in Alexandria on a Conver­
sation with Sidqi and Abud, 9 January 1936.
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Eden's demand for tine to study the Egyptian question 
was considered only an excuse, as every British politician 
was well acquainted with this subject, oil which there had 
been a number oi abortive negotiations. Being unable 
flatly to reject the Egyptian offer to negotiate, the 
British government, they asserted, put conditions which 
it knew rhat the Egyptians would not accept, and conse­
quently there would be no negotiations at all. It was 
for this reason, they claimed, that Britain insisted on 
excessive military demands, and threatened the Egyptians 
that she would revise her policy if the negotiations 
failed.'1'
Knowing that disorder was fatal to al] prospects 
of agreement, the minority parties instigated anti-British 
demonstrations by the students by telling them that 110 
treaty would be concluded v/ithout the throat of violence. 
Besides this, they encouraged them to strike and demon­
strate about thoir own private problems, such as the 
duration of courses and examinations. Sidqi was mainly 
responsible for this, while Mahmud frequently met the 
students leaders, offered them money, promised then high 
posts in the government and the patronage of the Liberal
Balagh, 10 February 1936.
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1 cParty, ' Th^ wari. tings of al- Aqqad, a very popular writer
among the students ? in the daily Hose al-Yusuf v a forner
2i.afdist organ, encouraging the students to make trouble, 
found a woleone echo in their breasts. It alian agents 
were also active in this direction, and it was reported 
bhat they supplied the students with arns, gave then 
military training in the Italian athletic clubs, and 
prompted them tc form groups on fascist lines.^
In spite of the Uafd’s appeals,^ unrest con­
tinued in nost of the Egyptian schools and the University, 
During the disorders at Dnmanhur at the end of January 
193^> the 'British flag over the British Consular AgentTs 
residence was pulled down and destroyed. In Cairo certain 
English ladies were subjected to violent and insulting 
behaviour from the students, and there were attacks upon 
members of the British forces. On the advice of the 
Residency, which was greatly worried by this students’
1. P.O. 371/20097, Enclosure in lei, No. 17 (19/3/36), 
Letter from the Director-General of European Depart­
ment to the Oriental Secretary, 4- January 1936.
2. See above, p. 36.
3. P.O. 371/20098, Enclosure in Tel. No. 102 (19/15/36), 
Memorandum on the Student Movement in Egypt by ParId 
Bashatly Effendi, deputy assistant Director-General 
of the European Department, 23 January 1936.
The Uafd had lost its overwhelming control ovqt the 
students. See above, pp. 29-31*
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disorder, jl conference was held on 15 February 1956 
between the under-secretary of tho Ministry of the 
Interior, representatives of the Public Security Depart­
ment, and the Rector of the Egyptian university to consider 
the question. The presence of Muhammad cAlI cAluba at 
that rime as iViinister of Education was anomalous, as he 
was a member of the Rationalist Party and. encouraged, the
movement of Egyptian youth in the belief that the old
q
parties had failed to liberate Egypt.
The minority parties intensified propaganda
among the workers and fallahln to join the disturbances.
faking advantage of the dissatisfaction among the workers
by certain labour legislations, they encouraged them,
particularly those of Prince °Abbas Halim's Federation
2of Labour Unions, to go on strike. Yith the object of 
spreading revolutionary and anti-British propaganda,
Ahmad Husayn, the leader of the Young Egypt Society, who 
was in close touch with the Palace,^ made a number of
1. P.O. 371/20098, Despatch Ho. 124 (I/69/36), Note by 
Lampson to Eden on the Political Situation in Egypt, 
1 February 1936.
2. See above, pp. 28-29.
3. T7ell informed quarters suggested to the Residency 
that the Palance financed the Young Egypt Society 
because it wanted to use it with its Greenshirts as 
a counterpoise to the Yafd and its Blueshirts.
P.O. 571/20107, 491 (19/41/36), Lampson to
Eden, 2 May 1936.
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1
tours In Upper Egypt* nn unsuccessful attempt was made
to induce the public to boycott British goods* Tho Young
Society distributed circulars, and al-Siyasa
claimed that this was the only method to force the British
2to yield to Egypt's demands.
The situation in Palestine was exploited by
the minority parties to undermine Anglo-Egyptian relations.
They denounced British policy there, which, they claimed,
caused tremendous injustice to the Arabs. In a leading
article on 14 July 1936* al-Siyasa claimed,
"the Arab Moslem nation had been strongly, 
patiently and intrepidly fighting the greatest, 
the most cruel and malicious power of the 
•world. She is suffering iaotolerable atrocities 
which are disgusting to humanity and will be 
condemned by future generations. The English 
are vigorously slaying the nation and ruining 
their lands".5
The Residency drew the attention of Mahmud Pasha to this w *
1. According to a report_from the provinces, these attempts 
to stir up the fallahin were unsuccessful because they 
ai'gued that "political trouble would lead only to less 
of employment and trade and consequent misery and 
privation".
P.O. 371/20096, Tel. No. 699? Lampson to Eden, 31 
December 1935*
2* Al-Siyasa, 18 December 1935*
3* P.O. 371/20116, Despatch No. 857* Lampson to the High 
Commissioner of Palestine on Offensive Articles in 
the Egyptian Press Regarding the Palestinian Distur­
bances, 21 July 1936. The P.O. translation is quoted.
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offensive campaign, but he refused to stop it, arguing 
that ho was an Arab himself and could not help sympathi­
zing with the Arabs in Palestine.
Pith these activities in Egypt, the Paloce and 
minority parties encouraged the Young Egypt Society to
send an anti-British propaganda mission to Europe.
1Subsidized by the Palace and possibly by Italy, Ahmad 
Husayn and Fathl Hudwan, the president and secretory of 
this Society, left in early December 1955 tor a tour in 
Europe in which they visited London, Paris, and Geneve,. 
Bor more them two months, they tried, "to impress influ­
ential circles abroad with the alleged inequity of Great
2Britain’s policy in Egypt". Bailing to meet the Foreign 
z
Secretary, they organised several public meetings in 
London, and contacted some prominent persons who were 
known for their sympathy towards Egyptian aspirations:
1. According to a secret police report, Italy contributed
£500 towards the expenses of this (journey,
P.O. 371/20151, Despatch No, 54-5 (4-35/4-/30)* iiinual
Report on Egypt for 1935> 13 May 1935*
2 c Ibid.
3. The Foreign Office refused to grant them an interview 
with Eden because it believed that their tour was 
partly financed by Italy, and they "night distort 
anything said to them and misuse the fact that an 
interview was granted to them".
P.O. 371/20090, Enclosure in despatch No. J 41/2/6, 
Comment by Macks of the Foreign Office, 31 December
1935.
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Lord Lanington, a former governor of Queensland, who was 
deeply interested in promoting good understanding between 
Britain and oriental nations, Fenner Brockway, secretary 
of the Independent Labour Party, and George Lansbury, the 
leader of the Labour Party.
It was reported to the Residency that the 
minority leaders, particularly °Ali Ivlahir and Sidqi, 
cooperated with Italy which, seeking to secure predomin­
ance in the Mediterranean, conducted a strong anti-British 
campaign in Egypt. Italian propaganda was vigorously 
intensified in 1935 and 1 9 3 6 * *  when a large s u b  of money"1' 
was paid t? the local newspapers, particularly al-Ahram 
and al-Balaghv to publish articles condemning the British 
policy in Egypt and emphasizing Italo-Egyptian friendship. 
Ihc well-organised Italian colony in Egypt numbering about 
65,000 mainly located in towns, was a useful weapon to 
Italian propaganda* An important part of it was played by 
the Agence d 1 Egypte et d !Orient, a news agency recently 
set up in Cairo under the management of Ugo Dodone, a 
former editor of the Local Italian newspaper Gioracle
1. Keown Boyd, the Director-General of the European 
Department, estimated that Italy used to spend 
.£35,000 in a normal year on propaganda in Egypt, 
ant in 1935 she spent several hundred thousand pounds. 
FoO. 371/20113, No. 981 (53^/28/36), Lampson to Eden, 
20 August 1936.
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d 'Oriente , r~ith a monthly budget of about £800 , it dis­
tributed to the press and other sources of influence free 
copies of bulletins containing much anti-British propa­
ganda .
In late 1935 and during the period of greatest 
tension over the agitation for the 1923 Constitution., the 
Italian Minister assured Nahhas of his country’s support 
for Egypt, and of Italian action in the League to 
embarrass England." The Italians contacted leading Copts 
such as Tawfig Dus to win over the Copts who had been 
anti-Italian owing to their religious connexion with 
Abyssinia. Moreover, misleading reports and inflammatory 
speeches denouncing British policy in the Near East were
2broadcast daily in Arabic by the Italian station at Bari.
The British government was greatly alarmed by 
this Italian propaganda and took immediate steps to 
counteract it by articles in the local and British press,^
1. bith its strong desire to have a treaty, the Tafd 
organised a strong anti-Italian campaign in its press, 
particularly in al-Jihad. The Italian propaganda in 
Egypt was far less ’effective than in other parts of 
the Near East probably mainly because Italy failed
to gain the support of the tafd.
2. E.O. 371/20131* Despatch No. 345 (435/4-/36), Annual 
Report on Egypt for 1935* 13 May 1935«
3* Al-~Ahran , al-Jihad, Daily Telegraph, and the Tines 
participated "in this campaign.
and by widespread ocular demonstration in Egypt, e.g. 
films, of British naval, military and air strength to 
show Britain's intention and capacity to prevent an 
external aggression on Egypt particularly from Italy. 
Moreover, the British government increased the strength 
of its military and air position in the Mediterranean.
The Residency suspected that the minority 
leaders in their efforts to disturb the atmosphere of 
the negotiations were cooperating with the Cairo corres­
pondents of the Times (Mr. Lumby) and the Daily Telegraph, 
who sympathized with their desire to prevent the \7afd from 
succeeding in any treaty negotiations. Lumby, who was 
believed to be under Mahmud's influence, supported his 
idea that Rasim should be replaced ,rby a strong Prime 
Minister to maintain public order and promote Anglo- 
Egyptian military cooperation until the international 
situation was cleared and the way was open to the return
p -
of constitutional life in Egypt". Nahhas complained to 
the Director-General of the European Department that Lumby 
published on 19 December 1935 a private conversation he
1. I could not identify him.
2. P.O. 371/20096, Despatch No. J 18/2/16, A Personal 
Letter from Cecil Campbell to Vansittart, 18 December 
1935.
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1had with him in which ho put a "fierce" interpretation
upon, and gave "a false impression of, his attitude", a
matter which caused him difficulties both in Egypt and 
o
Britain." In the summer of 1935 he publicised Mahmud's 
idea of a military alliance rather than a treaty. More­
over, Lumby sent other unhelpful reports such as that the 
British reply to the United Front was disappointing to 
the Egyptians because it did not commit the British 
government on the civil clauses of the 1930 draft treaty. 
Knowing the importance attached in Egypt to every word in 
the Times, the Residency was extremely worried by Lumby's 
reports. Lampsen, Kelly and Smart saw him in late January 
1936 and requested him to be helpful. But he remained 
adamant, claiming that he was only doing his job. The
1. In this interview Nahhas was reported to have said that 
jhe Vafd would not allow the minority parties to par­
ticipate in the negotiations and added "that the 
negotiations were almost unnecessary as all parties 
had agreed to accept the 1930 draft treaty without 
amendment". Lumby claimed that Nahhas was perfectly 
firm in maintaining the letters antV terms agreed in 
1930, and. if the British government declined to approve 
them, "the \7afd will denounce them for breaking their 
word and will resume the violent street agitation". 
Times, 19 December 1935*
2. F.O. 371/20090, Enclosure in despatch No. 1458 (621/ 
18/35) *, Letter from the Director-General of the 
European Department to the Residency, 24 December 1935*
3* F.O. 371/20099* Despatch No. 58/5/36, Kelly to Houston 
Boswall of the Foreign Office, 29 January 1936.
correspondent of tlie Daily Telegraph, who was in close 
touch with Sidqi and was believed to have been subsidized 
by hin during his tern of office as Prine Minister, wrongly
represented on £8 March 1936 the situation as deadlock
1 c — c "because of the \7afd's intransigence. Amin Uthnan,
the secretary-general of rhe Egyptian delegation, complained
to a member of the Residency13 staff ahout this "indis- 
2cretion’1, and, on the request of Lampson, the nev/s 
department at the Foreign Office advised the Daily Tele­
graph to avoid such remarks.
An I.* n y w t jiMi**
Even after the signature of the treaty, the 
minority parties continued their campaign against it, in 
the hope that if they reused public opinion, Parliament 
might refuse to ratify it. They opposed the Pafd'-s 
decision to discuss it in an extraordinary session of 
larliament cn 2 November 1936, and suggested that this 
should be in its ordinary meeting in the third week of 
November, ostensibly to give theEgyptians a reasonable 
chance to understand the treaty. The real motive behind 
this nay have been to have more time to attack it and to
1. F.O. 371/20102, Tel. No. 252(H), Lampson to Eden, 
29 March 1936.
2. Adn. 116/3588, Tel. No. 257? Lampson to Eden, 30 
March 1936.
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await the cohate in the House of Commons, in the hope that
there night ho a true interpretation of it in which the
Egyptian concessions would, he clearly shown* Arguing
that the present Parliament had been elected to achieve
complete independence and that the treaty did not offer
this, the liberal Party advocated a national plebicite
as in Iraq before the parliamentary ratification of the 
1
treaty. The Aafd, however, refused this suggestion on
the grounds that the case of Iraq was completely different
from that of Egypt. VJhile the Iraqi Parliament had been
elected long before the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930, it
was asserted, tbo Egyptian elections for Parliament
o
synchronized with the negotiation of the treaty
Dissatisfied elements, specially the nationalist 
thirty and the Young Egypt Society, organised meetings for 
the delivery of anti-treaty speeches, issued pamphlets, 
ancL published articles in the Arabic press in which they 
particularly exaggerated the* harm to Egypt from her 
military concessions to Britain, which, they claimed, 
would reimpose the protectorate and legalise the British 
occupation. A vocal minority of students, undor the 
leadership of Nur al-Din Tarraf, was instigated by the
1- AI-Musawwar, 18 September 1936.
2, Mahmud Ghannan: Al-Mucahada al-Mlsriyya al-Ingli-
2l.yza wa Pirn satha mfn al-Hu,iha all Amaliyyn ,"i) “ 366,
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Nationalists and some mentors cf the Literal Party to 
organise an anti-treaty movement when the school opened 
in Cctoter 1956, °Abud Pasha and hbrashl joined the 
opposition, and it was reported tc the Residency that the 
Latter financed al-Balagh, whose editor, Mahmud cAzml,
published unsigned articles strongly criticising the
_ c — "treaty. Certain foreign quarters and Prince Umar Tusun
were asserted to have promised financial support to the 
1oppositxon, and the Italian agents toot: every opportunity 
to attack the treaty.
The opposition tried to consolidate itself by 
forming a united front and brought considerable pressure
C C T* —-
upon Abd al- Aziz Eahmi to head it. As he was the only 
survivor of the three Egyptians who had demanded the 
independence of their country in the historic intervie?/ 
with kingate in 1917  ^ and as a man of acknowledged 
integrity, it was felt that his re-entry to politics would 
give the opposition a much needed impetus. Eahml, however, 
refused and this open movement against the treaty collapsed
I. Adm. 116/3591> Eel. No. 1066, Kelly to Eden, 10
September 1936. KollyA the acting High Commissioner, 
claimed that while Tusun was known not to favour the 
treaty and. had. made* several indiscreet remarks about 
it, he did not "appear to be prepared to take an 
active interest in the opposition movement".
Adm. 116/3591> Tel. No. 1090, Kelly to Eden, 17 
September 1936.
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becaucse it failed to find a popular politician to head 
it .1
Though, they were not pleased with the txeaty,
the minority parties, apart from the Nationalist Party,
soon realized that their tactics to wreck the treaty had
failed, and that it was :n their own interests to atop
opposing it, as they knew that the vfafdist government
might stay indefinitely in power, and that the British
would no longer help anybody to evict it. On 15 October
1936 the Sha b Party passed a long noncommittal resolution
tantamount to an expression of support for the treaty, and
Sidqi, who had an unlimited capacity for adaptability to
circumstances, suddenly appeared as an ardent admirer of
Nahhas. The majority of the Liberal leaders, led by
Mahmud, thought that it was in the interests of their
party to support the treaty as na step towards independence,T,
and concentrate on criticising the aafd in administrative
and other natters. Led by Mahmud CAbd al-Kaziq, the
party’s vice-president, a minority of the Liberal leaders,
however, believed that the party should oppose the treaty
and went to the extent of dismissing Mahmud for his
2signature to it.
1. P.O. 371/20119, Tel. No. 1090, Kelly to Eden, 17 
September 1936.
2* Al-Musa w w a r 20 September 1936.
1*0
The opposition to the treaty was ineffective 
because the “aid, with its efficient organisation and 
overwhelming support among the masses, conducted a strong 
campaign to support it, Nahhas described it as “the 
treaty of honour and independence”, and the iafdist press 
claimed that opposition would be equivalent to high 
treason,^ The Wafdist government, possibly by offering 
money and promising high posts to the state, induced 
some journalists, politicians, and university lecturers 
to publish bocks and articles claiming that the ‘"afd had 
forced the British to yield to Egypt's demands and that 
the tx*eaty would achieve her full independence* At the
p
same tine the /afd used its Blueshirts to frighten the 
opposition and threaten anyone who criticised the treaty. 
Mr. Hamilton, the acting Dirctor-G-eneral of the European 
Department, claimed that the editor of al-Balagh was told 
that if he opposed the treaty, the premises and printing 
press of his paper would be attacked and smashed.^ The 
Greenshirts were barred from carrying on anti-treaty 
propaganda in the country because, Nahhas claimed in
1* Al-Ahran, 15 September 1936.
2. See above, pp. 31-32,
3- P.O. 371/20119, Tel. No. 1090, Kelly to Eden, 17 
September 1936.
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Parliament, they were in the pay of a foreign government
The Nafdist gcvernne3.1t forbade anti-treaty meetings and
pronptly confiscated newspapers and pamphlets issued by
c —the Nationalist Party and Young Egypt Society. Aluba
Pasha, a former Liberal leader, arranged to address a
meeting criticising the treaty in a cinema at Cairo on
9 October 1936. Though the government permitted the
meeting, it inspired the cinema proprietor to refuse at
the last minute to hire his building. The meeting was
c —abandoned and. Aluba published the text of his speech in 
al-Balagh and al-Siyasa .
3The long disease and subsequent death of King
L. Strenuous efforts were made by certain deputies and 
the press to make the government disclose the ground 
on which this allegation was made, but Nahhas held 
that it was impolitic. Supported by the non-AVafdist 
press, Ahmad Husayn, the Greenshirt leader, immediately 
demanded*that*if the government statement was correct, 
he should be prosecuted, but the government refused the 
challenge. The immediate consequence of this charge 
was serious street-fighting between the Blueshirts and 
Greenshirts in which a number on both sides were 
injured. In most cases, although the Blueshirts were 
the aggressors, it v/as the Greenshirts v/ho suffered 
at the hands of the police, because the authorities 
hesitated to arrest the Blueshirts for fear of the 
tafd government.
Manchest er Guardi an, 21 July 1936.
2. Ibid., 15 October 1936.
3. Since 1934, Pu'ad was suffering from a serious illness 
which ultimately proved fatal.
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Fu'ad was the best portent for the success of the treaty
1
negociations. Jell aware of the intelligence and 
capacity for intrigue of the "old fox", as Fu'ad was 
known in the Foreign Office, the British government 
warned him iron the start that it relied on "his co-opera­
tion to induce a reasonable frame of mind among Egyptian 
2leaders," and that it would not allow an unsatisfactory 
ending to be turned to his advantage as in the past. 
However, both the Tv'afd and the British were relieved by 
his death leaving a minor, inexperienced, and ill-educated
nr
son.-'* The three Regents accepted Egypt's complete
1. The Foreign Office accused Fu'ad of attempting in 
his last days to make a quick breakdown of the 
negotiations. See below, p.l&tf.
2. F,G. 371/20096, Tel. No. 25, Eden to Lamp son, 16 
January 1936.
3. The death of Fu'ad 011 28 April raised a delicate 
constitutional problem as, according to the succession 
act of 1922, a^Council of Regency was to be formed 
until Prince Faruq attained, his majority on completion 
of 18 lunar years, i.e. until August 1937* Parliament 
was to meet within ten days after Fu'ad.'s death to 
approve his nominees or appoint new ones. Since the 
Egyptian Parliament was due to meet at the end of May 
1936, the 7afd suggested the recall of the Parliament 
dissolved in 1930 to settle the question. The minority 
parties refused and a compromise was finally agreed to 
by which the dates of the elections were changed in 
such a way_to allow Parliament to meet on 8 May^l936. 
Two of Fu'adfs nominees, FasIn and Mahmud Fakhrl, were 
unacceptable to Parliament, and the third, Adli 
Pasha, died. It finally ghose Prince Muhannad All 
(first cousin of Fu'ad), Aziz Pasha Izzat (the first 
Egyptian Minister in London in 1923), and Sharif 
Sabrl Pasha (the Queen's brother).
times, 9 May 1936.
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dependence on Britain and were ready to consult and 
follow her advice in all natters *
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Difficulties in Britain:
BincG the Declaration of Independence, a group 
of vocal Conservative? peers and LS.P.g, of whom Lord Lloyd 
and Churchill were the most active * were strongly against 
any settlement writh Egypt.1 Their influence on policy 
was, however, slight.^ They wanted, at least, to maintain 
the existing British military occupation and control over 
the Egyptian government. It was most likely that a treaty 
would relax this occupation. This, they believed, would 
be disastrous to imperial communications, and would give 
other powers a chance to challenge the British position 
in Egypt. The security of these communications could not 
be assured by military dispostions alone, but depended to 
a large extent upon the existence of a strong stable 
government in Egypt. If Britain gave the Egyptians the 
right to run their own internal affairs, it was felt that 
the result would be widespread disturbances throughout 
the country since it was extremely ill-suited to any 
representative government.^ No treaty would be acceptable 
to the Egyptians unless it gave then substantial conces-
1. In fact those peers and M.JP.s opposed the Declaration 
of Independence and preferred Egypt to be part of 
the British Empire.
2. See below, pp. 195-96.
5* horning Lost, 29 April 1936.
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sions in regard to the Capitulations and a wider latitude 
in the military occupation and administration of the Sudan, 
Though they admitted that the Capitulatory regime needed 
slight modifications^ those Conservative peers and M.P.s 
opposed any fundamental change that affected the privileged 
status of foreigners, particularly the British residents 
in Egypto As for the Sudan they claimed that any conces­
sions to Egypt would endanger the naintenonco of law and 
order, and destroy the British character of the adminis­
tration there,
Naturally this opposition to a treaty with 
Egypt was wholeheartedly supported by the dominions, 
particularly Australia and New Zealand, and the British 
colony in Egypt, The former viewed the whole question 
fro:: tho point of view of the security of the Suez Canal 
only, which they felt would be endangered by any military 
concessions to Egypt. In fact their opposition was an 
important factor that delayed the conclusion of a treaty, 
since the British government had undertaken not to do
anything that affected imperial communications except
q
after consultation and in agreement with them. It was
1. Cab. 24/262, A.B.C. 56, Appendix II to C.F. 129(56), 
Draft Conclusions of the First Meeting of the Anglo- 
Egyptian Conversations Committee on ? May 1936.
In all previous negotiations, tho British government
F/note contdo on next page
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only after a number of meetings between Eden and the 
representatives of the d.oninions that the latter reluc­
tantly accepted some slight military risks for the sake 
of a treaty.’*' The British residents in Egypt correctly 
expected that Britain would make great concessions on the 
Capitulations in return f rr her military demands, which 
were more extensive than those in the 1930 negotiations, 
ancl that Egypt would accept this. They were particularly 
worrie 1 by the possibility of unilateral Egyptian denun­
ciation of the Capitulations, especially after Nahhas1s 
declaration of late January 1936 that the 1'afd would not
o
dascuss then until after the conclusion of a treaty.
with its influence in Parliament, the British 
3Chamber of Commerce^ tried by a series of memoranda to
Eootnote 1 contd. from previous page
had given due consideration to the views of the domin­
ions. Britain accepted the 192? draft treaty only 
after their consent, and in 1930 negotiations repre­
sentatives of Australia, New Zealand, and India 
attended as observers.
1. These risks related mainly to two major military 
questions: bhe location of tho British troops in
Egypt ^ tine-limit of the treaty. See below,
pp„ 165-69 and pp. 177-82.
2. P.O. 371/20097o Enclosure in despatch No. 75/7/26/36, 
Letter from the British Chamber of Commerce to Lampson 
16 January 1938.
3. Tiiis was an association of British residents in Egypt 
which had two branches in Cairo and Alexandria.
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the British government to prevent Capitulatory and obher
concessions to Egypt. The Chamber suggested the formation
of a permanent standing committee of British residents in
Egypt ~k° advise Lamps on on how the treaty would affect
British interests; such a, method had been followed recently
1in India m  connection w i ~h the India Bill. Thougr the 
British government outwardly treated the Chamber with 
increasing deference since 1928, it was not swayed by its 
intransigent -views. It believed that the British occu­
pation of Egypt, with all the risks and difficulties it 
implied Mshould not be retained at all costs for the 
benefit of private commercial interests which in other
countries receive no such support from His Majesty's 
2
Government". In fact many points were settled by the 
treaty m  a sense contrary to the wishes of theChamber, 
and the only thing which the British government was 
prepared to do for all the foreigners in Egypt was to 
attempt to obtain some concessions at the capitulatory 
conference, without endangering the smooth working of 
the arrangements resulting fro-': the abolition of the
1. Eden refused this suggestion as the motive behind 
it was to advise against concessions to Egypt.
2. F.O. 371/20151, Despatch No. 1061 (7/687/36), Kelly 
to Eden, 9 September 1936.
3. See below, pp. 287-88.
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1
Capitulations.
Through the British Conservative press, parti­
cularly the Morning lost and the Daily Hail, and by 
special meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary* the opponents of the treaty persistently 
advised the British government tc postpone indefinitely
its offer to negotiate, on the grounds that the tine was
2
even nore inopportune than in 1933- Lampson and his 
advisers argued that the British government could not, 
even if it so desired, refuse the formal request of the 
Unitec'1 From; for immediate treaty negotiations, as it 
faced the position it had postulated since 19295 namely 
a body representative of all parties, \vith considerable 
justification,^ Lord Lloyd and his colleagues rejected 
this argument as the United Front was not a genuine union
1. F.O. 371/20131, Despatch No. 1061 (7/687/36), Kelly 
to Ivlen, 9 September 1936.
2» Saturday Heview, 21 September 1936.
3. The British government's demand was stigmatized by 
the British Disposition as undemocratic and they 
suggested that the British government should deal 
with the Egyptian government of tho day. Eden 
refused this suggestion as he was "convinced that 
all known Egyptian public figures should have their 
part in the Treaty and therefore be without pretext 
to go back up0n it in a critical hour".
Earl of Avon: Eden Memoirs, Facing the Dictators,
P- 393*
4. See above, pp. 39-40 and pp. 122-23.
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for a treaty, but a mere desire for power. He wrote: 
"Nothing had occuroc! in the last fivo years to bridge 
over the deer' differences between, or allay the nutual 
hostility of, the rival party leaders in Egypt save a 
general hunger for office sharpened by years of impotence 
and deprivation".^ They also rejected the Residency's 
view that a treaty was necessary to keep law and order
p
in Egypt, as the British forces in their present numbers 
and dispositions would have no difficulty in doing so,
ii
and even if a treaty were concluded, there was no guarantee 
that law and order would be maintained in future. The 
request of the United Front canc after a series of violent 
anti-British demonstrations demanding immediate nego- 
tiations. They claimed that if the British government 
accepted it, it would appear to have yielded to the 
forces of violence, and the Egyptians would feel that 
rioting would bring them all they wanted from Britain/** 
Whatever concessions Britain might make, the conversations, 
like the previous ones, were doomed to failure from the
Evening Standard, 19 February 1936.
2. See below, p. 156.
3. These demonstrations were particularly violent after 
the Guildhall speech of Hoare, the Foreign Secretary. 
See above, p. 123-
4. Evening Standard, 19 February 1936.
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start, an outcome which Britain could not then afford.
It was felt that the Laid never genuinely 
wished to conclude a treaty, as this would ipso facto 
mean its end Because its life had always "depended upon 
keeping an open sore". It would repeat its usual 
tactics of pushing demands to the furthest possible point, 
then breaking off negotiations, and its leaders would 
appear as .national heroes who refused to surrender the
p
rights of their country." The British government, it was
asserted, would not be justified in embarking on such
a sterile .adventure, and any concessions it night make
would be regarded by the Egyptians as acquired rights and
a starting point for further demands in any subsequent
3negotiations. Even if a treaty were successfully 
concluded, there was always the danger that it would be 
repudiated by future governments in Egypt.
The opponents of the treaty in Britain did not 
lose hope of wrecking it even after the British government
1. F.O. 371/2009^, Enclosure in despatch No. J 4-84/2/16,
Letter from 'Various European Residents in Cairo to
Sir J. Vardlaw-Milne, 3 January 1936.
2. But in the 1930's the r'afd had radically changed its 
tactics from extremism to moderation and was keen to 
have a treaty with Britain. See above, pp. 37-40.
3* E*0. 371/20096, Enclosure in despatch No. J 484/2/16,
Letter from Various European Residents in Cairo to 
Sir J. Nardlaw-Milne, 3 January 1936.
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had overruled their advice and had decided to enter 
forthwith into conversations. The Anglo-Egyptian. Commit- 
tee suggested that the British government should net 
start them unless the United Eront issued a statement 
that it would mntinain order and stop anti-British 
agitation. It was felt impossible to conduct friendly 
negotiations in an excited atmosphere, where the Egyptian 
government was unable or unwilling to curb violent and 
persistent student agitation. It was impossible, however, 
to obtain such a statement, and the British government 
thought it inadvisable to suspend the conversations 
pending its receipt. It was satisfied by a ‘warning to 
Nahhas and cAli Mahir, the Prime Minister, that it would& j * *
not continue the conversations if there were any riots 
or disorder.
The inclusion of Ahmad Mahir and NuqrashI in 
the Egyptian delegation was another chance for some 
Conservative M.P.s to attempt to prevent the negotiations. 
They claimed that it would be an insult to Britain if they 
were accepted as representatives of Egypt, since they were 
accomplices in the murder of Sir I.ee Stack. Their 
acquittal in 1926 was so directly contrary to the evidence
1. Composed of about forty M.P.s and under the presidency 
of Sir John ^ardlaw-Milne, this unofficial committee 
of the House of Commons had always been against 
concessions to Egypt.
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that the British member of the bench, Judge Kershaw, 
inn eel lately resigned, and the British government informed 
the Egyptian government on 2 June 1926 that it would not 
accept this verdict as a proof of i n n o c e n c e I t  was 
difficult for the British government to .raise any objec­
tion to NuqrashI as it hai approved his appointment in
21930 as Minister of Communications, and he was actually 
one of the members of the 1930 Egyptian delegation. The 
case of Ahmad Mahir was, however, different, as Britain 
had refused to negotiate with him in 1930, and accepted 
him only as an expert adviser to the Egyptian delegation. 
Though the British government preferred that he should 
not be one of the negotiators, it did not insist on his 
total exclusion, as his presence was a part of an 
internal combination, namely the maintenance of a 7-Jafdist 
majority and adequate representation of rival tendencies
1, F .0c 371/20101, Despatch No. J 184/2/16, J. wardlaw- 
Milne to Eden, 24 February 1936.
2. NuqrashI was regarded as a good Minister by the 
British officials who dealt with him.
3* In fact^the British government attempted to exclude 
Ahmad Ivlahir by suggesting a reduction of the Egyptian 
delegation to a similar number to that of Britain.
But this was not accepted by the Egyptian parties, 
as they did not trust each other. Nahhas, however, 
guaranteed that he alone would speak for the whole 
delegation.
F.O. 371/20101, Tel. No. 190(E), Lampson to Eden,
2 March 1936.
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1in the V;afd. Moreover, it did not want to offend his 
hrother cAlI Mahir, the Prime Minister. It instructed 
Lampson, however, to avoid any contact with him, as in 
1930. Nevertheless Ahmad Mahir participated actively 
in the conversations and was sometimes very helpful.
Ahile the Nahhas-Makran group of the '“afd was anxious 
from the beginning to resume negotiations in 1936 * the 
Mahir-Nuqrashi group opposed this,^ perhaps because they 
planned to discredit the former by accusing then ox 
cooperating with Britain to sell the country's independence 
Once they realized that a treaty was inevitable, the 
Mahir group quickly changed their tactics. They may 
have expected that Nahhas and Makran, with Britain's
C 0 7
help and friendship, would dominate the political scene, 
which they would not tolerate.
The most serious crux in the whole negotiations 
was the excessive demands of the technical advisers of the 
British government, who rocommended a military alliance 
that would achieve an ideal security a?or Britain's 
interests in Lgypt. They claimed that the defence of
1. There were two rivgl factions of the Tdaf d : that of
Nahhas and Makram ^bayd on the- one hand and that of 
NuqrashI and Ahmad Mahir on the other hand. Bor 
these see above, pp. 32*37.
2. See above, pp. 36-37.
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the Suez Canal was so vital to the British Eupire, as 
emphasized by the trend of world events since 1934, that 
Britain should maintain the fullest freedon of action now 
and in the future on its banks. On the other hand, the 
Foreign Office claimed that a treaty was politically 
nc-st important and worth a slight military risk tc 
satisfy the Egyptian amour propre. The gap between the 
two views was particularly wide over two major military 
issues: the location of the British troops in Egypt and
o
the duration of a treaty. This will be discussed later.
1* See above pp. 86-91*
2. See below, pp. 165-68 and pp. 177-82.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE OPENING OP KEGOTI.iTIOHS:__THE MILITARY CLAUSES
The Egyptian department at the Foreign Office 
felt* that the general dispostion of the Egyptians towards 
Britain after the Abyssinian crisis had created a more 
favourable atmosphere for the conclusion of a treaty.
But it considered that ea.rly 1956 was not tlie best tine 
to take advantage of this. The British governnent was 
too preoccupied by the interno,tional situation to study 
the question in the light of the changed circumstances. 
Moreover, Egyptian politics were in a very fluid state., 
The restoration of the 1923 Constitution was the "worst
i
possible portent for the chances of a treaty settlement". 
It would be premature to undertake negotiations in such 
an excited atmosphere. It was felt that the new friend­
liness in Egypt would probably last for some time so long 
as Britain declared her readiness to start discussions in 
a few months.
While agreeing that the moment was net ideal 
for undertaking negotiations, Lampson and his staff
L. P.O. 371/20096, Ho. 391/2/16, Minute by Peterson of 
the Foreign Office on the Political Situation in 
Egypt, 6 January 1936.
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opposed, their postponement. He emphasized the existence
of a disturbed state of nind in Egypt. He would net
guarantee the maintenance of public law and order by
the Egyptian government unless early satisfaction was
given to the request of the United Front. If the British
government was not ready bo negotiate immediately, he
asserted, it should be prepared to tako control of Egypt
1in the face of a hostile population and government.
The British government reluctantly accepted 
Lampson1 s advice and decided to eliter forthwith into 
conversations provided that they were confidential and 
preliminary. The failure of all previous negotiations 
had been followed by widespread and violent anti-British 
disturbances in Egypt. Britain did not want to give the 
1956 conversations any official character so as not "to
p
enhance the misfortune of a breakdown in them".
Both the Uafd and the opposition in Britain 
wanted to hold these conversations, like previous ones,
1. liie "holding down of Egypt by the might of British 
bayonets would have most unfavourable repercussions 
both on Bri bish and on world opinion and would have 
been represented as an example of British imperialist 
hypocrisy".
F.O. 571/30100, Ho. J 1633/2116, Minute by Campbell 
on the raison d 16tre of the Forthcoming Conversations 
with the Egyptian Delegation, 20 February 1936.
2. F.O. 371/20099v Enclosure in despatch Ho. J 1344-/2/16, 
Comment by Campbell, 16 February 1936.
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in London. But the British government insisted that they
should be in Cairo. do hold then in London would give
then none importance than it intended, and, says Eden,
51 There was always the danger that any Minister who cane
to London, and signed, would be overthrown on his return,
so compelling was our power of seduction thought to be15 .
In the early stages of the negotiations and in spite of
Nahhasfs pressure, Lampson avoided all discussions of
where the treaty would be signed. If the Egyptians knew
that this would be in London, they night regard it as a
further opportunity to try to extract concessions. It
was only :rpter the agreement on the military and Sudan
clauses that Lancs on 7/as instructed to tell Nahhas that• >
Britain would agree; with him to sign the treaty in 
London.^
The holding of the conversations in Cairo had, 
however, obvious disadvantages. It caused inevitable 
delay as Lampson had to refer to London on all matters.
If they were in London, the Foreign Office would be in 
closest touch with the defence and other departments
1. Earl of Avon: The Eden Memoirs, Facing the Dictators,
P. 593. ~ “  ’ ”
2 . Cab. 2 4 / 2 6 5 ,  C*F. 1 8 3 ( 3 6 ) ,  Memorandum by Eden on the 
Question whether the Egyptian Delegation should Come 
to London, 25 June 1 9 3 6 .
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concerned. In Cairo it was impossible to keep the con­
versations secret. cAli Mahir had warned the press 
"that there would be no publicity save any communiques 
issued either by the Government or treaty delegation. If 
any organ of the press transgressed, the rigour of the 
press law would be invoked".^ Nevertheless, the Egyptian 
press obtained some information from various Egyptian 
delegates, much of it highly coloured.
The Egyptian delegates, particularly the 
V7afdists, did not like this idee, of preliminary conver­
sations. Anxious to exploit then to advertise their 
political sentiments and to appear as the real leaders 
of the country, they did their best to invest then with
all the character of negotiations. They arranged to hold
c -then in the Za faran Palace where a secretariat was
installed, insisted on the exchange of benedictory
speeches at the opening cerenony on 2 March, and set the
Egyptian delegates on a "a naxinun of publicity and 
2
splash"„
All these attempts alarmed the British govern­
ment which regarded then as contrary to the spirit■of the
1. P.O. 371/20099? Tel. No. 13^(P), Lampson to Eden, 
10 February 1938.
2. F.O. 371/20099* Tel. No. 132, Lanpson to Eden, 10 
February 1938.
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conversations and likely to vitiate then, Prom the start 
Lampson warned both the Prime Minister, cAli Mahir, and 
Nahhas that these were only informal and confidential 
conversations. If that character was not understood and 
maintained, it would be difficult to maintain then. He 
added, "should there at a ay moment be student agitation 
or riots, I should refuse at once any further meeting until 
it had completely stopped".'*'
To tne British government, the whole treaty 
dfended upon agreement 03a the strategic issues. Once 
they were settled, the rest of the treaty would not 
present difficulties. Consequently it suggested that 
they should bo settled first. By such a course, Britain 
would .not commit herself to concessions on the non-military 
terms of the treaty only to find that the conversations
p
thereafter broke down on the military clauses. Moreover, 
this course would impress the Egyptians of the paramount 
importance of the military provisions to Britain.
1. Ibid.
2. ^.0. 371/200965 Tel. Ho. 24, Lampson to Eden, 8 
January 1936.
The military clauses : reactions in Britain and Egypt:
"he have to deal with serai-orientals and the
1tactics of the bazaar11. kith this idea in nind, Lanpson
started the nilitary conversations by asking for the
maxinun desiderata of the British government. At the
first session on 9 March* he offered the following:
"Until such time as Egypt, to the satisfaction 
of both parties, is in a position adequately 
to assume protection of her own territory, 
it should be agreed that forces (military, 
naval and air) of the two parties should 
be regarded as pooled in the common interest 
with the corollary of no limitation as to 
numbers, dispositions and so forth".2
To make this suggestion more palatable, the
British government declared its readiness to give Egypt
a free hand in the increase and modernization of her
array, Egypt, on her part, should undertake to attach
a British military mission to her army and purchase all
it$ equipment from Britain. The British government had
always been reluctant to strengthen the Egyptian army
because there was a danger (which, however, was not
considered to be serious in the 1930's) that, through
lack of discipline, it, "night be induced to join the
1. F.O. 371/20098, Tel. No. 125, Lampson to Eden, 8 
February 1930.
2. F.O. 371/20101, Despatch Ho. J 224-5/0. , Lampson to 
Sir Oliphant of the Foreign Office, 5 March 1930.
161
mob and give them sufficient armed assistance to create 
a very serious situation, or, as [had] happened in the 
past, the Egyptian army might again become the instrument 
of personal or party ambition1' , ^ If a friendly treaty was 
concluded with Egypt, Britain was, however, prepared to 
give this concession in the hope that the Egyptian army 
might then be a valuable ally to cooperate with the 
British forces in the defence of Egypt and the Sues Canal.
To Justify these increased British military
demands, Lanpson emphasized that the Italian threat to
rendered the 1930 draft military clauses obsolete,
and called for a more extensive Anglo-Egyptian military
cooperation. Anxious to wreck the treaty, the minority
parties conducted a strong press campaign in which they
claimed that there was no real Italian danger to Egypt.
The British government learned from a highly secret and
2x©liable source that Sidqi, the cleverest of the Egyptian 
politicians-, nicknamed in the Foreign Office "the dirty 
dog", directly inspired the Italian under-secretary for 
foreign affairs to hand a declaration to the Egyptian
1. Cab. 4/22, C.O.S. 309, Enclosure 3 to C.I.D. Bo.
1113-B, Report by the C.O.S. on the Military Aspects 
of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Proposals (1933), 19 
May 1933*
2a F.O. 971/20103, Bo. J 2962/G-. , Campbell to Lampson, 
22 April 1936. The name of the source is not given.
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Charge d TAffaires at Rone
ntc the effect that the Italian Government 
had no intention of attacking or in any way 
threatening Egypt, and that Italy was always 
disposed to conclude with Egypt agreements 
guaranteeing the maintenance of the common 
frontier and a policy inspired by feelings 
c. f profound friend ship " .1
I'bere were reports in the anti-".afdist press that secret 
negotiations were actually taking place for the conclusion 
of a non-aggression pact between Italy and Egypt. Mon­
sieur Gallacl, the editor of the Journal cl{Egypte, told 
the Oriental Secretary that this rumour was based on a 
suggestion made by Siclqi to Nahhas at an early stage of 
the military conversations that the conclusion of such a 
pact "would cut the ground from beneath the feet of the 
British negotiators and make it difficult for them to 
maintain their present military demands which were
la" gely based on requirements for the defence of Egypt
2 c - -
against Italy". Though Ali Mahir totally denied these
c —
reports , §idqi1 s organ, continued to argue that
such a pact would be of advantage to Egypt.
\7ith the help of the Italian propagandists, 
the Palace and. the minority parties described the whole
1. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1935-36, Vol. 312,
corr^ sriiTzr^ '— ~ — — ~ — — * — " — ™
2. P.O. 371/20104, Tel. No. 367 (534/1/36), Lanpson to 
Eden, 4 April 1936.
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international situation created by tlie invasion of
Abyssinia as a trial of strength between Italy and Britain.
The Italian victory loft Britain in a critically weak
position and in urgent need of the friendship of
to face the strong Italian challenge. Consequently, they
asserted, rather than nake concessions to Britain, the
tine was most propitious for Egypt to extract her national
demands. The Egyptians need only be intransigent to
secure whatever concessions they wished from Britain.
dhile Britain needed the alliance of Egypt, al-Balagh
claimed that Egypt did not need Britain, as she could
reciuit by her own resources a strong army to protect
her territories against any danger
"dhile accepting the British military mission,
the Egyptian delegation categorically refused the pooling
of forces, which, they felt, involved encroachment on
tneir sovereignty, It meant more than association of
British troops with theirs, and amounted In practice to
a continued, occupation of Egypt by British troops. They
maintained that "except in time of war no sovereign could
accept an equal partnership with an allied army on its 
2
territory". The pooling suggestion, in fact, created
• AI-Balagh, 20 February 1936-
2, E.O. 371/20103, Tel. No. 290, Lampson to Eden, 9 
April 1930.
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bad feeling among the Egyptian delegates. According to
Ga secret police report, Makran Ubayd declared that, 
"although he had been optimistic beforehand, ho thought 
after the first meeting that the chances of success were 
only 20/o,
Though illness had lost Fu'ad the control ever 
the government and deprived him of much of his energy, 
the Foreign Office suspected that he was attempting in 
his last days to cause a quick breakdown of the negoti­
ations. After learning the unreceptive attitude of the 
Egyptian negotiators to the British pooling formula,
Fu'ad blamed Lampson for his indulgence in generalities 
in the first session on military clauses, and advised him
to get down as scon as possible to definite business and
2 cconcrete proposals- He also inspired Alii Mahir to hint
to Lanpson that the British should not worry over failure
of the negotiations, as they could adopt a temporary
military alliance with Egyjjt leaving the larger questions
for later negotiations.
1. F.O. 371/20101, No. 212, Lampson to Eden, 9 March 
1936.
2. F.O. 371/20102, Tel. No* 223> Lanpson to Eden, 17 
March 1936.
3. F n0 o 371/20102, Tel. No. 231, Lanpson to Eden, 20 
March 1936*
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The Egyptian delegation, however, suggested 
that the framework of discussion should be within that 
of haspson’s verbal co d dunications of January 193& i«e. 
the effect of recent developments on the military clauses 
of the 1950 draft treaty.. The pooling formula was some­
thing new and far from the spirit conceived, in 1930* In 
their vie?/ the practical course was to ’’take the clauses 
of the 1930 draft and examine each in turn seeking when­
ever to adapt them to the changed circumstances of today”.'*’ 
On 16 March Nahhas suggested that the heads of the two 
dell agations should meet to come to an understanding 011
suggestions leading to definite proposals. Lampson
2
agreed and the first meeting was held on 17 March.
The first serious issue facing the negotiators 
was the location of the British troops in Egypt, a matter 
whtch had been a cause of sharp differences between the
1. P.O. 371/20102, Tel. No. 222, Lanpson to Eden, 16 
March 1936.
2. In his meeting with Nahhas, Lanpson was assisted by 
his three service advisers: the G-.O.C., Lieutenant
General Tfeir, A.O.C., Sir Robert Brooke Fophain, and 
the Gommander-in-Chief (Mediterranean)i Admiral Sir 
L'fT. Fisher. Nahhas was advised by Amin Uthman, 
bhe secretary-general of the Egyptian delegation. 
Amin was well acquainted with the Egyptian question 
and was most helpful in these conversations. More 
than once he persuaded Nahhas and other members of 
the Egyptian delegation to make concessions to 
Britain.
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Foreign Office and the service departments. Hie Foreign
Office had always stated categorically that no Egyptian
government would accept any treaty which, would permanently
maintain the British troops in, or in the immediate
neighbourhood of, Cairo and Alexandria, and advised the
British government to agree to their transfer to the Canal
Zone. Depending on the advise of the military authorities
in Egypt, the Foreign Office claimed that this transfer
would not involve a great military risk as a British
garrison could ensure the safety of the Suejj Canal, and,
if necessary, resume control over Egypt, as well from
die Canal Zone as from their present 'positions in the 
]cities. ' Such a transfer, it was felt, would be politr- 
caily most desirable, as the presence of the British 
troops in the cities not only reflected on Britain's 
acknowledgement of Egyptian independence, but also sapped 
the responsibility of the Egyptian government fot keeping
1. This view 'was first stated by General Burnett^Stuart, 
the immediate predecessor of General heir, and later 
supported in June 1934- by the latter and the A.O.C, 
After a shcrt visit to Egypt in late February 1936, 
General Deverell, who became C.I.G.S. on 7 April 
1936, claimed that the withdrawal of the British 
troops from Cairo to the Canal Zone would be better 
from a military point of view. Ee telegi.aph.ed this 
view' to the War Office, but he was told to mind his 
own business.
F.O. 371/20101, Tel. Bo. 210, Lampson to Sir Oliphant 
of the Foreign Office, 10 March 1936.
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law and. order; and enabled the Egyptians to throw back 
on Britain the blame of everything that went wrong in 
their internal affairs.^-
But the fighting departments had persistently 
objected to this as a grave danger to imperial communi­
cations. All plans for attempts to commit acts of 
sabotage on the Canal and engineer internal unrest in 
Egypt would be hatched in Cairo, and the presence of 
British troops in or near wou^d be a powerful deterrent. 
From the Canal Zone, it was felt most difficult for 
Britain to send forces to Cairo to quell any trouble that 
endangered the life and. proi^erty of foreigners. It night 
even be necessary to rcoccupy Cairo in the face of a 
dissatisfied Egyptian army, trained and equipped by
Britain herself. Moreover, this would be a good excuse
2
for foreign powers, such as Italy, to send forces to 
C^ -.iro to defend, their own nationals. In case of trouble 
at Alexandria, it would be much easier and safer to send 
reinforcements from Cairo than from the Canal Zone.
1. F.O. 371/20118, No. J 7423/2/16, Text of a Talk on 
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty by J.A. Spender broadcast 
ty the B.B.C. on 31 August 1938*
2, Italy had. recently sent troops in suioport of her 
own nationals at Hodeida.
Cab. 4-/22, C.I.D. No. 1137-B. Report by the C.O.S. 
on the Defence of the Suez Canal against Blocking 
Attack and Sabotage, 18 May 1934.
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While the read from Cairo running across the Delta would 
X^ermit such reinf or cements in a day, they would he 
uncertain Iron the Canal Zone owing to the vulnerability 
of communications across the Nile Delta, even if inproved. 
The desired connection between the Egyptian and British 
arnies, so that they could be regarded as one force to 
neet external aggression, would be lost if the British 
troops were transferred from Cairo to the Canal Zone.^
The British troox^s should remain in or near Alexandria 
to cope with any threat to Egyx^t from Libya and the 
Mediterranean. Until recently the |>ossibility of such 
an attack had been remote, but the recent Italian strength 
in Libya constituted a x^otential threat to Egypt. British 
plans, it was felt, should be based on the possibility 
of a hostile Italy.
The location of the British troops in Egypt 
was thoroughly discussed in the Cabinet before the 
beginning of the negotiations. Chile well aware that it 
was unlikely to obtain the x>ooling formula, the Cabinet 
decided to offer it so as to give the service advisers 
a chance to explain the strategic situation. Faced by 
its complete refusal, Larrpsor was instructed to declare
, 137“ “
1. Cab. 24-/262, C .I .D ./1225--B. Deport by the C.O.S. 
on the Military Aspects of an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty,
1 April 1936.
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Britain's readiness to withdraw her forces fron the centre 
of Cairo to the outskirts of the city, i.e. from Kasr 
al--Nil and the Citadel to Abhasia and al-Helmieh. With 
this nobile reserve in the suburbs of Cairo, the British 
troops should be maintained in the C-nal Zone and at, or 
in the neighbourhood of, Alexandria. The transfer of 
British troops fron the cities would take place when the 
Egyptian army,to the satisfaction of both parties, was 
efficient enough to take over.
While agreeing to the stationing of British
troops in the Canal Zone, Nahhas refused to sanction the “ . #•
1occupation of Cairo and Alexandria. Owing to the pres­
ence of the British fleet, he claimed that the danger of 
a sudden attack was just as impossible as a sudden descent 
upon Alexandria. In case of danger, Britain could send 
reinforcements in a few hours from Isnailia. Even if not 
properly trained, he asserted, the Egyptian troops could 
hold positions adequately at Alexandria, and in the 'Sma&mmm.
1. The Egyptian negotiators did not agree to the reten­
tion of the British troops in Alexandria because they 
thought that Britain intended to make the port a 
permanent British naval base. Though the British 
government emphasized that it was only anxious for 
permanent coastal defences to be set up there in 
Egyptian hands, the Egyptians strongly opposed the 
occupation of Alexandria.
E.O. 371/20102, Tel. No. 295 *> Lamps on to Eden, 12 
March 1936.
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Western Desert until such reinforcements arrived. He 
rejected the phrase "to the satisfaction of both parties", 
as, in his view, it "would be interpreted in Egypt as a 
loophole enabling British troops to stay in Cairo and 
Alexandria regardless of any time limit 011 the pretext 
that Egyptian troops were not fit to take over"^
Nahhas. however, made a number of important conces­
sions over and above the 1930 draft military clauses.
While in 1930 the peace-time garrison in the Canal Zone 
was to be 8,000, Nahhas offered to increase it to 10,000* * a # *
land forces, with 400 pilots and ancillary personnel for 
administrative and technical duties. The 1930 draft had 
given Britain the right to send reinforcements to Egypt 
in case of war or imminent menace of war. In addition 
Nahhas was ready to accept Britain's right to send re in­
fo" cements in the case of apprehended emergency and before
2a state of acute crisis was reached. * Nahhas also offered
o c
extensive training facilities south of Ismailia for the 
British army in the Suez Canal Zone. Britain was given 
the right to pass her troops across the Delta to manoeuvre 
in the Western Desert whenever necessary. The Royal Air
1. F*0. 371/20103, Tel. No. 258, Lampson to Eden, 31 
March 1938.
2. F.O. 371/20104, Tel. No. 305(H), Lampson to Eden, 
16 April ].936.
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Force would have landing grounds in Egypt wherever it
1wanted and freedom to fly to them whenever it wished. 
Another concession over and above the 1930 draft was the 
provision of new, and the improvement of existing, means 
of communications from the Canal Zone to the interior of
_  p
Egypt. Egypt would also build alternative accommodation
for the British troops in the Canal Zone. The British
troops would stay in their positions in the cities until
the new communications and accommodation had been provided
for them to the satisfaction of the British military 
3mission/
Though all agreed on the complete secrecy of the 
conversations, the non-Wafdist delegates disclosed the
1. The principle of liberty of flight was finally accepted 
on condition that reciprocal facilities would be granted 
to the Egyptian air force in British territory. It
was fully understood that this would not include 
Palestine. Moreover, flights for training purposes 
would take place mostly over desert areas. Populated 
areas would only be flown over where necessity so 
demanded.
F.O. 371/20102, Tel. No. 245 -j Lamps on to Eden, 9 July 
193  ^*
2. Besides increasing and improving the railway facilities 
in the Canal Zone, Egypt agreed to double the line 
between Zagazig and Tanta, and to improve that from 
Alexandria to Marsa Matruh. Egypt was also to con- 
struct and maintain seven*roads and to improve three 
others.
3* F.O, 371/20102, Tel, No. 245> Lampson to Eden, 26 
March 1936.
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nature and extent of Nahhas?s concessions. While realizing* 0
that they were "a very hitter pill to make the public 
1
swallow", the Wafdist press strongly supported them. It 
asserted that the road programme was essential to encour­
age tourism in Egypt and would be profitable to Egyptian 
workers and contractors. The disclosure of these con­
cessions led to an outcry in the non-Wafdist press which 
regarded them as incompatible with Egyptian independence.
It particularly criticised bhe heavy expenditure on roads, 
railways and barracks, which was expected to delay Egypt's 
economic development and hinder the progress of the urgen-
p
tly needed social services in education and health." It 
was felt that the 1930 military clauses were the maximum 
Egyptian concessions, which had been accepted by Britain 
as the basis of any subsequent negotiations, and that 
aiiM departure from them should be rejected even at the
1. F.O. 371/20104-, Enclosure in No. 7/257/36, Minute by 
^■illiamson-Nepier on a Conversation math Tawflq Diab 
and Hafiz Awad, proprietors of al-Jihad and Kawkab 
al-S&arq"respectively, 1 April 1930.
2* Al-Siyasa, 26 July .1936.
3. Following the failure of the 1930 negotiations, Mr.
Hnederson, then Foreign Secretary, stated that if the 
Egyptians accepted in the future the 1930 draft military 
clauses, they would still be available, and the British
government would be prepared to try to reach an
agreement on the Capitulatory and Sudan clauses.
Crnd. 3575v Egypt No. 1 (1930), p. 8.
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expense of breaking off the negotiations.
The service departments disliked the movement of 
the British troops from Cairo to Helouan, some fifteen 
miles south of Cairo, as any necessary reinforcements to 
the western frontier or the Suez Canal would have to pass 
through Cairo, which would he very disadvantageous in 
cases of serious disaffection there- The British govern­
ment, however, overruled them and offered this. But 
Nahhas refused arguing that "the Egyptian people would 
never he ahle to understand or acquiesce in the change of 
site and would regard it as another or even a more
1pronounced form of perpetuation of the present occupation".
The conversations now reached their first deadlock.
While Lampson had to refer to his government for new
instructions, Nahhas wanted to adjourn the conversations
p
owing to the approach of elections. On 20 April 1936 
tne two delegations agreed to adjourn the conversations 
till 5 May, when they met to adjourn again till 15 May.
This delay was inevitable, as the British government had 
not yet decided on two major issues: the location of the
1. F.O. 371/20104, Tel. No. 303(H), Lampson to Eden, 
16 April 1956.
2. The elections were held on 2 May 1936.
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British, troops in Egypt and the question of the time-limit.'*" 
This adjournment was rather opportune to Nahhas as it
2
gave him time to settle his "other numerous occupations" 
erg. the formation of his Cabinet and so forth. Moreover,
it enabled him "to be more firmly in the saddle or at any
rate have had more opportunity of seeing how he stands
with his ov/n party and whether he can safely make conces­
sions to H.M.G. or had better stick out against their 
demands".
The treaty question was facing serious difficulties 
in the British Cabinet. Eden, who had been in Geneva, 
felu it essential to be present in Cabinet when the matter 
was discussed. In a personal message he asked Nahhas to 
agree to another adjournment. Nahhas agreed provided 
that he [Nahhas] took the responsibility and issued a 
statement alleging his preoccupation with questions of 
internal politics. To give the real reason, he correctly 
expected "would afford certain quarters an excuse to 
accuse His Majesty's Government of wilful procrastination".^
1. See below, pp. 177-85.
2. j? ,0. 571/20106, Tel. No. 387(H), Lamps on to Eden,
5 May 1938.
3* E.Oc 371/20107:, Enclosure in Tel. No. 407(H) 5 Comment 
by Campbell, 11 May 1938.
4. E.G. 371/201075 Tel. No. 407(H), Lampson to Eden,
9 May 1938.
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Lampson agreed end tLe Egyptian delegation issued the
following communique to the press:
"Owing to the pressure of work in connexion 
with questions of internal politics, the 
head of the Egyptian delegation has arranged 
with the head of the British delegation that 
their meeting which was to have taken place 
on May--,13th should he postponed until May 
25th".
These frequent adjournments were deliberately
interpreted by the anti~¥afdists as a proof of the
reluctance of Britain to have a treaty, and her intention
to spin out negotiations until the inernational situation
made it easier for her to defy the Egyptians. It was
felo that if she were not ready to concede Egypt’s demands
immediately, the Egyptians should ally with Italy, v/hose
victory over Abyssinia proved that she was the superjor
power and that British power was on the wane. Britain,
they asserted, would be unable to protect Egypt from a 
2gas attack, as was the case in Abyssinia which Britain 
had originally encouraged to resist. It would be far 
better for Egypt, they claimed, to seek the friendship
1. Ibid.
2. The ruthless use of this gas in Abyssinia inspired 
profound fear among the Egyptians who realized that 
they would have a hard time if they were at war 
with Italy.
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1
of a power as strong and ruthless as Italy. Alarmed by
this campaign, the British government instructed Lampson
c — —
on 5 May 1936 to warn All Mahir, then Prime Minister,
"against any tendency in interested Egyptian quarters to
use. these Italian manoeuvres to stir up anti-British
feeling to hinder the course of the present Anglo-
2Egyptian discussions". Lampson also reminded Nahhas, 
who became Prime Minister on 10 May, that treaty or no 
treaty, the only safe policy for Egypt would be friendship 
with Britain, and that any raprochement with Italy at 
the expense of this friendship would be harmful to Egypt.
Conversations were resumed on 26 May. Responding 
to Nahhas's counter-proposals and strongly advised by 
Eden, the British government was now ready to do without 
a base in or near Cairo, but it insisted on the retention 
of -its troops in or near Alexandria until both parties 
were satisfied that the Egyptian army was fit to take 
over. As in the case of Cairo, Nahhas firmly refused to 
accept an indefinite period for the withdrawal from
1. P.O. 371/20107* Enclosure 1 to despatch No. 511 
(534/14/36). Report by Mr. Nellesey of the Ministry 
of the Interior to the Residency, 6 May 1936.
2. P.O. 371/20133* Tel. No. 235* Eden to Lampson, 6 
May 1936.
3. P.O. 371/20107* Tel. No. 250, Eden to Lampson, 13
May 1936.
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Alexandria.*** He was., .however, ready to fix a larger term 
than for Caii’o, provided that it was clearly defined and 
not too extensive. No agreement was reached on this 
question.
The conv^rsations turned to a more difficult
issue: the protection of the Suez Canal and the question
of the time-limit. This had been another source of
conflict between the Foreign Office and the service
departments. Before the beginning of the negotiations,
the Residency and the Foreign Office had stated clearly
that there would be no prospect of obtaining any treaty
which did not provide for a time-limit, after which the
question of its duration and revision should, if necessary^
be referred to the League of Nations. Both the 1928 and
2
1930 draft treaties had provided for this, and it was 
feUt most unlikely that the Egyptians would agree to an 
indefinite treaty in 1936, since they did not admit that 
Britain was legally in possession of the right to protect
1„ F,0. 371/20108, Tel. No. 4-72, Lampson to Eden, 26 
May 1936*
2. In the I93O negotiations, the Egyptian delegation 
was induced with the utmost difficulty to agree that 
the retention of the British troops in the Canal Zone 
should remain unquestioned for twenty years.
F.O. 371/2.0100, Tel. No. I69, Lampson to Eden, 26 
February 1936.
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the Suez C a n a l T h e  Egyptians wanted in this respect
parity of treatment with Iraq. Article 11 of the Anglo-
2
Iraqi treaty of 1930 had put a definite time-limit, and
there was no Justification for refusing Egypt the same
concession. Rather than allow the negotiations to breed:
down over tlvis issue, Eden advised his colleagues to agree
to an article in the terms of article Id of the 1930
draft treaty: viz., at any time after the expiration of
twenty years, the two countries, at the request of either
of them, would enter into negotiations to revise the
treaty. If they disagreed, the matter would he submitted
to the Concil of the League. Nevertheless negotiations
for such a revision could start with the consent of both
3parties at any time after ten years.’ Such an article,
1 See below, pp., 185-87-
2. This article provided that the treaty should continue 
for twenty-five years. At any time after twenty years 
the two countries would, at the request of either of
. them, conclude a new treaty which should provide for 
the continued maintenance and protection of the 
essential communications of the British Empire. If 
they disagreed, the matter would be referred to the 
Council of the League.
E.O. 371/20104, No. J 3027/2/16, Appendix IV of a 
Report by the C.O.S. on the Question of Time-limit,
9 April, 1938.
3. The C.I.D, recommended that the treay should not 
include any provision referring to its duration, 
as a time-limit would be a temporary and dubious
E/note contd0 on next page
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in the view of the Foreign Office, would not involve a 
great military risk to the security of the Suez Canal as, 
according to article 8 of the treaty, the British forces 
would withdx’&w from the Canal Zone after twenty years 
only if Egypt were able by her own resources to ensure 
the liberty and entire security of navigation in the Canal. 
Financially, it was felt, Egypt could not afford to build 
a strong army, and however efficient it might be, she 
cculd not ensure the security of theCanal as a fleet 
would be needed for this purpose. Since it had never been 
suggested in the treaty that Egypt would have a navy, 
Britain could retain her forces after twenty years on the 
grounds that the Egyptian army had not yet attained the 
necessary state of efficiency. After twenty years, the
Footnote 3 contd. from previous page
safeguard which might be open to later challenge by 
Egypt. But Eden argued that if this suggestion were 
adopted, the legal position would be somewhat uncertain. 
Apart from the possible termination of the treaty under 
article 19 of the Covenant (according to this article, 
the Assembly "may from time to time advise the recon­
sideration by members of the League of treaties which 
had become inapplicable"), it might be open for Egypt 
to argue that she could terminate it unilaterally at 
any time after giving reasonable notice.
^.0. 571/20102, No. J 2667/2/16, Minute from the Foreign 
Office to the Service Departments on the Duration of 
the Treaty, 27 March 1936.
1. F.O. 371/20110, No. J 5400/2/16, Draft Conclusions of 
the Second Meeting of the Anglo-Egyptian Conversations 
Committee on 12 June 1930.
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British troops would not leave the Canal Zone unless the
1Council of the League decided unanimously that they were
no longer necessary to protect the Canal and imperial
communications. With Britain’s strong influence in the
League, it was difficult to conceive such a situation,
and the existing treaty would go on unchanged, a situation
which would suit the British government very well. The
refusal of Britain to allow any reference in the treaty
to the League would he exploited embarrassingly against
her, as her critics would make a contrast between this
attitude and her recent championship of the League during
2
the Abyssinian crisis. If Britain insisted on an 
indefinite treaty, it was asserted, this would lead to a 
rupture of negotiations with dangerous consequences in 
Egypt; and the who 1 e He ar East.
Only a small minority of the Cabinet, particu­
larly Ramsay Macdonald, the Lord President, and the 
Marquis of Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, 
had supported Eden over this complicated issue. Though 
well aware that Eden’s proposal entailed an element of 
risk after twenty years, they thought it would be worth
1. Under article 15 of the Covenant, tho Council could 
only act unanimously,
2, P.O. 371/20100, Tel, Ho. 179? Lampson to Eden, 28 
Pebruaj?y 1936 *
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taking in order to secure a treaty. The Egj^ptians night
then he glad to allow the British forces to remain in
Egypt, if, during the next twenty years, Britain obtained
1a close treaty relationship and won their confidence
2But the majority of the Cabinet strongly upheld the 
service departments' view that it would be most dangerous 
for tho Empire's communications for such a vital British 
interest to be put in the hands of the League at a tine 
when the international situation had entirely changed 
owing tc the rise of Italy as a Mediterranean and North 
African power. In twenty years time, the League’s com­
position, rules and functions might have fundamentally 
changed, or it might be completely abolished. Possibly 
the powers would be jealous of Britain as a colonial power
1. Cab. 23/84-, No. 35(36), Conclusion 1, 11 May 1936.
2. The following ministers were most active in their 
opposition to any reference to the League: Oliver 
Stanley (President of the Board of Education), Hoare 
(Pirst Lord of the Admiralty), Simon (Home Secretary), 
Viscount Hailsham (Lord Chancellor), Thomas Inskip 
(Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence), Kingsley 
Pood (Minister of Health), Chamberlain (Chancellor of 
the Exchequer), Viscount Halifax (Lord Privy Seal).
J. According tc the legal advisers of the Foreign Office, 
if tho Council of the League ceased to exist in twenty 
years time, the British government could argue that 
the treaty position would be maintained. Possibly, 
however, some other form of arbitration might be found. 
Cab. 23/81, No. 38(36)? Conclusion 3? 20 May 1936.
182
and might decide against her. Parliamentv it was asserted,
1
could not be induced to agree to such a settlement, which
would be unacceptable to the dominions and public opinion
in Britain. In fact the representatives of Australia,
New Zealand and South Africa strongly objected to any
suggestion that might at any time weaken British control
2over the Canal. If the British government used its 
majority to secure the passage through Parliament of the 
provision for reference to the League., this would impose 
a very grave strain on imperial relations. Rather than 
have a treaty with a time-limit, the Cabinet preferred 
not to have a treaty at all.
Eden attempted to prevent a breakdown of the 
conversations by putting forward a new proposal in which 
he suggested that in return for Britain's acceptance of 
a ■•reference to the League, Egypt should, recognise Britain's 
independent and perpetual right to protect the Suez Canal. 
Though the C.I.G-.S. advised against this proposal, the
1. The Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, thought that on
a question of this importance, the Cabinet should take 
its decision purely on the merits of the case and not 
be influenced by the House of Commons. If the Cabinet 
were convinced of what was the right course, the House 
of Commons would accept it.
Ibid.
2. Cab„ 24/262, A.E.C. (36), Appendix II to C.P. 129, Draft 
Conclusions of the First Meeting of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Conversations Committee on 7 May 1936.
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i
Cabinet reluctantly accepted it on 20 May 1936. rfo cover
Britain's claim for undisputed right to protect the Canal,
Lampson was instructed to offer the following:
"In view of the position of His Britannic 
Majesty in relation to the Canal, His Majesty 
the King of Egypt recognises that His Britannic 
Majesty may, through the Commanders of his 
forces, take all steps necessary for the 
maintenance of the security and freedom of 
navigation in the said Canal. The Egyptian 
authorities will cooperate in all measures 
for the purposes aforesaid".^
Lampson emphasized that Britain's right to protect the
Suez Canal should be within the meaning of Article 9 of
the Canal Convention of 1888,^ i.e. by assuming the
1. In fact the Cabinet had at first refused this proposal 
on 30 April 1936 on the grounds that the British 
position in relation to the Suez Canal should be 
recognised by Egypt beyond any possibility of doubt,
It strongly held the view that any difference between 
the two parties should not be referred to the Council, 
but to a conciliation commission whose decisions should 
be recommendations only. Since its functions were 
advisory only, it could not be said in Parliament that 
the government had handed over a vital matter to the 
decission of a third party. But Eden pointed out that 
such a procedure would not be acceptable to the 
Egyptians, "and would involve political difficulties 
owing to its implications of doubt in the future of 
the League".
Cab 23/84, ITo. 38(36), Conclusion 3? 20 May 1936.
2. Cab. 24/262, C.F. 136(36), Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on An^lo-Egyptian Treaty Negotiations, 16 
May 1936.
3o Article 9 gave Egypt the primary right of defending
the Canal and enforcing the provisions of the Convention. 
Turkey was only entitled/ to cooperate in its defence 
if Egypt lacked adequate means of defence and called 
upon her to partake in such defence.
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residual rights of both Turkey and Egypt. He claimed that 
most other powers had already recognised that Britain 
possessed these residual rights. Britain had acquired 
Turkey’s rights through the treaty of Lausanne and Egypt’s 
rights through the Protectorate. On the Declaration of 
Independence, these rights were vested in the British 
government under the second Reserved Point. It was felt
that the weak link in this chain was Egypt, and it was
her recognition that Britain was seeking to obtain by a 
treaty.
Britain insisted that her claims in relations to
the Suez Canal should be permanent. In this respect the
actual British offer was as follows :
"His Majesty the King of Egypt recognises 
that the Suez Canal and adjacent territories, 
while being an integral part of Egypt, form 
an essential artery of all forms of communi­
cations between different parts of the British 
Empire, the permanent maintenance and pro­
tection of which is in the interests of both 
the High Contracting Parties, and accordingly 
authorises His Britannic Majesty to maintain 
on Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the 
Canal such forces as His Britannic Majesty 
considers necessary to ensure the protection 
of this artery of communications1*.
Instructed by his government, Lampson frankly told Hahhas
that Britain was not ready to hand over to a third party
1. Cab. 24-/262, C.P. 136(56), Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Negotiations, 16 
May 1936.
185
the decision as to the title to defend the Canal, The- 
only question which could after twenty years he referred 
to the Council of the League would he the number and siting 
of the troops required for this purpose. Even after this 
period, they should not he reduced to a token force. If 
appealed to, tho Council could only decide what the sub­
stantial numbers would be.'*'
The Egyptian delegates categorically rejected 
both proposals which they regarded as deliberately 
designed by Britain to wreck the treaty. Lampson took 
immediate steps to disabuse their minds of this belief.
He pointed out that the recent international developments 
and problems arising therefrom had made necessary for
Britain "to put forward proposals covering gaps revealed
2m  earlier draft arrangements". Nahhas, who was extre-4 # 7
mely upset; and disappointed, argued that these proposals 
had completely changed the whole basis of discussion. If 
a breakdown were to be avoided-, he asserted., Britain should 
withdraw them and accept those of the 1930 draft treaty. 
Nothing could better explain the Egypcian point of view 
than a document prepared by Makram ^bayd, which was
1. E.O. 371/20108, Tel. No. 269, Eden to Lampson 21 
May 1936.
2. E.O. 371/20108, Tel. No. 477(H), Lampson to Eden,
26 May 1936.
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praised by the Residency as being well-argued and res-
tratined- Nahhas handed it to Lampson on 1 Juno 1936,
1and its main points are as follows:
According to the Suez Canal Convention of 1888, 
the defence of the Canal belonged to Egypt as it generally 
recognised the sovereign rights of the Sultan and Khedive, 
and article 12 specifically reserved Turkey's territorial 
rights which had devolved exclusively upon independent 
Egypt. Since article 9 of this Convention gave Egypt 
the primary right to defend the Canal, the British 
proposals, which claimed this for Britain, would place 
Egypt in an inferior position as an ally of Britain to 
what she had held as a vassal of Turkey. While the 1930 
draft treaty recognised the principles of the Convention, 
it gave Britain an extensive right to co-operate in the 
dej-ence of the Canal. It allowed her to station her 
forces in the Canal Zone, which could be unrestrictedly 
increased In case of war, menace of war, or, as recently 
suggested, emergency, and even after tho withdrawal of 
her forces from Egypt, she could do this in such cases.
The British claim for a permanent occupation of the Suez 
Canal failed to solve the principal Anglo-Egyption problem
1. For the full text of this memorandum see Appendix II.
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of the presence of British troops in Egypt, and infringed 
Egypt's sovereignty since the Canal was an integral part 
of her territoryo ihile the 1930 draft treaty provided 
for the future evacuation of Egypt, it made this dependent 
on her ability to defend the Canal. Since Britain would 
train the Egyptian army, she would be in a singular 
position to judge this, and in the unexpected case of 
difference, the matter would be submitted to the League. 
This solution would be fair to Egypt and Britain, and 
would not be foreign to the Canal Convention, which 
provided for Egypt to call on Turkey if she were unable 
to defend the Canal, and in case of difference to refer 
the question to the Signatory Powers.
Lampson tried Nahhas with the suggestion of 
some form of assurance outside the troaty to cover both 
points. But Nahhas remained adamant. An impasse was 
reached and the chances of a treaty became slender.
Eden saved the conversations from failure by
instructing Lampson to come immediately to London for
q
consultation. While the minority leaders argued that 
the conversations were doomed to failure and there was
1. Eden hoped that Lampson’s return would prove to the
Egyptian delegation that they were mistaken in assuming 
that Britain made her latest proposals to ensure a 
breakdown. No.
P.O. 371/20108, Tel./288, Eden to Lampson, 28 May 1936.
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no justification for any further adjournment, Nahhas,
who was anxious to avoid a breakdown, warmly welcomed
this move. rie guaranteed that there would be no danger
whatsoever of its being misread or causing trouble.
Lampson arrived in London on 4- June. He was accompanied
1
by the A.O.C. and the Oriental Secretary, Mr. Smart.
The latter was brought because "he [had] been present in
all meetings with Nahas Pasha, [was] fully conversant
with the whole military situation and [had] also the
p
advantage of participating in Iraqi negotiations". His
local knowledge and historical background would be of
3great benefit.
L. Sir Walter Alexander Smart entered the Levant Consular 
Service in 1903 and served in Persia, Morocco, U.S.A., 
Greece, Syria, and Egypt. He became the Oriental 
Secretary at Tehran 1920-22, Oriental Secretary at 
Cairo 1926, Oriental Counsellor at Cairo 1929-4-5? and 
Oriental Minister to the British embassy at Cairo in 
1945- Who's Who, 1961, p. 2813.
2. IT.0r 371/20109? Tel. ^o. 4-92, Lampson to Eden, 28 
May 1936.
3. The foreign Office did not want Smart to come to 
London, but Lampson persuaded it to agree. He tele­
graphed: "I would very much prefer to bring Oriental 
Secretary as well. His specialized knowledge is 
unique and would be most helpful and there are many 
other points beyond purely military clauses, discussions 
of which in department would be most valuable with a 
view to subsequent Cabinet decision which may be 
necessary, furthermore Oriental Secretary being in 
close touch with Egyptian feeling could advise upon 
probable effect of any proposed course of action".
P.O. 37-1/20109? Tel. No. 4-9^ , Lampson to Eden, 29 
May 1936.
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While Lampson was in London, Nahhas put a new 
complexion on the whole matter. On A June 1936 ? he told
p
Mr. Kelly, the acting High Commissioner, that even after 
the withdrawal of her troops from Cairo and Alexandria, 
Britain could send bhem back without limit in an appre­
hended emergency. On 6 J m e 3 Makram °Ubayd, Nahhas: s 
right hand and the most powerful influence in the Wafd, 
repeated the same offer to Kelly.
This in effect provided Britain with a con­
tinuing military alliance. With this new principle, Eden 
persuaded his colleagues to abandon their demands for 
independe3.1t action by Great Britain for the protection 
of che Canal, and the recognition of her rights to its 
permanent military occupation. In a memorandum to the 
Cabinet, Eden argued that this important new principle
"would remove one of the grave objections 
to our admission of the possibility of our 
evacuation of the Canal Zone„ It would 
also render far less important the inclusion 
in the Treaty of a recognition by Egypt of
1. Sir David Kelly entered the Foreign Office in 191-4- and 
served in France between 1915-19• He entered the 
Diplomatic service in 1919 and served in Buenos Aires, 
the Foreign Office, Lisbon, Mexico, Brussels, Stockholm, 
Foreign Office 19319 Cairo 1934-, Minister in Egypt 
(local rank) 1937, Counsellor in Foreign Office 1938- 
39 j Minister in Berno 194-0-4-2, Ambassador in Buenos 
Aires 194-2, Ambassador to Turkey 294-6-4-9? Ambassador 
to U.S.S.R. 194-9-51, and Knight of Malta 1954-. He 
wrote: ThirtyNine Months (1930), The Ruling Few (1952),
Beyond the‘“lron Curtain (1954) , Tho"" Hungry Sheep "(1955) * 
Who was Who, 1951-50,'p, 606.
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a permanent British right to protect the 
Suez Canal* Indeed, it may he argued that 
a permanent alliance is such a recognition, 
since the whole raison d ;§tre of tho alliance 
from our point of view is to-j provide security 
for British communications”.~
On this new basis, the British government agreed that
either country could refer the question of the Canal and
its defence to the League after twenty years, if, at that
time, they were ar odds upon the subject. In persuading
his colleagues to accept this, Eden was helped by a strong
2campaign xn. the British press which warned the government
that it would Incur heavy blame if it lost this chance to
conclude a treaty. In its leader on 10 June 1936, the
fines said,
" . . o . .. but it would be deplorable if the 
Cabinet, whose duty is to survey their experts1 
auvice in a wider perspective, were on that 
account to lose a great opportunity which 
may never recur. To throw away the chance 
for an agreement, which may -prove of
1.. Cab„ 24-/262, C.P. 156(36), Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Negotiations, 8 
June 3.936.
2. The Times, Manchester Guardian, and the Spectator 
participated in this campaign.
3. Instructed by the Cabinet, the Foreign Office made an 
Inquiry on the origin of this article which showed that 
it had been produced, without any official inspiration, 
by the Times special correspondent who had just come 
back from Egypt. Eden, however, warned the Times and 
other newspapers on the need for caution in any 
expression of opinion on Anglo-Egyptian relations.
Cab. 23/84-, No. 4-1(36), Conclusion 3? 10 June 1936.
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inestimable value to both countries during 
the next twenty years, through the vague fear 
that it may lead to embarrassment twenty 
years hence, would indeed make caution the 
excuse for timidity”c
The C.I.G.S. advised the Cabinet that once the
Cairo position was abandoned, the maintenance of the
British troops at Alexandria would be militarily unsound.
The Cabinet, however, felt that the new principle of
perpetual alliance rendered the continued occupation of
Alexandria far less necessary. At her own discretion,
Britain could send her forces at any time to any part of
Egypt. Consequently the British government agreed to
fix a time-limit for the occupation of Alexandria, i.e.
. . 2uen years as maximum and seven as minimum.
The perpetual character of the alliance was the 
most unacceptable clause of the treaty to the Egyptians. 
Ev6n some of the rTafdists criticised it,^ while the
1. Times, 3,0 June 1938.
2. Cab. 23/84, lie. 43(38), Conclusion 1, 23 June 1938.
3-. Mahmud Ghannam, a prominent hafdist M.P., criticised 
this as, in his view, it admitted Egypt’s continuing 
inability to protect herself, and might make her 
subject to British occupation at times when her own 
interests were not dirgctly involved.
Mahmud _ Ghannam: AI~Mu ahada al~Mi sriyya al-Ingliziyya 
wa* Mrasatha min al-Wu‘jha al- Amaliyya, pp . 142"50 * 
This view was further expressed'to me by Ghannam in 
Cairo in late September 1988.
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Liberal Constitutional Party condemned it as incompatible 
with Egyptian sovereignty and called for its amendment as 
soon as possible. The Lafd, however, asserted that it 
was in the interests of both countries0 While the security 
of the Suez Canal was a permanent British interest that 
could not be ensured .by Egypt alone, Egypt would continue 
to be too weak to defend herself against any foreign 
aggression without the support of a strong faithful ally 
like Britain,'1' Though international law recognised 
perpetual alliances, Makram CUbo.yd asserted, it permitted 
their termination on the basis of rebus sic stantibus*
Though the treaty had provided that the British 
troops should withdraw from Egypt after twenty years if 
the Egyptian army was in a position to defend the Suez 
Canal, the Nationalist Party asserted that this would 
never happen, as Egypt, faced with a formidable expenditure 
on barracks, railways and roads, could not afford to 
train such a strong army. Moreover, the League, which
1. Muhammad ^ al-Maghribl; Al-MuCahada min al-'Lujha
2. Makram cUbayd: Bahth Tahllli Muqaran li'1-Mu°ahada
al-Mi s r i yy a al - Ingliz i'yy a , pp. 63-64.
Rebus*sic stantibus refers to a tacit condition believed 
by some to apply to all treaties that "they should 
cease to be obligatory as soon as the state of facts 
and conditions upon which they were founded had 
substantially changed”.
Mahmud Zayid: Egypt*s Struggle for Independence, p. 184.
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was to decide whether or not the Egyptian army had attained 
the necessary efficiency, would never decide in favour 
of Egypt, as it was solely created to serve the interests 
of the imperial powers.
Both the British government and opposition
regarded the military provisions as satisfactory. With
those extensive concessions to Britain, the treaty was in
fact felt to he a step out of the old imperial age which
would bring Egypt to a dominion level. While Eden
regarded it as f,one of the very few worthwhile settlements
1
negotiated in that time of international lawlessness", 
Balron, speaking for the opposition, hoped that it would 
open a new chapter in Anglo-Egyptian relations "based upon 
mutual respect, sincere cooperation and abiding friendship, 
net merely between governments but between the British 
antL the Egyptian peoples themselves".^
Pith tho intention of depriving the National 
government of the credit of a settlement with Egypt, 
the Labour opposition, however, claimed that though the 
193^ military clauses were substantially similar to those 
negotiated by them in 19309 the latter 'were then severely
1. Earl of Avon: Eden Memoirs, Facing the Dictators,
p . 394.       —
2• Parliamentary Debates , Commons, Vol. 318, 1936-37, 
Col. 268-69.
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criticised by the Conservative opposition. Dalton pointed
out chat Chamberlain, Churchill and even Eden, though in
much more moderate words, had attacked them when the 1930
draft treaty was debated before the House of Commons.
Lord Snell, leader of the Labour peers, followed Dalton's
line by saying in the House of Lords,
"I should liko to remind them [i.e. the 
national government] that when Labour was 
in office it proposed similar agreements 
to this Treaty and its efforts broke down 
on the question of the Sudan. There was 
the most hearty applause emd happiness among 
the Opposition of that period that Labour 
had failed to bring peace to Egypt. I 
cannot, therefore, to-day let His Majesty's 
Government "get away", as we say, with the 
idea that all this was born out of their 
own head; they really inherited it from 
a previous generation"
Though agreeing that some of the 1930 military clauses
were almost identical with those of 1930, the government
empliasized the essential differences in favour of Britain.
Ir particularly asserted that the new roads and railway
facilities would make Geneifa, the new cantonment of the
British forces, about 80 miles by road from Cairo and
2
150 miles from Alexandria. Consequently the British 
forces, which consisted mainly of highly mobile forces,
1. I-ar1iamentary Debates, Lords, Vol. 103, 1936-37, 
Col. 372. ~ *  ~ ~~
2. Ibid., Col. 363*
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could be rushed in a few hours to any part of Egypt if 
emergency arose.
A small group of obstinate British Conservatives, 
however, thought that the 1936 military provisions would 
still weaken Britain1s capacity to protect Egypt at the 
very moment when it ought to be strengthened. In fact 
they never trusted the Egyptians and did not want a 
treaty. This attitude was clearly shown in a leading
article in the Morning Post on 28 August 1936 which
asserted,
"What we most dislike, however, is the basic 
idea of the whole treaty, which is to commit 
our vital imperial interests to the mercy 
of Egyptian good faith. We do not for a
moment doubt the personal good faith of
Hahas and his fellow negotiators, but it 
would be imprudent to overlook the fact 
that their present mutual harmony is dic­
tated solely by the exigencies of treaty 
making. It affords no assurance of a per­
manent unity of feeling among the Egyptian 
people, still less does it afford the 
assurance that five, ten or twenty years 
hence the contract will be honoured by 
their successors. Plenty of mischief 
lurks, too, in the impending acceptance 
of Egypt into membership of the League of 
Nations. In fact this much-heralded treaty 
looks to us more like the beginning than 
the end of trouble".
2
Though this group of "Tory toughs" expressed their
Morning Post, 28 August 1936.
2. This phrase is used by Harold Nicolson. See Nicolson, 
H .: Diaries and Letters 1930-39> P * 86.
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views in the press and in parliament with unequailed
eloquence, their influence in the party and the government
was negligible. It was felt that there was nothing
constructive in what they said. Harold Nicolson said
in his memoirs thac they "were more hitter than determined,
1and more out for a fight than for reform". Churchill,
the leader of this group had virtually no influence.
Baldwin, as Prime Minister from November 1935 to May 1937>
2did not offer him any Cabinet office, while Eden^ and 
the younger Tories would have nothing to do with him.
Conversations over minor military matters:
Lampson returned to Cairo on 30 June 1936. On 
6 duly a drafting committee was set up/** Though the two
1. Ibid., pp. 371-72.
2o Harold Nicolson claimed that Mrs. Winston Churchill
told him that her husband wanted to have the Admiralty. 
Ibid c, p » 221.
3. Eden claimed that his appointment in May 1935 as 
Minister for the League of Nations was "heavily bat­
tered by Mr. Churchi]1 from below the gangway in the 
House of Commons".
Earl of Avon, Eden Memoirs, Pacing the Dictators, 
p. 219. “ ’ ~
A* Egypt was represented by Muhagmad Mahmud, Ahmad 
Mahir, Ilafiz Afifi and Amin UbhmanI Britain’s 
representatives were the A.O.C., the G.O.C., Beckett, 
the second legal adviser at the foreign Office, and 
Hopkinson and Smart from the Residency.
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delegations were now in agreement on the principal issues,
it v/as only on 24- July that the toxt of tho military
clauses was initialled by the heads of the two delegations.
This was meanly due to the obstructive attitude of the
non-E'afdist delegates, In spite of Nahhas*s appeal,
Sidql left Egypt in mid-Jane 1936 to operate in the
background against the treaty. Nahhas asked him to come
t° Egypt, *b\xt; he refused and his supporters claimed that
he resigned in protest at the excessive British military
demands. The others, particularly Mahmud and cAbd al-
Eattah Yahya, remained in Egypt to do their best to
deprive the Wafd of the credit of a settlement. Though
he was a party to every material text agreed, upon, either
inside tho Egyptian delegation or the drafting committee,
Mahmud at the last minute objected to the military clauses
on a number of specific points and on the general ground
that they went into too much detail and showed Britain’s
distrust of the Egyptians. It was because of these
manoeuvres that Nahhas attempted on 6 July 1936 to secure
modifications on almost every point on which agreement
had previously been reached. Alarmed by this attitude
and realizing that an exhibition of further pationce
would not provent the plotters from continuing their
activities, the Bpitish government instructed Lampson on
—  8
8 July to warn Nahhas that this method of the Egyptian
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delegation was intolerable and
"would, if persisted in, reduce negotiations
to a farce ...... If the Egyptians now
start haggling .and trying to wriggle out 
of the undertakings on matters of principle, 
the -whole question may well be thrown into 
the mo11 ing p o t1T . 1
This sharp reaction was also intended to strengthen the 
hands of Nahhas and his colleagues who wished for a 
treaty, and to stiffen their resistance to the obstre­
perous attitude of Mahmud. Nevertheless, after a long
stormy meeting of the Egyptian delegation, Makram and 
— c "■Amin Uthman, at the request of their colleagues, came 
to Alexandria on 12 July to see Mr. Beckett in order to 
obtain certain drafting amendments, to prevent the 
secossion of Mahmud and other non-Wafdist delegates. 
Though Nahhas and Lampson were anxious to avoid this, 
they were prepared to fact it, if necessary, to get a 
treaty through. They urged the British government to 
hasten the conclusion of the military clauses, as the 
continued delay would enable the minority leaders to play 
upon the impatience of the public and wreck the treaty.
In persuading his government to give him wider discretion
1. F.O. 371/80112, Tel. No. 4-16, Eden to Lampson, 8 
July 1936.
in matters of secondary importance Lamp son telephoned'1' the
Foreign Office on 10 July 1936, "This is a very critical
time. All sorts of wheels are revolving. All sorts of
people are out for sabotage of Treaty. We risk missing
2the bus if we delay.
The military discussions had dragged on so long 
on five matters of secondary importance. The first of 
these was the occupation of Alexandria. The British 
delegation attempted to get the maximum desiderata of 
their government. They claimed that this was a matter of 
vital importance which the British government had to defend 
before Parliament and public opinion. The Egyptian dele­
gation protested that ten years was impossible. It would 
not take the Egyptian army so long to become capable of 
taking over from the British troops. Moreover, they 
claimed, such a long period would suggest that a continu- 
ation of the occupation was intended. They offered six 
years, A compromise period of eight years was finally
1. This is the only example which I know in which Lampson 
telephoned the Foreign Office, and he was reproved for 
it.
P.O. 371/20113 v Tel. No. 430 v Vansittart to lamp son,
11 July 1936.
2. F,0. 371/20113, No. J 6221/2/16, Telephone Message from 
Lampson to Campbell, 10 July 1936,
3* F.O. 371/20112, Tel. No. 626(E), Lampson to Eden,
2 July 1936.
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agreed upon. As a face-saving provision for the Egyptian
delegation9 a sentence was added that both sides considered
this to be the approximate time required for completion
of accommodation and improvement of railway facilities
1
between the- Canal Cone and Alexandria,
The second poin: at issue concerned the "appre­
hended emergency". On this question, the Egyptian 
delegation tried at first to go back on what they had 
already offered, and claimed that the "apprehended emer­
gency" formula should not be incoroperated in the permanent 
alliance terms. But the British delegation firmly 
rejected this. 'The Cabinet had abandoned two important 
issues in return for this Egyptian offer. It would be, 
Lampson asserted, "most unfortunate if His Majesty’s
Government had now to be informed that their previous
2understanding was mistaken".
The Egyptians finally agreed to the inclusion 
of the formula in the immutable alliance terms on two 
conditions: It should read "apprehended international 
emergency"f The word "international" was deliberately 
intitoduced to exclude the use of this article as a basis
1. E.0. 5/1/20113, Tel. Ho. 671, Lampson to Eden, 9 
July 1936*
2. IhO. 371/20112, Tel. Ho. 649> Lampson to Eden, 7 
July 1930.
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for British interference in the internal affairs of Egyptf
Moreover, in this case, as in the case of menace of war,
there should be mutual consultation between the two
governments. They argued that Britain should meet them
on this point
"otherwise it would be represented in Egypt 
that the new treaty while terminating military 
occupation in one article in fact gave His 
Majesty’s Government a permanent right to 
reoccup77- the country at any time when in 
their unilateral judgement they chose to 
say that there "was an emergency".
The British delegation agreed to the first 
condition as completely harmless. They accepted consul­
tation only after Fahhas assured- them that it would bec *
purely formal and that the British discretion as to the 
extort and nature of the reinforcements to be sent to 
Egypt would be absolutely unfettered. Since the treaty 
did-* not state whether Britain or Egypt would be the judge
3.x such an emergency, the British government, however, 
felt that it could reinforce at its own discretion without 
consultation with Egypt. If the Egyptian government 
disputed the existence of such an emergency, the only 
remedy would be to appeal to the League. The reinforce­
ments would arrive before the Council of the League would 
decide, by which time "either the emergency would be over
1. ibid •
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1
or it would be increased into a menace of war or war”.
Moreover, it v;as folt improbable that the Council would
unanimously decide against Britain, and the Egyptian
government, if properly handled., would not wish to embark
upon a serious dispute with the British government upon
2such a matter.
It had been agreed that the British troops would 
leave Cairo and Alexandria as soon as alternative accom­
modation had been provided fox* them in the Canal Zone.
But a thi.rd difficulty had arisen as to which government 
should be responsible for their construction. The 
Egyptian delegation considered it a question of principle 
that their government should build the barracks. They 
would not allow the British government to buiDd then, 
since this would mean that the decision as to the date of 
departure of British troops to the Canal Zone would be 
left in Britain's hands.^ Moreover, they asserted, as
1. P.O. 371/20122, Enclosure in <7 8708/2/16, Rote by the 
Foreign Office on Consultation in the Case of War,
Menace of War, and Apprehended International Emergency, 
Undated.
2. F.O. 371/20105, No, J 3420/2/16, Letter from Campbell
ao the Under-Secretary of State, War Office, 25 May 1930. 
The British government did not publicly declare these 
views in Parliament because it was afraid of their 
possible repercussions in Egypt.
3* F.O. 371/20114, Tel. No. 713-> Lampson to Eden, 20
duly 1936.
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the British forces night only he temporary occupants,
the barracks would he the permanent property of the
Egyptian Government, which should naturally he responsible
1for their construction*
Hahhas was prepared to accept that the plans 
and specifications should he prepared hy British author­
ities and submitted to the Egyptian government. These 
plans would he subject to any modifications arising from 
military and other requirements during the actual con­
struction period. Control and supervision of work would 
he carried out hy a joint committee set up hy the two 
governments„ ^
Lampson and his staff were of the opinion that 
it would he in Britain’s interest that Egypt should build. 
He telegraphed, UI helieve that if we are building and 
barracks have not been finished in three or four years 
effect here would he deplorable".^ Any delay would he
1. E.O. 371/20113? Tel. Ho. 675? Lampson to Eden, 10 
July 1936.
2- 1,0. 371/20114-, Tele Ho. 713? Lampson to Eden, 20 
July 1936*
3. The A.O.C., however, did not like the responsibility 
of building to he left to Egypt.
4. E.O. 371/20113? Tel. Ho. 684, Lampson to Eden, 13 
July 1936.
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1
bound to bo blamed on Britain as an act of bad faith.
Bor practical and political reasons, the British government, 
however, strongly held the view that it should build the 
barracks. On the practical side, it was felt difficult 
for the Egyptian Id Elic horks Department to understand 
the War Office regulations and to maintain the buildings.
If Egypt built the barracks, it would be difficult for 
Britain to ask for any necessary change to the type of 
technical accommodation during the construction period, 
as Egypt would complain that this would cost more. More­
over such and other demands would load to political 
difficulties, as Egypt would accuse Britain of intentionally
making them to delay the buildings and consequently stay
2
longer in Cairo,
The British government's proposal was that Egypt 
she ild provide the necessary sites free of charge, and 
Biitain would be responsible for the entire programme of 
building. As regards the possibility of delay, the 
Egyptian government would be given the right to investigate
1. General Weir thought that if Egypt build, the British 
troops would get more generous accommodation and 
amenities than if Britain did.
E.O. 571/20114, Tel. Mb. 715, Lampson to Eden, 20 
July 1950.
2. E.O. 371/20115, lei• No. 448, Eden to Lampson, 18 
July 1930.
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any such delay. 'To persuade Hahhas to accept this 
proposal, the British government made a number of con­
cessions. It was ready to accept a liability of million.
1Egypt's share, f.5 million, would he paid to Britain by
equal annual instalments, subject to a fair rate of
interest, over a period of five or six years. The British
government also offered to reduce the period of its occu-
2pation of Alexandria to six years.
But Hahhas maintained that this could not beC ♦
a matter of bargaining. He told Lampson that even
Mif he were to give way on the point himself 
against his own convictions he would never 
be able to justify it in the face of public 
opinion. Damage which that would cause to 
his own position and consequently to his 
ability to secure the general acceptance 
of the treaty and its numerous concessions 
in the face of hostile intrigues would be 
disasterous". *
He would only allow the British government to build if
1. While the British government estimated the total cost 
of the barracks as 3$ million, the Egyptian Minister 
of Public Works claimed that, with tho facilities
at his department, he would construct^them for three 
to five millions. This provided Hahhas with a further 
reason to reject the British proposal.
P.O. 571/20114, Tel. Ho. 715, Lampson to Eden, 20 
July 1936.
2. P.O. 371/20113? Tel. Ho. A49? Edon to Lampson, 18 
July 1936.
3. P.O. 371/20114-, Tel. Ho. 713? Lampson to Ejen, 20
July 1936.
206
it were ready to pay the whole cost of the barracks. It
would then usell their, to the Egyptian government at their
estimated value if and when the British forces evacuate 
1them". The British government refused this suggestion
as it would entail a great financial concession on its
part. It was felt that this would he a gamble as Britain
2
might never recover the money.
Anxious not to break off negotiations on this
X
issue and strongly advised by Lampson? the British 
government finally gave way. It allowed Egypt to build 
provided that she would accept Britain's plans and 
specifications, and her right of supervision. Moreover, 
out of the 10,000 troops which were to stay in the Canal 
Zone, she was to provide accommodation for only 2,000, 
and to contribute only £390,000^ towards the cost of the
1. E.O. 371/20115, No. J 6539/2/16, Note by Campbell for 
Eden on the Barrack Accommodation, 21 July 1936.
2 „ Ibid.
3* Lampson telegraphed Eden, "I believe we are making a 
great mistake over this question of our building .... 
he are making Nahas position difficult and we may well 
have reasons later to regret it".
IhO. 371/20114, Tel, No. 715, Lampson to Eden, 20 
July 1936.
4. This was the estimated sum spent by the Egyptian 
government before 1914 011 the construction of new 
barracks for the British troops at Abbasia and Bab
E/note contd, on next page
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barracks for the rest. This was sc heavy a financial
burden on Egypt that Britain herself responded to Mataud's
1
appeal in the summer of 1938 to undertake a portion of
it, though the treaty had been in force for only two years
and there were objections in Britain to the revision cf
2any of rts terms at this stage.
The two delegations agreed that all the Egyptian 
ports, aerodromes, and means of communications should be 
furnished to the British government in case cf war, 
imminent menace of war, or apprehended international 
emergency. The Egyptian government would take all 
administrative and legislative measures to render these 
facilities and assistance effective, but the British 
government wanted it to be specifically stated that these 
measures included "effective censorship15. This formed a 
fourth crux in the negotiations. The British reasons for 
tnis desire were explained in a letter from the War Office 
to the Foreign Office:
Footnote 4- contd. from previous page
al~Hadid as an alternative to their accommodation 
at Kasr al-dTil.
Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 1936-37, Vol. 103,
Col'. “397“98". ~ ~
h  At the end of 1937 king Faruq dismissed Nahhas and 
appointed Mahmud to be the new Prime Minister.
•a
2. For this agreement see Cmd. 5861, Egypt Bo. 1 (1938).
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"We attach particular importance to the 
adjective "effective" as it means that we 
can keep the Egyptians up to scratch, he 
particularly wanted the censorship mentioned 
so that we can discuss proposed measures with 
the Egyptians in peace time1'.
Lampson offered the following agreed minute to
deal with the matter: "The facilities and assistance
2referred to in the second sentence of Article G-" will 
include if required by His Majesty’s Government in the
5United Kingdom the imposition of an effective censorship", 
While declining to deal with the matter in an 
agreed minute, the Egyptian delegation offered to incor­
porate effective censorship in the main article provided 
that martial law was mentioned too. The motive behind 
this was to establish the right of the Egyptian government 
to declare martial law in future. The Egyptian had never 
forgotten the memory of the war years when Britain had 
asoumed for herself the right to declare marial lav/ in 
Egypt.
The British government had originally intended 
to secure in the treaty the right to declare martial law
1. EoO. 371/20113, Enclosure in No. J 6204-/2/16, Letter 
from the War Office go the Foreign Office, 16 July 
1936.
2. Article 7 in the treaty as signed.
3* F.O. 371/203.13, Despatch No. 790 (7/4-32/36), Lampson 
to Eden, 4. July 1930.
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in Egypt, This was essential to its original claim of 
independent action for the protection of the Sues Canal, 
But with the abandonment of this claim, it agreed to the 
Egyptian proposal.^ Moreover* for censorship to he 
effective, martial law would probably be necessary,
finally there was the question of telecornuni-
2
cations in and through Egypt. Though well aware of the 
vital importance of British control of these, Lampson 
thought that there would be no justification for the 
British government to insist on their settlement in the 
treaty as they were not covered by the four Reserved 
Points, The best tactics, in his view, were to deal with 
them separately by exchange of notes with the Egyptian 
government. Believing that they were undoubtedly 
covered within the Reserved Points, the British government 
overruled him and wanted them to be settled in the treaty.
1. P.O. 571/20113, Tel. No. 675, Lampson to Eden, 10 
duly 1956.
2. Telecommunications were defined in the International 
Telecommunication Convention as "any telegraphic or 
telephonic communication of signs, signals, writing, 
facsimiles, and. sounds of any kind by wire, wireless 
or other system of processes of electrical signalling 
or visual signalling".
P.O. 371/20149v Bo* 1 6060/2247/16, Extracts from the 
Minutes of the 98th Meeting of the Imperial Communi­
cations Committee, 30 June 1936.
3- F.O. 371/20148, Tel. No. 2379 Lampson to Eden, 23
March 1936.
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1It, however, did not ask for the monopoly of cable and 
wireless communications in and through Egypt, but merely 
demanded for some form of reaffirmation of the 1932 
exchange of letcers. In these Sidqi, then Prime Minister, 
gave assurances tc Sir Percy Loraine, then High Commis­
sioner, that, "the principle of Anglo-Egyptian cooperation 
in regard to cable and wireless communications in and 
through Egypt would bo adhered to in a genuine spirit of 
cooperation and to the furtherance of common Anglo-
p
Egyptian interests". The British government felt that
"in the event of failure to obtain some recog­
nition in the treaty of the present de facto 
position, the British interest in question 
would result in a possibly insecure basis, 
since there is no engagement towards His 
Majesty’s Government by the Egyptian govern­
ment which^operates after the conclusion of 
a treaty".
Moreover, "the absence cf any such provisions from 0. 
treaty might afford an opportunity, if not an invitation, 
to competing foreign interests to renew their previous
1. See below, pp. 213-14.
2. P.O. 371/20148, Enclosure in Ho. J 2247/2247/16, 
Untitled, 13 Eebruary 1936.
3* P.O. 371/20148, JMo. J 3316, 2247/16, Memorandum by 
the Eoreign Office to the Imperial Communications 
Committee on Cable and Wireless Communications in 
Bgypl* 13 Eebruary 1936.
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attempts to obtain a footing in Egypt"
Against his own convictions, Lampson was 
instructed to offer the following agreed minute to cover 
the question of telecommunications:
"The means of communications referred to 
in the second sentence of Article G^ include 
telecommunications (Cables, telegraphs and 
wireless). In view of the possibility of 
the necessity arising out of theuse of 
Egyptian telecommunications for the purpose 
of the alliance, there would be consultation 
bet 70en the Egyptian and United. Kingdom 
Governments with regard to any important^ 
measures affecting such communications".
The Egyptian delegation completely refused this
agreed minute. Hahhas assured Lampson that he was neither
able nor willing to accept any provision in the treaty
regarding t el e coram uni cations . They were not covered in
the 1950 draft and he would not allow them in the 19 3&
treaty.
Through Anin cUthman, Lampson modified the
British formula to read as follows:
"The principle of consultation (or alter­
natively collaboration) between High Con­
tracting Parties regarding military affairs 
which is inherent in the treaty of alliance 
extends to field, of telecommunications which
1. Ibid.
2. Article 7 in the treaty as signed.
3. F.O. 37I/2OII3> Despatch Ho. 790 (7/432/36)> Lampson 
to Eden, A July 193&*
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under modern conditions play so important 
in tliis connexion"
But Hahhas remained adamant. In view of this, Lampson * • /
informed his government that it would he most unwise to 
insist on its point of view. He persuaded it to fall 
hack on his original idea, i.e. to deal with the matter 
outside the treaty.
The question was finally settled hy exchange of 
letters dated 12 August 1936 between Lampson and Hahhas,
p
as the Egyptian Prime Minister. The agreement reached
was only to enter into force on the date at which the
treaty would he signed. The letter of the Egyptian Prime
Minister to the High Commissioner, says, inter alia,
111 have the honour to inform Your Excellency 
that the Egyptian Government are impressed 
wxth the importance of telecommunications 
to and from or in Egypt in connexion with 
their Alliance with the United Kingdom and 
tho extent to which unfox*seen changes with 
regard to these matters made in time of 
peace may affect plans in time of war. They 
propose that both Governments should follow 
the principle that such communications should 
he in the hands of exclusively Egyptian or
1. E.Oo 371/20114, Tel. Ho. 705, Lampson to $den, 19 
July 1936.
2. These letters were ostensibly not to he part of the 
treaty negotiations. But there was no agreement 
that they should he kept confidential.
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British or Anglo-Egyptian concerns".
The arrangements made in 1932 by the Eastern 
Telegraph Company/ and the Marconi lladio Telegraph Company 
of Egypt with Gidql’s government ensured a British monopoly 
of wireless and caole communications in and through Egypt 
pending the final settlement of the matter in a treaty 
with Egypt. These two companies demanded that this 
position should be expressly confirmed in the 1936 treaty 
owing tc the strategic importance of such communications 
for British interests. Apart from the attempts of foreign 
powers to get a footing in Egypt's telecommunications, 
they argued, uhs Egyptians themselves might try to control 
them completely. Since this monopoly was not covered by 
the hour Reserved Points, the British government thought 
it illogical to insist on obtaining it in a treaty whose 
rsIson d *§tre -was to settle them. It, however, planned 
to bring diplomatic pressure on the Egyptian government 
to grant such monopoly. Since this question was not 
settled in the treaty, there was always the danger that
1. P.O._371/20117* Enclosure in ho. J 7193/2/16, Note by 
hahhas to Lampson, 12 August 1936.
The*first sentence of this letter was intended to imply 
consultation without saying so in specific terms, 
hahhas planned to show this letter to the whole Egyptian 
delegation. The word consultation was intentionally 
avoided as it might create much difficulty there.
P.O. 371/20149^ Tel, ho. 730(E), Lampson to Eden,
23 July 1936.
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the Egyptian government "might argue that the exclusive 
position had gone by default", and might even grant 
concessions to other foreign companies.
1. F.O. 371/20148, 17o. J 2398/2247/18, Personal Letter 
from Sir Norman Leslie of Cable and Wireless Ltd., 
to Campbell, 16 March 1938.
CHAPTER FIVE
\ THE SUDAN CLAUSES
There Vere anxieties in the British government 
that in spite of concessions on the military side, nego­
tiations might break down, as in 1930, over the Sudan' 
question. In such a case Britain would be in a much worse 
position, as these concessions would hereafter be used 
against her. The Cabinet had actually asked Lampson about 
the possibility of postponing the military conversations 
until some progress was made in the Sudan question.'1' But 
these apprehensions were groundless, as the Sudan question 
was settled in a week, in conversations which took place 
at the Antoniades Palace in Alexandria between 27 July and 
2 A agust .1936. This was mainly due to the change of 
Egyptian policy in this respect in the previous six years. 
While the Egyptian negotiators had claimed in 1930 that 
the Sudan should return to its normal position as an
1* In the Cabinet meeting of 23 June 1930, Lampson, who 
was present, answered these inquiries by saying that 
this might be possible, but it would be contrary to the 
principles on which the conversations had so far 
proceeded on Britain’s own propositions, that they 
should deal first with the military clauses, secondly 
the Sudan, and the remainder of the treaty thereafter. 
Cab. 23/84, Ho. 43 (30), Conclusion 1, 23 June 1930.
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ordinary Egyptian province,"1 they accepted in 1936 the
British view of the mandatory character of the administra-
2
tion in the Sudan provided that they had a share in it on 
the basis of the Condominium Agreement. Britain met this 
desire by giving them some concessions, mainly of publicity 
value, which did not affect the existing position of the 
Sudan as an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in which Britain 
was the active and Egypt the passive partner.
Without the presence of Sir Stewart Symes, the 
Governor-General of the Sudan, the Sudan provisions might 
not have been settled as quickly as they were. His meeting 
with the Egyptian delegation and his explanation of the 
issues m  question were most helpful. Another'reason for 
this quick settlement was that Lampson did not need to
1. In a conversation on 1 April 1930 between Makram and
Cecil Campbell, a member of the 1930 British delegation, 
the former defined the Egyptian nationalist view as 
being that the Sudan 1 was a rebellious province of 
Egypt which had been reconquered by Egyptian troops with 
such assistance from British troops as tlie British 
Government would have rendered in similar conditions to 
any other foreign power in whom they were interested; 
on the reconquest of the Sudan, the British Government 
had taken advantage of their strength and Egypt’s 
weakness to impose upon Egypt an unequal and unfair 
agreement, namely the 1899 convention".
E.O. 371/20114, Enclosure in Ho. J 6375/2/16, Note by 
C.E. Sandars, Symes*s private secretary, on the Histor­
ical Antecedents of the Proposal for the Appointment 
of an Egyptian Deputy Governor-General, 17 July 1936.
2* See below, p. 217-
3. See below, pp. 231-32.
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refer to London on every detail as he had done during the 
military conversations. While he had been in London, the 
Sudan question was fulls?" studied and final instructions 
were given to him.
The Sudan clauses: reactions in Egypt and Britain:
As in 1930, the British proposals were based on 
the primary consideration that the Sudan Conventions of 
1899 h.ad led to the establishment of an autonomous govern­
ment exercising conjoint sovereignty in the form of a 
mandatory administration for the welfare of the Sudanese 
people. This trusteeship should continue to be exercised 
by the present, predominantly British, regime under the 
authority of the Governor-General. With this in mind, 
the British government suggested that the two governments 
should agree that the primary aim of the administration in 
i;be Sudan was the welfare of the Sudanese. The establish­
ment of this principle of trusteeship in the interests of 
the Sudanese was desirable, as Sudanese nationalism, though 
still embyrionic, was felt to be an important factor 
providing an argument against any excessive Egyptianisation. 
While both co-domini reserved liberty to modify the 1899 
Agreements in the future, the status of the Sudan should 
continue to be that resulting from them. Accordingly the 
Governor-General would exercise on behalf of both countries
the powers conferred upon him hy the agreements. As the 
sole authority for the appointment and promoting of offic­
ials in the Sudan* he could select British and Egyptian
candidates for posts for which there were no qualified 
1
Sudanese, He couj.d, however, occasionally appoint to
special posts persons who were neither British, Egyptian*
2
nor Sudanese. This last provision was made at Symes1s 
suggestion in cast he should wish to appoint a specially 
qualified person for a temporary mission, e.g., the organ­
isation of anti-locust measures, or to appoint persons to 
minor technical posts for which no suitable Egyptians were 
available, e.g. Greek artisans to be employed on pump 
schemes.
The extreme Conservatives in Britain opposed the 
return of Egyptian troops to the Sudan as, in their view, 
thfcy would undoubtedly easily incite Sudanese soldiers 
to revolt on religious grounds.^ But the British govern­
ment was prepared to offer this provided that the Governor-
1. See below, pp^ 228-30-
2. Cab. 24/263, C.P. 176(36) Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on Anglo*-Egyptian Negotiations, the Sudan, 
x9 June 1936.
3. Cab. 24/263* C.P. 192(36), Memorandum by Lord Halifax, 
Lord Privy Seal and Acting Foreign Secretary, on Anglo- 
Egyptian Conversations, the Sudan, 8 July 1936.
4** Morning Post, 28 August 1936.
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General would decide the number of the troops and their 
localities. The Times, however, asserted that in view of 
the new situation in north-east Africa, the association of 
Egyptian troops with the British and Sudanese forces for 
the common defence of Anglo-Egyptian sovereignty would be 
more advisable than ever.'"
After the 192-4 crisis, the British government's 
policy of regarding the Sudan as an Anglo-Egypt!an con­
dominium had been radically changed when it claimed that
"the effect of the 1899 Cromer-Boutros Ohali 
Agreement was to constitute the Sudan as a 
new state, distinct and independent from 
Egypt and enjoying all administrative, legis­
lative and judicial rights. On this basis 
the policy of His Majesty's Government since 
1925 bad been to regard the Governor-General 
as in many respects a Head of State with the 
power of concluding international agreements 
of his own".2
The Egyptian government had sometimes expressed reserves 
about this, but it had never delivered any effective
* Times, 50 June 1936*
2. F.O. 371/20108, No. J 4731/2/16, Memorandum by Pink of 
the Foreign Office on the Sudan and.International 
Conventions, 3 March 1936.
3. On the Sudan Government's ratification of the inter- 
rational convention for preservation of Fauna and Flora, 
the Egyptian government sent a note to Lampson in which 
it expressed its reserves about the whole subject of 
the participation of the Sudan in international con­
ventions. The British government rejected this note
F/note contd. on next page
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protest, and, in Britain's view, this method was fairly 
well established in the eyes of the world#
In the 1S50 negotiations, however, the two 
delegations had agreed that in future the Sudan Government 
could only participate in, or terminate Its membership of 
international conventions by virtue of a declaration signed 
on behalf of the British and Egyptian governments. This 
joint action should be specifically taken in respect of 
the Sudan, and should not merely follow from the fact that 
Britain and Egypt were both parties to, or had both 
denounced, a convention. Lampson and Symes in 1956 
objected to this arrangement and suggested that the 
existing practice of direct accession and adherence to 
international conventions should continue. They asserted 
that any departure from this procedure would weaken the 
Brutish argument that the Condominium Agreements had
Eootnote 3 contd. fi'om previous page
on the grounds that the existing method should 
continue until the two governments agreed on some 
other procedure.
F.O* 571/20099*; Tel „ No# 562, Eden to Lampson, 25 
April 1956 o
1* If this formula were adopted, the Sudan would also 
lose its current "practice of negotiating bilateral 
agreements as a Separate State".
P.O. 571/20108, ITo > J 4751/2/16, Memorandum by Pink 
of the Foreign Office on the Sudan and International 
C onventi ons, 3 March 1956.
resulted de tjure as well as de facto in the establishment 
of an autonomous government of the Sudan, "and would in 
any case pave the way to further piecemeal challenging of 
the principle of autonomy in other directions, e.g. the 
allegiance of the Sudan Defence Force11.^  While agreeing 
that it would be more convenient to maintain the present 
practice, the British government felt that certain con­
cessions should ha. made if agreement was to be reached.
The 1930 formula, put forward by Britain herself, had then 
been accepted by the Egyptian delegation, and it would be
p
difficult for Britain to refuse it in 1936* Consequently 
the British government offered this formula in 1936? with 
slight modifications, which it thought would still pre­
serve for the Sudan the status of a territory with a 
separate entity of its own.
1. F.O. 371/20102, Despatch No. 59 (91*A.7), Enclosure in 
No. 301(7/163/36), Despatch from Symes 011 the Position 
of the Sudan Government in Regard to International 
Agreements and Conferences, 1 March 1936.
2. P.O. 371/20108, Tel, No. 637- Eden to Lampson, 14 July 
1936.
3- These modifications, which were embodied ip the 1933
draft treaty, did not change the principle on which
the 1930 formula was based, but avoided certain tech­
nical difficulties which appeared likely to result
from their practical application.
E.O. 371/20108, No. J 4731/2/16, Memorandum by Pink of
the Foreign Office on the Sudan and International
Conventions, 3 March 1936.
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The 1930 negotiations had. collapsed over the
Sudan question partly because the British government
refused to give the Egyptians the right of unrestricted
immigration in the Sudan, According to enquiries made by
the British government since 1930, there would for a
generation be no danger of* mass Egyptian immigration to
the Sudan, as its adverse climatic conditions and poverty
of natural resources would prove an effective barrier.
This was confirmed by the report of the Egyptian economic
mission which visited the Sudan in January 1935* Unlike
the Gezira, Gash and Tokar irrigation schemes, which were
already fully cultivated by the Sudanese, the rain-grown
cultivation of the Sudan was uncongenial to the Egyptians.
The Egyptian non-agricultural classes, in the view of the
British govexnoment, were also unwilling to go to the
Sudcui, and where were cases where it was impossible to
obtain the services of Egyptian doctors for the medical
supervision of gangs of Egyptian labourers recruited for
0
temporary work ir. the Sudan. Moreover, for a period of 
twenty years at least, there would be sufficient available
1. MahmudGhannam: Al-Mucahada al—Misriyya al-Ingliziyya
wadpirasatha min al-Wutjha al- Amallyya,”p . 337*
2. F.O. 371/20110, Despatch No. 7/394/36, Kelly to 
Campbell, 11 June 1936.
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land in Egypt itself. 'Though in actual practice since
1930 no bar had been put in the way of any bona fide
Egyptian who wanted to go to the Sudan for purposes either
of trade or set clement, the Egyptians, it was asserted,
had not shown the slightest desire for this. While the
British government was net afraid of intensive Egyptian 
1immigration, it objected to the entry of undesirables 
such as political agitators and drug traffickers. Conse­
quently, when offering in 1936 unrestricted Egyptian 
immigration, it insisted 011 the Governor-General1s undis­
puted right to refuse entry to any person for reasons of 
public order and health.
The British government, however, firmly refused 
Egypt's claim to preferential treatment under the gujse of 
exceptional facilities for Egyptian immigration, as this, 
in its view, "would be a serious derogation from the
autonomy of the Sudan Government and from their trustee
2
obligations" . For this reason .Britain refused to go 
beyond her offer in 1930? namely an affirmation that there
1. In fact there was a pronounced migration from the Sudan 
to Egypt, and it was said that three provinces in the 
Sudan were "living very largely on the remittances,
in money and kind, sent back to them by the emigrants". 
Ibid.
2. E.O. 371/20104, ho« J 3238/2/16, Memorandum by the 
Foreign Office on the Sudan Question in the Forthcoming 
Treaty Conversations, 18 April 1936,
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should be no discrimination between British and Egyptians 
in matters of commerce, immigration, or the possession of 
property. It was felt that this formula did not offer any 
advantage to Egypt, as article 6 of the Condominium Agree­
ment provided that no special privileges should be given 
to the nationals of any European power in the matter of 
trade, residence, or the holding of property in the Sudan. 
But there was nothing in the Agreement to prevent such 
privileges being given to the Egyptians, though there was 
equally nothing which stated that they should be given.
By assimilating Egyptian to British subjects and thus to 
other Europeans who could not be placed in a privileged
position, this formula, in the British view, was actually
a
a ’'retrograde step from the Egyptian point of view" .
In their counter-proposals, the Egyptians 
accepted the British proposals about immigration, equality 
between British and Egyptians, and the method by which 
international conventions would be applied to the Sudan.
But they tried t: obtain a clear statement of what they 
claimed to be their rights in the Sudan, particularly as 
regards sovereignty and participation in the administration 
These alleged rights followed partly from the Egyptian 
assertion that the Condominium Agreements were not justly
1 * Ibid.
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applied, but more particularly from their thesis of a
residual Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, i.e. a
sovereignty deriving from the original Egyptian conquest
of the Sudan, and the undivided administration up to the
1time of the Mahdisu revolution*
Nahhas withdrew the 1930 Egyptian demand for
renewed discussion of the Sudan question within a year,
but he asked that the whole question should be settled in
the near future. The British government rejected Nahhas1s
proi:>osal as it gavo a much more temporary aspect to its
suggested Sudan clause* The Egyptians also proposed that
this agreement should not "prejudice Egypt's rights and 
2interests" ‘ in the Sudan, by which they intended to cover 
a residuary right to sole sovereignty over the Sudan.
Under Egyptian pressure and as a last hope of reaching 
agreement, the British government had accepted this phrase 
in 1930 - But in 1936 it considered this highly dangerous 
to its position in the Sudan, as it implied that Egypt had 
unspecified rights and interests "other than those flowing 
from the terms of the condominium or the articles of the
1* Cab. 24/263, C.P. 176(36), Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Negotiations, the 
Sud an, 19 1une 1936.
2. 371/20115, No. 1(H), Lampson to Eden, 28 July
1936.
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treaty, or that the condominium [was] in some ways inimica
1to those rights and interests1'*
The British government suggested that the status 
of the Sudan should continue to be that resulting from the 
Condominium Agreements. The words "continue to" were an 
addition to the 1950 proposals. Their object was partly 
to ensure that there was no material change in the Sudan, 
but more partieulnrly to secure the British interpretation 
that the post-1924- developments were in accordance with 
the 1899 Conventions. Britain strongly opposed the 
Egyptian demand for their omission, as without them it 
would be open to the Egyptians to claim the restoration 
of the s tat us q u p t ante 1924-, and might take the British 
government to arbitration on this point under the general 
arbitration clause of the treaty. Britain wanted to secure 
thtvu the existing situation in the Sudan would continue 
except insofar as it had been modified by the treaty 
itself.^
In 1936 the Egyptians were unimpressed by the 
value of the return of the Egyptian troops to the Sudan 
as a concession, and they omitted it from their counter-
1. Cab. 24-/263, C.P, 176(36), Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary 011 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Negotiations, the 
Sudan, 19 June 1936.
2. P.O. 37-1/20115, No. 4-80, Eden to Lampson, 31 July 1936.
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draft. Their idea was that as this was an Egyptian right,
1mention in the treaty- would appear to limit it. uhile
the Nationalist Party argued that Britain allowed this in
1936 only to safeguard her imperial interests in the Sudan
2and to protect it against any attack from the East, the 
Egyptian delegation regaided it an important concession to 
which their public attached great importance. They 
accepted the return of their troops in principle, hut 
they suggested the substitution of "stationed in the Sudan' 
for "placed" in the following British proposal: "In
addition to Sudanese troops, both British and Egyptian 
troops shall be placed at the disposal of the Governor- 
General for the defence of the Sudan". They also asked 
for an agreed minute to the effect that the Egyptian 
government would send its forces to the Sudan as soon as 
the, treaty came into force. The British government never
1, F,0. 571/20104-, -No. J 3236/2/I6 , Memorandum by the
Foreign Office on the Sudan Question in the Forthcoming
Treaty Conversations, 18 April 1936,
2. While Britain got sufficient guarantees and facilities
for her troops in the Canal Zone (see annex to
article 8 of the treaty), the Nationalist Pary empha­
sized that similar concessions were not given to the 
Egyptian troops in the Sudan.
Qanun Thamcuifip li-Sanat 1936, p . 95 •
3- Cab. 24-/263, Annex A to C.P. 176(36), Memorandum by 
the Foreign Secretary on Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Nego­
tiations, the Sudan, 19 June 1936*
228
accepted this as it felt that while the word "placed"
implied that the Governor-General would choose whether he
would have Egyptian troops in the Sudan., and in what
numbers and whore, "stationed in the Sudan" removed this
idea of discretion lying with. him. The phraseology
suggested for the agreed minute seemed to give to the
Egyptians the discretion to send their troops and perhaps
1to decide their mmbers.
In the belief that Egypt should actually parti­
cipate in the administration of the Sudan, ITahhas suggested 
that Egyptians should be appointed, to all posts forthwith 
and in adequate proportions, and that an Egyptian deputy 
Governor-General with the right to sit in the Council 
should also be appointed. This would mean that a compara­
tively large number of Egyptian officials would be appointed 
to jhe Sudan administration, an eventuality which the 
British government ruled cut, as it would destroy tho 
British character of the administration and would make
its functioning impossible. It also refused the proposal
o
to appoint an Egyptian deputy Governor-General^ or a
1. B.O. 371/20115* Enclosure in Tel. No. 1(H), Comment 
by Campbell, 29 July 1936.
2. This Egyptian deputy Governor-General would be the 
acting Governor-General if the latter was on leave, 
which Britain would not tolerate.
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member of the Council. The work of a member of the 
Governor-General1s Council was normally discharged by a 
head of department* and actually occupied a minimum of 
his time. An Egyptian member without portfolio would be 
likely either to resign on discovering this, or to spend 
his protracted spare time in intrigues. It was felt that 
his appointment would revive the Sudanese demand for 
representation on the Council* which Britain regarded as 
undesirable at the time, and would be exceedingly unpopu­
lar among the Sudanese and British members of the politica 
and other services in the Sudan. Incidentally the appoint 
ment of an Egyptian Grand QadI to the Sudan four years 
previously had aroused bad feeling among the Sudanese.^
The British government was, however, prepared to appoint 
Egyptian officials 111 the Sudan provided that there was 
no unfair competition with the Sudanese and no ousting 
cf British occupants of posts. They were* however, not 
to be appointed to the political service, as their avowed 
administrative policy to restore the Sudan to its former 
status as a province of Egypt, was irreconcilable with 
the British view of the mandatory character of the
1. E-0. 571/20115, Tel. No. 480, Eden to Lampson, 31
July 1930.
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1
administration. Their appointment should he confined
2
strictly to technical posts, and would depend on suitable
3
vacancies and eligibility of candidates.
While refusing the Egyptian counter-proposals, 
the British government admitted that the Egyptian claim 
to exercise some personal supervision of the administratioi 
was not unreasonable. The function of such an Egyptian 
observer could be exercised inoffensively by .an Egyptian 
trade commissioner in Khartoum, provided that he did not 
affect the official channel of communications from the 
Governor-General, through the High Commissioner, to the 
Condominium governments. As a supplementary gesture, an 
Egyptian military officer of high rank could be appointed 
as a military secretary to the personal staff of 'Ghe 
Governor-General at KhartoumZ1- The British government
o E.O. 371/20114, Enclosure in Ho, J 6375/2/16, Note by 
C.E. Sandars, Byrnes's private secretary, on the Histor­
ical Antecedents of the Proposal for the Appointment 
of an Egyptian Deputy Governor-General, 17 July 1936.
2. In the final text of the treaty it was considered
undesirable to say in public th-t the Egyptians would 
be appointed only to technical posts, but, in Britain's 
view, the principal Egyptian negotiators appreciated 
this quite well.
E.O. 371/203.22, Ho. J 8708/2/16, Note’ by the Eoreign 
Office on Sudan Clauses, 24 November 193&*
3* P.O. 371/20115, Tel, Ho. 5(R)v Lampson to Eden, 30 
July I93O.
4. P.O. 371/201l4, No. J 6375/2/16, Memorandum by Byrnes 
on The Anglo'-Egyptian Treaty Conversations, Sudan 
Aspect, 17 July 1936.
lmew that no Egyptian could face an accusation that he had
signed away Egypt's rights in the Sudan. While refusing
the Egyptian demand that the treaty should not "prejudice
Egypt's rights and interests", it was ready to exclude fro:
it the question of sovereignty, by adding a sentence to
the effect that "nothing in this article should prejudice
1the question of ultimate sovereignty in the Sudan". By
narrowing down to the question of sovereignty, it would be
in Britain's view, much less dangerous than the vague
2phrase desired by the Egyptians . While the Egyptian 
delegation regarded this as satisfactory, tho Nationalist 
Party and other extremists in Egypt wanted a clear provi­
sion in tho treaty that sovereignty lay with Egypt so that 
nobody would challenge this in the future.
With his persuasive character and by virtue of 
his position as Governor-Gexieral, Cymes impressed the 
Egyptian delegation in his interview with them on 29 July
1. In a memorandum to the Cabinet, Eden argued that this 
concession was of form rather than substance, as it 
did not prejudice or alter the existing position in 
the Sudan, but was "calculated to enable the Egyptian 
delegation to represent to their public that they [had] 
in fact reserved Egypt's "residual soveriegnty" and 
[given] nothing away".
Gab. 24/263, C.P. 1/6(36), Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on Anglo-Egyptinn Treaty Negotiations, the 
Sudan, 19 June 1936.
2. F.O. 371/20115* Enclosure in Tel. No* 1(R), Comment by 
Campbei1. 29 July 1936.
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1956. By claiming that he spoke, not as a political
advocate for ono side or the other, hut as an administrate:
responsible to both governments for the good administratioi
of the Sudan, Symes persuaded the Egyptian delegation to
work for the concrete British concessions, rather than
Mto cry for the moon"^ which thoy would not get. At the
2drafting stage, however, the Egyptians obtained other
insignificant concessions. The Governor-General would
communicate directly with the Egyptian Prime Minister,
and would address an annual report on the administration
z
of the Sudan to the British and Egyptian governments. 
Nahhas emphasized that this would only be a reversion to 
the previous practice, abandoned in 1924-, laid down in the 
1899 Conventions. At his particular request, the British
1. E.O. 571/201155 Enclosure in Tel. No. 5(B) * Comment by 
an Official at the Foreign Office, 31 July 1956.
2. The drafting committee met on^29cand 50 July, and was 
composed of Makram Ubayd, Amin Uthman, Hafiz Aflfl, 
Beckett, Smart and Hopkinson.
F.O. 571/20115? Tel. No. 751(B) * Lampson to Eden, 50 
July 1956.
5. The then prevailing channel of communications with the 
Egyptian government was through the High Commissioner, 
though the Governor-General sometimes visited and 
miked with the Egyptian King and Prime Minister on his 
passage through Cairo. The annual report was certainly 
communicated to the Egyptian government before publi­
cation, though not directly addressed to it.
FeCu 371/20115? Enclosure in Tel. No. d(B), Comment by 
Campbell, 50 July 1956.
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government e.greed that the inspector-general of the
Egyptian irrigation service in the Sudan**" would he invited
to the Governor-General1s Council when matters relating tc
2
his departmental interests were before it. 'To meet the 
Egyptian desire that the Egyptian officials in the Sudan 
might rise to the top of the tree, Britain agreed that the 
promotion of members of the service should be irrespective 
of nationality "up to any rank" in accordance with indivi­
dual mexdts. The British government felt that this 
represented no danger to its position as the appointment
and promotion of all officials in the Sudan were in the
3hands of the Governor-General. The provision that 
promotion v/ould be in accordance with individual merits 
was regarded as a sufficient safeguard against unsuitable 
promotions. Moreover, promotions in the Sudan were not 
maAe from the technical to the administrative services.
The Egyptian delegation suggested substituting 
the word "their" for "the" before administration in the 
following British proposal: "The High Contracting Parties
agree that the primary aim of the administration in the
1. In 1936 he was a British subject, Major Hewhouse.
2. F„0. 371/201155 Tel. No. 760(H), Lampson to Eden, 1 
August 1956*
3. F.O. 371/20115*, Enclosure in Tel. No. 751(H), Comment 
by Campbell, 1 August 1936.
Sudan must be the interests of the Sudanese".'*' Since its 
object was to preserve the British character cf the admini­
stration, the British government refused this as it might 
mean that the administration was Egyptian as well as 
British, particularly as other Egyptian proposals showed 
that they demanded the appointment of Egyptians to admini­
strative posts. Britain, however, accepted this when the 
Egyptians dropped these demands, and regarded "their 
administration" as meaning the administration by the
Governor-General who embodied and represented the British
2and Egyptian shares.
As expected, the extreme Conservatives in Britain 
criticised the Sudan clauses as giving Egypt a much wider 
latitude than the Egyptians themselves expected in the 
military occupation and administration of the Sudan.
The ie who remembered the ill-treatment of the Sudanese 
by the Egyptians in the 19th Century and their intrigues 
there against the British in the 20th Century asserted that 
the Sudan provisions would produce nothing but friction in
1. Cab. 24-/263, Annex A to C.P. 176(36), Memorandum by 
the Foreign Secretarjr on Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Nego­
tiations, the Sudan, 19 June 1936.
2. F.O. 371/201159 Enclosure in Tel. No. 751(H)> Comment 
by Campbell, 1 August 1936.
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1the Sudan. The majority of British opinion, however, was 
more reasonable and thought it natural for Egypt to demand 
a share in the condominium of the Sudan, a region in which 
she had sacrificed many of her people, spent much money, 
and upon the watois of which her very existence depended. 
Though admitting that the new joint administration resul­
ting from the 1956 treaty might create difficulties in 
the Sudan, it was hoped that "if practiced in a spirit of 
mutual confidence, [it] should both afford protection to 
the Sudanese, and offer an opportunity for Anglo-Egyptian 
cooperation that should finally kill any lingering anta-
■ H 2gonzLsm" .
Still adhering to the Egyptian claim that the
Sudan was an integral part of Egypt, the Nationalist Party
and other extremists in Egypt regarded the Sudan article
as a complete surrender of Egypt’s legal and historical
Sudan
rights ip the /. Though the nation had persistently 
refused the illegal Condominium Agreements, they claimed, 
the 1936 treaty recognised them, a matter which would
Morning Post, 28 August 1936.
2* Manchester Guardian, 28 August 1936.
3. During the 1930 negotiations the Wafd claimed that 
these Agreements were so hated in Egypt that they 
should not be mentioned in the draft treaty.
Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi 1 : Pi A qab a 1 -Thawra a h
Misriyyo, t o l. 3, p. 25.
actually separate the Sudan fro ^ Egypt as they gave all
the military and civil authority in the Sudan to the
1British Governor-General. Since 1924, however, these 
Agreements had existed only in name and the Sudan was 
practically a British protectorate apart from the recog­
nition of certain Egyptian privileges, l'he Egyptians 
were increasingly in a position of inferiority as regards 
the administration and defence, and in commercial and 
immigi at ion questions. There was a. possibility that their 
influence might soon be totally excluded from the Sudan. 
Rather than allow this unsatisfactory situation, other 
minority parties and the Y/afd thought it advisable to 
accept temporarily rhe Sudan clauses which, in their view, 
would restore the situation that had prevailed before
Though the Egyptian government had reserved for 
^'rself the right to question the validity of the Nile 
Waters Agreement of 1929 in any future treaty negotiations, 
bhis matter was not referred to in the Sudan article of
1. Qanun Thananln li-Ganat 1936 ■, p . 145 *
Al-Ahram, 2 August .1936*
3. The Egyptian government reservedjfor itself this right 
under paragraphs 1 and 5 of Mahmud’s Note to Lord 
Lloyd of 7 May 1929* Eor the text of these paragraphs 
and the whole Nile Waters Agreement see Cmd. 3348, 
Treaty Series, No. 17 (1929)*
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1936- In 1933 tho British government decided to raise
the whole question of the Nile waters in any coming
negotiations., and* as a concession to Egypt, the 1933
draft treaty-5- suggested that the irrigation experts of
Egypt* the Sudan and Uganda should meet under the presi-
ency of the Egyptian Minister of Public Works or his
deputy at least once every three years
1 for the purpose of discussion and exchange 
of information particularly in regard to 
any major irrigation project which may be 
contemplated by any of the countries concerned 
...... and the High Contracting Parties
undertake to attach the greatest possible 
weight to any resoltnions or expressions 
of opinion which may resulb therefrom"
This draft was inappropriately worded and besides, the
British government asserted in 1936 that it could not be
regarded by Eg3rpt as a concession* as it fell far short
of the undertaking given to her by the British Note of 
31929 > Consequently it decided not to raise this matter 
in the 3.936 negotiations unless Egypt questioned the
1- This was a draft treaty prepared at the foreign Office 
and approved by the British government as the basis of 
any future discussions with Egypt, It made substantial 
modifications in favour of Britain in all aspects.
2, i\0. 371/203.04, No, J 3238/2/16, Memorandum by the 
foreign Office on the Sudan Question in the forth­
coming Treaty Conversations, IS April 1936.
3- See Cmd. 3348* Treaty Series No, 17 (1929)? P* 50.
238
validity of the Nile Waters Agreement, in which case 
Britain was determined to reaffirm it in the treaty.
Though the Wafd had denounced this Agreement at the time 
of its signature, as in the 1930 negotiations, it did not 
raise the matter in 1938. The British government claimed 
that it would continue in force, as, according to para­
graph 1 and 5 of Mahmud’s Note to Lord. Lloyd, Egypt could 
terminate it only on the occasion of treaty negotiations. 
Moreover the British government felt it improbable that 
Egypt whald do this because "seeing that the Sudan lies 
above Egypt, all the trump cards lie in the Sudan's hands 
anyhow, and therefore a refusal by Egypt to observe the 
Nile Waters Agreement can only harm Egypt and cannot harm 
the Sudan"
Co: versations on the financial matuers affecting tho Sudan 
Since 1898 the Egyptian government had incurred 
considerable expenditure in the Sudan; amounting approxi­
mately to :Z±5 million. It had spontaneously offered the 
Sudan an annual subsidy of .8750,000 since the withdrawal
1. E.O. 371/20102, Enclosure in No. 287 (7/14-8/36), 
Comment by Beckett, 16 April 1936.
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1of the Egyptian ti'oops from the Sudan in 1924-25. The
1930 draft treaty suggested that the whole question of the
Sudan deht to Egypt should be deferred for discussion
between the two governments until the treaty cane into 
2force. The British government supported this proposal
as the deplomble condition of the Sudan's finances., owing
to the economic depression, made the time unsuitable for
negotiations on the subject. The British were not on very
secure grounds in arguing that the Sudan had a contractual
right to the subsidy, which was of vital importance to it,
and it was felt unreasonable to sk a controversy with
the Egyptions over the question in the hope that they
3would continue to pay it for political reasonsn Moreover
1, E.G. 371/20136, No. S. 24915v Letter from Waley (Trea­
sury) to Campbell, 21 February 1936.
,/hile Britain accepted the annual subsidy as an aid to 
the general administration of the Sudan that could not 
be reduced or withdrawn by a unilateral action, the 
Egyptian government claimed that it should be strictly 
allocated to the defence of the Sudan.
2. In the 1933 draft treaty, the British government sug­
gested. that discussions on the subject should take 
place as soon as the economic situation would permit. 
From the British point of view, the advantage of this 
formula over that of 1930 was that it was much vaguer, 
and in effect postponed the whole question to an 
indefinite future.
F.O. 371/20137? Lo. 7/4-06/36, Cairo Chancery to 
Egyptian Department, 11 June 1936.
3 . F.O. 371/20136, No. 147? Ejen to Lampson, 4 March
1936.
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the maintenance of the status quo would enable a number
of difficult claims and counter-claims on either side to
1remain dormant. Although these claims were strictly 
speaking of a financial nature, they were hound up with 
the political past of the Sudan, and their discussion 
might lead to an undesirable political controversy which
o
would complicate the negotiations
In 193^ the British government had changed its 
position and preferred all the financial questions to be 
settled In the treaty. The subsidy was actually voted 
every year and there was a constent danger that Egypt 
might reduce or withdraw it. It would make things 
difficult for the Financial Secretary of the Sudan if he 
did not know how long the subsidy would continue at its
1. The British government argued tnat the Condominium 
Powers had a financial responsibility towards the Sudan. 
Britain1s: responsibility was the guaranteeing of the 
wbo.le Sudan debt to Britain amounting to £14,454,360, 
and that of Egypt was the annual subsidy. The British 
government felt that its case over these financial 
matters was very weak. whereas it expected the Sudan 
to pay punctually the interest and sinking fund on its 
debt to Britain, it asked Egypt to wait indefinitely 
for the payment of interest on its loans to the Sudan, 
and to continue a subvention to the Sudan in the mean­
time .
E.O. 371/20137v Eo. J 7H0/380/16, Note by Campbell 
to Eden on the Sudan Debt and Egyptian Subvention,
3.4 August 1936.
2. E.O,. 371/20137? No. J 5562/380/16, Memorandum by 
Scrivener of the Foreign Office on the Indebtedness 
of the Sudan and the Egyptian Subsidy, 22 June 1936.
current rate, or when he might he called upon to repay 
the debt to Egypt. If the natter was to be settled in 
subsequent negotiations, the Sudan night expect a much 
worse bargain .**“ Since Nahhas was inclined to be forth-° * j
coning in financial natters, the British government thoughl
that he would attach litmle importance to the matter, and
it could be settled without difficulty on terns favourable
2to the Sudan.
The Treasury suggested to the British government 
that it should try simply to secure the cancellation of 
the Sudan debt 011 the grounds that;, of the two parties in 
the Condominium, Egypt had derived, and would continue to 
derive, the greater material advantage from the occupation 
of the Sudan. While Britain got no material benefit from 
this occupation, Egypt received the protection and control 
op the Nile waters and the security of her southern 
frontier. Tho Sudan was still unable to balance its 
budget, and it was felt only right that Egypt, the principa 
beneficiary from Its occupation, should make up the deficit 
But the British government rejected this proposal, as it
1. E.O. 571/20137 5 Enclosure in No. 7/303/36* Comment by 
Campbell, 30 April 1930.
2, E.O. 371/20137> Bo. J 5502/380/16, Memorandum by 
Scrivener 011 the Indebtedness of the Sudan and the 
Egyptian Subsidy, 22 June 1936.
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would make the Sudan entirely dependent on the goodwill of
the Egyptian government for the payment of the subsidy.
Instead Britain accepted the suggestion of Hugman, the
Financial Secretary of the Sudan, that the Sudan should
agree to a gradual reduction of the subvention and its
final extinction, while Egypt should, cancel the debt
finally* When Nahhas referred to the question on 29 
q
July 1936/ Lampson made the following suggestion:
"It is agreed that in consideration of the 
following progressive reduction of the annual 
subsidy paid by Egypt to the Sudan, the 
Egyptian government will make no claim in p 
respect of the Sudan’s existing indebtedness.
The subsidy shall accordingly be reduced in 
the following manner. Until 1945 the amount 
of the subsidy shall be -£E750,000; from 1946- 
1950 9E700,090v from 1951 to 1955 £E650,00Q; 
from ±956-1960 £0550,000; after I960 nil”.5
This met the desire of tho Sudan Government that the
subsidy should continue unchanged for at least a number
of years.
1. Lampson was instructed not to open the question, but 
to wait for the Egyptians to do sc as they would 
undoubtedly do.
Ibid.
2o In the Bricish government's view, only £5,174,493 of 
the Sudan debt to Egypt would be recoverable,
F.O. 371/20136, No. S. 24915, Letter from Waley 
(Treasury) to Campbell, 21 February 1936.
3* F«0. 371/20137, No. J 6890/380/16, Minute by the 
Foreign Office on the Sudan Indebtedness to Egypt,
5 August 1936.
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Nahhas strongly rejected this suggestion, as it
entailed an obligation for the Egyptian government to
continue the subsidy* He claimed that it was impossible
to get the Egypcian Parliament to consent in advance to
make this subsidy a regular annual standing charge in the
budget. Hather than commit himself to the British formula,
he was prepared to let the conversations fail. He,
however, suggested that the matter should be dealt with
as in 1530, and on the arrival of the Egyptian delegation
in London, the Egyptian Ministry of Einance should at
once take the matter up with the British Treasury with a
2view to settlement. Strongly advised by Lampson, the 
British government finally accepted Nahhas1s proposal, 
particularly as further discussion would lead to delay, 
and consequently give an advantage to those in Egypt who 
wished to wreck the treaty.
The British government instructed Lampson to
1. See above, p. 239*
2 o Prom the British point of v i e w N a h h a s ’s proposal was 
an advance over 19309 since it envisaged not only the 
discussion, as in 1930, but also the settlement of 
the debt question before the signature or at any rate 
the ratification of the treaty.
E.O- 371/20115, Enclosure in Tel* 751(H) <, Comment by 
Campbell, 1 August 1930*
3. E»0„ 371/20137^ Tel. No, 487, Eden to Lampson, 5
August 1936.
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pur sue the natter non with Nahhas and Makran in order to
attain some agreement 011 the proposed discussion in London
and to obtain some unilateral declaration from the Egyptia2
side that the7/ vvould continue to pay the subvention until
the financial circumstances of the Sudan warranted a
reduction of its amount, and provided a final settlement
of the debt. These desires wore partly made by a statement
1by Nahhas as Prime Minister. He would not agree to cancel 
the Sudan debt, but would not ask the Sudan to repay any 
of it before its financial position allowed this. Ho 
would either pay the subsidy for the defence of the Sudan 
provided that he might deduct from it the expenses of the 
Egyptian army stationed in the Sudan, or pay the full 
subsidy for 1936? and consider future payments as loans 
from Egypt to the Sudan, to be repaid when tho Sudan was 
ir. a position to do so. This communication was made to 
inform the British government of the manner in which the 
Egyptian government would approach the discussions in 
London. It was embarrassing to the British government, 
as it would be dependent on the goodwill of Nahhas alone.
1. The non-government members of the Egyptian delegation 
were not given copies of this statement as Nahhas 
wanted to keep them out. In fact the whole question 
of the subsidy and debt was settled behind the backs 
of the Egyptian delegation, and the British government 
discussed it with Nahhas, Makran cUbayd and Amin 
"Uthmau..
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Lampson was instructed to attempt to obtain this statement
in the name of the Egyptian government, but nothing carne 
1out of this.
On 5 November 1936 the two governments reached 
an agreement on these financial matters. The repayment of 
the debt was postponed to a future date, when it would be 
agreed that the Sudan's financial position had sufficiently 
improved to make repayment possible without an adverse 
effect on the development and government of the country.
The Egyptian government undertook not to withdraw the
p
annual subvention except after giving fair notice.
1. E 0. 371/20137v No. J 7110/3S0/16, Note by Campbell 
to Eden on the Sudan Debt and Egyptian Subvention, 
14 August 1936.
2. E.O. 371/20122, Enclosure in No. J 8708/2/16, Note 
by the foreign Office on the financial Questions 
Affecting the Sudan, undated.
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The reactions of the Sudanese and Sudan Government to the 
treaty:
The reports of the Public Security Branch at 
Khartoum"*" gives the iiapression that the feelings of the 
Sudanese about the treaty were dictated by their individual 
and personal preoccupations. There was no such thing as 
public opinion or national feeling as was understood in 
Europe, with its conservative outlook, completely limited 
by local interests and unconcerned with the external 
world, provincial tribal opinion in the eastern, central 
and western Sudan regarded the treaty as nothing. It still 
viewed the Sudan government as British and the " theory of
p
Egyptian partnership as a meaningless political fiction".
It disliked the Egyptians because of their bad adi^inis- 
trntive record in the Sudan during the Turcc-Egyptian
1 Though usually these British reports should be treated 
cautiously, I believe that they give a fairly reason­
able assessment of the Sudanese reaction to the 1936 
treaty.
2. C.R.CK, Pile No. Km.P./ScP/36,H.2, Memorandum by the 
Public Security Branch, Khartoum, on the Peeling in 
the Sudan Regarding the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936*
27 July 1936. The memorandum goes on to say that in 
the north the sedentary agricultural and commercial 
population astride the railway and river had, as a 
natural result of geographical position, racial affinity, 
and commercial and labour contracts, developed a 
political opinion which recognised Egypt's political 
existence. They were favourable to a closer partner­
ship with her provided their own material interests 
in commerce and land, which they were not ready to see 
prejudiced by any theories of national brotherhood, 
were properly safeguarded.
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period and the first twenty-five years of the Condominium,
when they shared its government with Britain. Consequently
it was against the return of any Egyptian influence to
the Sudan# In a conversation on the treaty on 14 October
1936 between Shaykh °Ali al-Tum, the head Bhaykh (Nazir
°Uiaun) of the Kababish,, end Newbold, the governor of
Kordofan, the former said:-*
"You know that in common with all Arabs in 
tho Sudan, 1 dislike the Egyptians. Their 
record here was afin* No one [who] had 
watched the Egyptian Mamur at work or in his 
private life can really respect him. He is 
a glutton and has no self-restraint and cares 
only fox1 his body. Consequently we do not 
tolerate any return of Egyptians in an 
executive capacity (bi sifat Hukam). They 
are not ahl zirna (i*e1 disinterested) and 
we regard then as an inferior race without 
courage or patience.......... I feel very
strongly that the power (guwa) and all •,
executive posts must remain Tn English hands".
Of tho more sophisticated Sudanese, the merchants
1. C.H.O., Eile No. Km.P/ScR/36.H.2, Note from Newbold 
to J.C. Penny, the Controller of Public Seciruty 
Intelligence, on a Conversation with Shaykh Sir cAli 
al-Ttim on tho Treaty, 14 October 1936.
Though All al-Tum preferred the Egyptians not to be 
given any concessions in the Sudan, he realized the 
political reasons for the British to be liberal to 
them. He did net feel any anxiety about the return 
of some Egyptian soldiers especially to Haifa or to 
guard the dams or ports; nor did he object to Egyptian 
clerks or technical people in departments which had 
110 respongibility or power over the people.
Since Ali al-Tum was pro-British, his remarks 
should not be regarded as completely impartial.
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alone took a realistic view, and were felt to be on the 
whole in favour of a treaty, particularly those with 
Cairo connections, ihey perhaps believed that the 
stabilization by the treaty of the political relations 
between tho two countries would make for greater mutual 
commercial prosperity, and might lead to Egyptian capital 
investment in the Sudan, which would help them to increase 
the capitalisation of agricultural schemes. Association 
with Egypt, they felt, "might also strengthen their hands 
in approaching the Sudan Government over the various 
alleged grievances which from time to time agitate the 
Sudan chamber of commerce".'*' The return of the Egyptian 
troops to the Sudan in 1937 was particularly welcomed by
p
retail merchants as this was a new source of revenue.
On principle a small diligent group of the intellectuals
In C.R.O., File No* Km.P./ScR/36.II.2, Memorandum by the 
Public Security Branch, Khartoum, on the Feeling in 
the Sudan Regarding the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, 
27 July 1936.
2. Tlhile the muwalladin (Egypto-Sudanese) expressed 
natural sentimental pleasure at tho return of the 
Egypt ian troops, the intellectuals were, on the whole, 
unsympathetic. Many of them, particularly the young, 
"looked upon the returning troops as another alien 
array of occupation whose arrival stressed the sub­
jection of the Sudanese to foreign domination".
C .R .0., Sudan Monthly Intelligence Summary, No. 47 
for December 1937v para. 1180.
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C C ” 1led by Arafat Muhammad Abdallah opposed the infiltratioi 
of Egyptian capitalism in the Sudan, and advocated that 
the state should not only continue its commercial ventures 
but should also undertake new ones, Lhat gains the 
Sudanese capitalists might get would only go to their 
private pockets and the new wealth would drive then away 
from the mass of the people, as they wore expected to 
adopt now ways of living and follow their own private 
interests * The ultimate result would be that they would 
turn into "black Greeks" and exploit the people. If, on 
the other hand, the state took control of the important 
economic enterprises, the gains would be reaped by the 
people in the form of hospitals, schools and important 
menans of transport, kith such views in mind, cArafat1s 
group opposed the Egyptian economic mission, which visited 
the Sudan in February 1935 to study its potentialities 
and arrange economic relations and cooperation between
p
Egyptian and Sudanese entrepreneurs.
Though, as usual, Sayyid cAlI al-Mirghani, the
1. Arafat, the editor of al-ffa.jr, was pro-Egyptian and 
the representative of the 7/hite Flag League in Cairo. 
After seeing the Lafd’s feebleness against Sidql1s 
government in the 1930’s, he returned to the Sudan
as an anti-Egyptian and a strong advocate of "the Sudan 
for the Sudanese". He died on 23 July 1936.
2, On the invitation of Symes, the Royal Agricultural 
Society in Cairo sent this mission, but nothing came 
of it.
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head of the Khatmiyya sect, did not publicly state his
views on the treaty, he never liked it. This was partly
because he, as the chief Sudanese collaborator with Britain
1at that time, would benefit most if all the power in the
Sudan was in the hands of the Sudan Government. The
concessions given by the treaty to the Egyptians would
undoubtedly accelerate the rate of Sudanese sophistication
2and depreciate the Faki status, which was his sole claim 
to authority. He probably feared that his more modern and 
realistic rival, Sayyid cAbd al~Rahman al Mahdi, the 
leader of the Ansar, was far better equipped than he to 
extract personal advantage from Egyptian intervention in 
the Sudan's affairs. He felt that the Sudan would not 
obtain any advantage from closer association with Egypt.
The employment of Egyptian officials in the Sudan would 
ine/itably result in lowering the prestige of the adminis­
tration, and the Sudanese government officials would be 
far from the realization of their ambitions.1'
1. It was only in the 1940's that al-Mirghani became 
pro-Egyptian.
2. Faki status is that of a man of sanctity and holiness 
to whom people look up as an example of a good way of 
life and as a channel of spiritual power (baraka).
5-* C.R.O., File Ho. Km.P./ScR/36.H.2, Memorandum by the 
Public Security Branch, Khartoum, on the Peeling in 
the Sudan Regarding the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 
27 July 1936.
In view of M s  family hi story and of M s  own
activities in 1924, when he played an important part as
an anti-Egyptian propagandist,^ it was natural that
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman al-Mahdi should oppose the treaty
as it reintroduced Egyptian influence into the Sudan.
The Ansar were particularly worried by the fact that,
according to the terms of the treaty, the important
question of sovereignty over the Sudan was to be shelved
2
for twenty years. In their view, this implied that 
Egypt could, in theory at any rate, still claim to be 
legally sovereign over the Sudan, Hoping to get the 
assurance of the British government that sovereignty 
would pass to the Sudanese, Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman
1. Britain’s chief Sudanese collaborators, the religious 
and tribal^leaders, were alarmed by the pro-Egyptian 
agitation in 1924 particularly uhe White Elat petition 
to the Governor-General opposing the expulsion of the 
Egyptians from the Sudan. On the initiative of Sayyid
Abd al-Rahman, they sent in June 1924 a loyal petition 
in which tfiey deplored the pro-Egyptian propaganda, 
and demanded that Britain should continue to administer 
the Sudan’s affairs till it was ready for independence. 
Gaafar Bakhiet: British Administration, pp. 79-82.
2. The treaty provided that nothing in it would prejudice 
the question of sovereignty over the Sudan. According 
to the nationalists, this vague term could be inter­
preted in three different ways: that sovereignty 
would be, as in the Condominium, for both Britain
and Egypt, or for Egypt alone or for the Sudanese. 
Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub and Muhammad Abd al-Hallm:
Mawt Dunya* pp. 1?0~?2.
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-  1 travelled to London in 1957 * "but he got no satisfactory
response. According to cAhd al-Rahman cAli Taha, a
confidant of the Sayyid, when he questioned Mr. R.A.
Butler (now Lord Butler), then acting foreign Secretary,
about the issue, he received the usual evasive answers:
"sovereignty over the Sudan is represented by the two
flags", and "it is described in the Condominium Agreement".
The treaty was disappointing both to the pro- 
Egyptian intellectuals and their opponents. Under the 
leadership of Ahmad Khayr, the former, who were weak and 
few,v were disappointed to see the Wafd publicly approve
1. Some of the Sayyid's supporters advised him not to go, 
argueing that war might break out while he was on his 
way, or that Britain might prevent him if she knew the 
real motive behind his journey. But he insisted on 
travelling for the ostensible reason of rest and 
treatment• _ r _
Abd al-Rahman All Taha: A1-Sudan li11-Sudanyyin,
p* 30.
2. Ibid., p. 30.
The same information about the Sayyid's visit to 
London is mentioned in his memoirs. See Sadiq al- 
Mahdl: Jihad fi Sabil al-Istiqlal, pp. 3$-35*
3. Since the collapse of the pro-Egyptian rebellion in 
1924, the extremist Sudanese nationalists were contin­
uously weakened. Because of the British policy of 
firmness, and in the absence of organised propaganda 
from Cairo, the intelligentsia became increasingly 
estranged from their former pro-Egyptian views. In 
1929 the Sudan government felt confident enough to 
release most of the White flag leaders imprisoned in 
1924. Several of them were allowed to stay in Cairo, 
but were so disgusted with the coldness of the Egyptian 
nationalists towards them that they returned to the 
Sudan full of hatred to Egypt.
G-aafar Bakhiet: British Administration, p. 226.
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the existing regime in the Burl an by endorsing the Condo-
mini urn Agreements. Par from behaving like an ally against
the common British enemy, the hafd, in their view, was
only too pleased to he readmitted as a nominal co-ruler
of the Sudan, and to send a token force there. They
realized that their hopes that Egypt would unseat the
British in the Sudan for them were imaginary, and that
the Sudanese woul 1 have to depend on their own energies,^
Since September 1S36, Ahmad Khayr was agitating for a
2congress which should not be for the graduates only but 
a true parliament of the people.
To the majority of the intellectuals i.e. the 
advocates of "the Sudan for the Sudanese”, who considered 
themselves the section of the community best entitled to 
speak for the nation as a whole, the treaty was most 
offensive as they had not been consulted. Before the 
beginning of the conversations, al-AFajr, the principal 
Sudanese journal in the thirties, launched a strong 
campaign demanding that the Sudanese should have a say 
in determining the future of their country. With their 
usual claim that they had the right to speak for the
1. Ahmad Zhayr: Klfah Jayl, pp. 48-50.
2. In this context '’graduates” meant those who had 
completed their intermediate or secondary education.
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1Sudan, the Egyptian politicians never liked this attitude,
2
which they denounced as an "English plot". The main
reference inade in the treaty to the future of the Sudan
and its people was the yague statement that the primary
aim of the administration in the country should be the
welfare of the Sudanese. In the eyes of the nationalists,
this was a most insensitive insult because it appeared to
treat the Sudanese as less than human and certainly not as
responsible adults. In the summer of I960, hr. Muddathir 
c —
Abd al-hahin interviewed about twelve outstanding Sudanese 
politicians, including two ex-Prdme Ministers, representing 
different shades of opinion. They all condemned this 
clause. The notion that "animals may apsire to and 
content with so-called welfare, but free men will not be 
satisfied with less than freedom", was uniformly expressed 
by almost each one of them.
These feelings of discontent, however, were 
mixed with a certain delight in the relative freedom and
1. The weekly hose al-Yusuf, however, supported the 
Sudanese demand"~for participation in the conversations 
over the Sudan clauses.
heekly hose al-Yusuf, 5 August 1936.
2. Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub and Muhammad cAbd al-Halim:
Mawt Dunyat pp* 1^0-72.
3* Muddathir Abd al-hahim: Imperialism and Nationalism,
p. 120.
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increased opportunities that followed the restoration of
Egypt's position in the S u d a n a n d  the return of the
competition "between Egypt and the Sudan government to win
the sympathy of the Sudanese. Well aware of the advantage
of this new situation, some of the Sudanese tried to play
off the Sudan Government and Egypt against each other. On
19 October 1957? in a leading article headed "The need for
sending educational missions abroad", the acting editor
°i al-Sudan praised the Egyptian government for accepting
forty-four Sudanese students free in its schools. The
Sudanese, he added, hoped that England, as the other
partner of the Condominium would do something similar for
the Sudan. The Gordon College was, no doubt, a useful
institution, but unless Sudanese students were given
adequate chances of receiving higher education, their
theoretical priority for government posts given by the
2treaty would not be realized. In its issue of 5 October
1 9 5 7 al-Nil carried an article in which it said,
"England had already raised several monuments 
in the Sudan ...... the Gordon College, the
Kitchener medical school, the Stack Laborat­
ories ...... from all of which a large number
of trained Sudanese leave every year. Egypt, 
of course, had done a lot, but mainly of a"
1. See below, pp,. 263-64.
2. C .R .0 ., Sudan Monthly Intelligence Summary, ho. 43 
for August 1937.
256
general and transient nature. The Egyptians 
should also raise in the Sudan a permanent 
visible monument, a Earouk institutea 
Nahas college, a Toussoun orphanage".
While willing to use the opportunities which
were bestowed upon them as a result of the Anglo-Egyptian
rivalry, the nationalists realised that the ultimate
salvation of their country lay in their own hands, and
that they should organise themselves for this purpose.
Accordingly a number of suggestions were made in 1957 Tor
the creation of some national body to be the spokesman of
the Sudanese, although each reflected the attitudes of a
p
particular strand of political opinion in the country.
Arguing that the Egyptian propaganda was turning the heads
of the Sudanese, Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman suggested the
formation of an advisory copncil to preserve the separate
identity of the Sudan, and to define the position and
aspirations of ibs people under the new regime. In a
leading article on 16 August 1956, the editor of al-Rajr
treaty
claimed that the 1956/left the Sudan in the same state of 
poverty and misery that resulted from the Conominium 
Agreementso The position of the Sudanese, in his view,
1. C.R.O., Syrian Monthly Intelligence Summary, No. 45 
for October'1957•
2. Muddathir Abd al-Rahim: Imperialism and Nationalism, 
p. 124.
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could not be improved unless their demands were ascertained, 
which could only be done by the intellectuals. The 
editorial then appealed for all the graduates to call for 
a graduate conference to form a united front for the 
formation and enforcement of a progressive programme.
The object of al-Fa,jr and the intellectuals for whom it 
spoke was to oppose Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman by an organised
and independent body of the graduates as the representative
1 „
of the Sudanese. A few weeks later theSharif Yusuf
al-Hindi, the leader of a prominent taricja, suggested as 
a compromise that a council should be formed of ten 
Sudanese: the two Sayyids, the head of the cUlana’,
p
and seven representatives of the graduates. Meanwhile, 
the graduates, particularly those of Omdurman Club led 
by IsmacIl al-Azharr and Mekki Shibeika (MakkI Shibayka.) ^  
we<e foiloxving an independent path. The upshot of all 
these efforts, however, was the formation of the Graduates 
General Congress in February 1938.
The Sudan Government would have preferred the
1. Through his political and religious influence Sayyid
Abd al-Rahman was trying to dominate the nationalist 
movement. "See below, p. 264.
2. C.R.O., Sudan Monthly Intelligence Summary, Ho. 43 
for August 1937°
3. Both were graduates of rhe American University of 
Beirut, and were then teachers at the Gordon College.
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Sudan question to be settled in a separate agreement with 
Egypt rather than fora, as in the 1950 draft treaty, one 
of the articles of the treaty itself. If it formed part 
of the treaty, it would be subject to the provision of 
the revision article. Consequently, it was felt, there 
would be a risk that at the end of twenty years the League, 
at the insistence of Egypt, might decide on such a 
radical change in the existing arrangements that Egypt 
would bo come the active and Britain the passive partner 
of the Condominium. Synes was particularly worried at 
the possibility that the League right secure for Egypt 
the right to appoint the Governor-GeneralE From the 
practical point of vievy the -British government felt that 
there would be no great risk in accepting this, as British 
influence in the League would prevent it from recommend:! ng 
any changes contrary to Britain’s interests. Since the 
Sudan clause provided that the primary aim of the adminis­
tration should be the welfare of the Sudanese, the British 
government asserted that it was unlikely that the League 
would unanimously decide that the interests of the Sudanese 
would be favoured by the appointment of an Egyptian
1. Cab. 23/84, No. 43(p6)? Conclusion 1, 23 June 1936. 
Under the Condominium agreements, the Governor-General 
was to be appointed by the Egyptian sovereign on 
nomination by the British government.
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Governor-General, or by putting in any way the adminis- 
tration of the Sudan in Egyptian hands. This would even 
be less possible in twenty years' time when the process 
already begun of teaching the Sudanese to administer 
themselves would have developed a long way. Moreover,
Bud ane se nati onalism, uhich aiready existed, was likely 
by the end of twenty years to have increased greatly in 
strength. If Britain refused the Egyptians the satisfac­
tion which they would get from the fact of the Sudan 
provisions being revised in this way, they would, in the 
view of the British government. sacrifice the treaty rather 
than to give way. They accepted substantial modifications 
in the 1930 nildtary clauses on the grounds of the 
changed military situation, but there would be no excuse 
for Britain to ask them to do so in the case of the Sudan.
In the Sudan Government’s view, the interests 
of the Sudan would, be best served, as mentioned above, by 
an Anglo-Sgyptian treaty provided that its conclusion 
would not imply to the Sudanese an imminent or ultimate 
threat of active Egyptian Intervention in the government 
and internal affairs of the Sudan. Any such threat, said 
Byrnes in a telegram to the Foreign Office "would have
1. Cab. 2^/265m C.P. 176(36), Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on the Anglo-Bgyptian Treaty Negotiations, 
rhe Sudan, 19 June 1936.
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repercussions in the Sudan nore inportant end possibly 
more violent than would result from the failure of treaty 
negotiations as long as British military forces remain in
p
Egypt O' v,ith such views, Synes accepted the employment 
of a few Egyptian officials in non-adninistrative posts
2only, and unrestricted Egyptian immigration to the Sudan. 
Phile accepting in principle the return of Egyptian troops 
to the Sudan, he suggested that this should be specifically 
part of the Englo-Egyptian military arrangements and not 
part of the political settlement of the Sudan. This, he 
asserted, would have unfortunate political repercussions 
there, as it would be regarded by the Sudanese as "a 
symbol of Egyptian authority in the Sudan”. Moreover, 
he was reluctant to have the Egyptian battalions stationed 
at Khartoum, since they would be a serious embarrassment 
tbfcre, and preferred that they should be at Port Sudan or 
Haifa. Synes persuaded the British government that, if 
this were overruled, it should accept the permanent 
retention of two British battalions in the Sudan, and
h  P.O. 371/20097* rlel. ITo. 7 (Saving), Lamps on to Eden,
23 January 1936.
2. It was felt that there would be no danger of massive 
Egyptian immigration to the Sudan. See above, pp. 222-23
3. P.O. 371/20099* lei. ITo. lid, Eden to Lampson, 27 
February 1936.
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the stationing of the Egyptian, troops at Jebel nwlia or 
elsewhere away from contact with the population and the 
Sudan Defence Force.^ hhile appreciating Symes’s argu­
ments» the British government decided that the return of 
Egyptian troops to theSudan should not bo introduced into 
the military conversations as this would complicate them, 
and would not satisfy the aspirations of the Egyptians 
who might regard uhis as a limitation on their authority 
in the Sudan* The matter should he discussed in the 
Sudan clause, where it was felt to he useful as a make­
weight in these discussions with regard to which there
was little that the British government was ready to 
2
concede. In the view of the Foreign Office, Synes!s
objections to this could be met :iby the fact that the
Egyptian and Sudanese public, seeing the treaty as a
whole, would not necessarily make the point that the
a
return of Egyptian troops was/symbol of the reassertion 
of Egyptian sovereignty".^ In spite of Byrnes*s advice,
1. F.O. 371/20103:, Bel. TTo. 273 ? Lamp son to Eden, 6
April 1936.
2. F.O. 371/20104, loc J 3238/2/16, Memorandum by the 
.Foreign Office on the Sudan Question in the Forth­
coming Treaty Conversations, 18 April 1936.
3c F.O. 371/20105, Bo. J 3468/2/16, Minute by Campbell 
on Anglo-Egyptian Conversations, an Account of the
F/note contd. 011 next page
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the British government was prepared, to alio?/ the Egyptian
troops to stay at Khartoum because., it believed, any offer
which did not include this would have no value in Egyptian 
1
eyes* The Egyptian negotiators, however, did not press 
for this, and the treaty provided only for the return of 
Egyptian troops without stating their numbers or location* 
While agreeing that it was inevitable to gi'anb 
the Egyptians sone concessions in the Sudan without which 
the Wafd could not justify the treaty to its followers, 
lyres was well aware that these concessions would leave 
the door "a little less firmly closed to Egyptian pene-
p
tration than it had been"* In such circumstances, he
Footnote 3 contd. from previous page
Proceedings of an Interdepartmental Meeting at the 
foreign Office, 20 April 1936*
Robert Vansittart, the permanent under-secretary of 
the Foreign Office, opposed the return of Egyptian 
troops to any part of the Sudan as, in his view, they 
would again become the focus of unrest and dissatis­
faction*
F.O. 371/20097*, Enclosure in Tel. jtfo * 8 (Saving), 
Comment by Vansittart, 30 January 193&*
1. T,ampson did not agree with this view* He believed that 
the return of Egyptian troops to other localities in 
the Sudan and the institution of an Egyptian military 
liaison officer at Iihartoum would satisfy Egyptian 
inspirations *
F,0. 371/20103* Ho. J 739/2/16, Minute by the Foreign 
Office to the War Office 011 the Question of the Return 
of Egyptian Troops to the Sudan, 27 March 1936*
2. C.R.O., File Ho. Km.P./ScP/36.H.2, Memorandum by Symes 
on the 1936 Treaty, 1A November 1936.
263
said in a memorandum on the treaty issue on 14 November 
1936,^' !Iit [would be] idle to hope that the young Sudanese
p
politicians [would] not look to Egypt for inspiration"*
If this Egyptian influence was not quickly checked, they 
would undoubtedly ally with the Egyptians , a development 
which would lead, as in 1924, to anti-British activities. 
The only remedy for this danger, in his view, wTas the 
encouragement of a measure of Sudanese nationalism It 
had new become most vital, he asserted, for the Sudan 
Government to win the support of the Sudanese intelligen­
tsia by advancing their interests both in government 
service and in politics. ^  He planned to give then gradually 
increased representation and participation in the govern­
ment of the country and further facilities for higher 
education* More important, Synes encouraged them to 
organise by themselves a representative national congress 
to work in close cooperation with the Sudan Government on
1. I/ith other subjects, this memorandum was discussed at 
the meeting of the governors of the provinces at 
Khartoum in November 1936.
2. C.R.O., File No. Kx..P./ScE/36.H.2, Memorandum by 
Symes on the Treaty, 14 November 1936.
3. This new policy is discussed in more detail in Dr. 
Gaafar Bakhiet1s thesis: British Administration,
pp. 292-96.
264-
1a policy of "the Sudan for the Sudanese". Alliance with 
the intelligentsia, in Synes’s view, was not only the test 
answer for any revival of Egyptian agitation, hut also a 
check to the rising danger of neo-Maheisn. Since the 
1920's, it had heen the policy of the Sudan Government to 
build up Sayyid Abe! al-Fuhman into a wealthy capitalist 
by assisting his cotton cultivation schemes in the White 
and Blue Nile, whilst forbidding him to visit the centres 
of fanatical MahGist feeling in the west. The plan was 
to turn hin into a rich man of the secular trype, which
p
would moan the decrease of his religious pretensions. “
This policy worked well until 1935*, after which the 
relations between the Sayyid and the British deteriorated 
rapidly and his religious and political influence increased 
continuously. He was most popular in the graduates’ 
cl .bs in the Three Towns, and used to receive intellectuals 
of all kinds. The government becane increasinly suspicious 
of the growth of noo~Mah.dism as there was a danger that its 
leader might become the symbol for the intelligentsia and 
unite them with the traditional and relgiious elements into 
a strong political frcnt with overwhelming nationalist 
apj^eal •
1. This congress, however, soon fell into the hands of the 
extremists and followed an anti-British policy.
2. Gaafar Bakhiet: British Administation, p. 276.
THE CONVERSATIONS OVER THE CIVIL CLAUSES
Before the beginning of the conversations,
Lamp soil advised his government to adhere generally to the 
civil clauses of the 1930 draft treaty, if the military and 
Sudan clauses were satisfactorily disposed of. He claimed 
that complete repudiation of the 1930 draft would cause a 
general refusal in Egypt to enter into the proposed 
conversations. The British government would be placed in 
a difficult situation if, after obtaining agreement to its 
military requirements, it went back on the civil clauses.^ 
Britain could justify her extra military demands on the 
grounds of changed conditions, but cou^d not do so in case 
of die civil clauses. In his view, any additional safe­
guards would prove illusory, even if the Egyptians relue^'"’^  
tantly accepted them, 1 since an independent Egyptian
government could if ill-disposed render them largely
2ineffective n.
1. E.O. 371/20096, Tel. No. 24-v Lamps on to Eden, 8 
January 1936.
2. E.O. 371/20097 ^ Tel. No. 4-2, Lamp son to Eden, 17 
January 1936.
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In the 1933 draft treaty,*** the British government
had approved several substantial departures in its own
favour from the 1930 civil clauses. IThile tightening up
the obligations to employ only British officials in Egypt,
it wanted to maintain the Financial and Judicial Advisers.
Though agreeing to abolish the European Department of the
Ministry of the Interior, the 1933 draft treaty suggested
the retention of an effective European police element in
2
the Egyptian cities* In 1930, however, Lampson persuaded 
his government to accept his view. It was prepared to go 
even further in the matter of Capitulations which was not 
a major British interest. It was felt that concessions 
there were the only sphere which could offer a substantial 
makeweight for the more exacting military requirements of 
Britain* ^
The Capitulatory clauses: reactions in Britain and Egypt
According to the Foreign Office, Egypt had a 
good legal right tc the unilateral denunciation of the 
Capitulations, or, at least, a r:i ght which the British
1. See above, p. 237*
2. See below, p. 286,,
3. F.0-. 371/20100, Tel. No* 9 (Saving), Eden to Lampson, 
10 March 1936•
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government could not dispute. Following Turkey's entrance 
into the First world \7ar, the British government took the 
view that this put an end to the treaty on which the 
Capitulatory rights in Egypt of Britain and her allies 
depended. Unwilling to end the Capitulations at that tine, 
Britain cuased the Egyptian government to issue a decree 
on 9 February 1915 prolonging provisionally the existence 
of the Consular Courts and other exceptional jurisdiction 
in Egypt. So far as Britain and her allies in the First 
korld Far were concerned., it was felt, the Capitulations 
in Egypt depended entirely on an Egyptian decree, and not 
upon any treaty basis. Consequently an Egyptian decree 
could put an end to them. Of the remainder of the Capi­
tulatory powers, the enemies of Britain in the First For Id 
Far, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Turkey, were forced to 
surrender their rights in the Peace Treaties.^ This left 
a small number of powers (Spain, the Netherlands, Norway
and Sweden) whose Capitulatory xm.ghts had no treaty basis
o
at all, but were most favoured nations rights only. In 
1936, however, the British government claimed that the
1. After the success of the October Revolution in 1917? 
Russia voluntarily gave up her Capitulatory rights 
in Egypt.
2. F.O. 371/20122, No. 1287, Memorandum by Beckett, 30 
November 1930.
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Capitulations could not to abolished immediately, and that 
this should bo done with the agreement of the Capitulatory 
powers. Consequently the British proposals which were 
handed to the Egyptian delegation on 1 August were 
confined to what was felt to be reasonable to expect the 
powers to accepr.
As regards the judicial Capitulations , the 
British government- claimed that there was no practical 
alternative to the 1930 proposals. By those it offered 
to use all its influence with the Capitulatory powers to 
obtain their agreement to the transfer of the jurisdiction
p
of tne Consular Courts to the Mixed tribunals. This 
transfer would necessitate the revision of the existing 
laws relating to the organisation and jurisdiction of the 
Mixed Courts, including ghe preparation and promulgation 
of dL. new code of criminal procedure. Bor these purposes, 
the British government accepted as a basis the princip3.es 
resulting from the 1920 discussions on the subject.^
1. See above, p. A9*
2. This transfer would be subject to article 9 of the treaty 
which stated that the immunities and privileges enjoyed 
by the British forces in Egypt would be determined in a 
separate convention between the two governments.
3« In 1920 the Milner Mission suggested a programme for 
the reform of the Capitulatory system in Egypt. See 
Toynbee: Survey of International Affairs, 1937* Vol.
1 , p. 591.“ - —  —  1
Jurisdiction in natters concerning statut personnel should 
remain with the consular authorities unless an agreement 
was made between the Egyptian government and foreign 
governments for their transfer to the Mixed Courts*
Though the British government admitted that the Mixed 
Courts were beginning to be unpopular in Egypt, it claimed 
that they vere not "in their judicial capacity any real 
fetter on the free government of the country1
The British proposals of 1956 made an advance 
over those of 1930 with regard tc the legislative Capitu-
p
latxons*“ The latter maintained the legislative functions
of the Mixed Courts and added the general power to reject
Egyptian legislation. In 1930 the British government
offered to use all its influence to abolish them* In a
memorandum to the Cabinet, Eden said that the
"legislative capitulations [were] in parti­
cular far more galling to Egyptians govern­
ments than the judicial capitulations, and 
the unpopularity which Chad] fallen upon 
the Mixed Courts [was] largely due to their 
conflicts with Egyptian governments in the
exercise of their legislative functions.....
If the Mixed Courts [were] to survive in 
Egypt5 they should be relieved of their
1. Cab* 24/263, A*E.C.(36)3, Annex II to C.P. 184(36), 
Memorandum by the Foreign Secretary on Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty Conversations, the Capitulations, 14 May 1936*
2. See above, pp. 49-50.
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legislative functions"
In return for this, Egypt should undertake that none of 
her legislation would he inconsistent with the principles 
generally adopted in modern legislation or discriminate 
inequitably against foreigners, including foreign companies.
The foreigners in Egypt and the extreme Conser­
vatives in Britain regarded this undertaking as insuffic­
ient, as it was not in the terms of the legislation that 
the danger lay, but in the application of the law once it 
was passed. Many times, it was asserted, foreigners had
suffered great injustice from attempts to apply certain
p
lews which weie equal to all. To x^rovide against such 
injustice, they claimed, a legislative veto on behalf of 
foreigners was necessary. Lord Lloyd and the Bribisb 
Chamber of Commerce-' suggested that this should be given 
to the Mixed Court of Appeal at Alexandria, a matter which, 
in their view, would not hurt the Egyptian amour propro , 
as this court was in itself an Egyptian institution. The 
British government refused this suggestion as it would 
impose 011 the Mixed Courts quasi--legislative functions 
which they were not best fitted to discharge. Moreover,
1. Ibid.
Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 1936-37, Vol. 103, 
Col. 383^ - - •  -
3. See above, p. 14-6.
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it would not be accepted by the Egyptians, and would
1
involve a modification of their Constitution." It was 
satisfied by Egypt's simple treaty undertaking which would 
give it the right to protest diplomatically against any 
discriminatory Egyptian law. In case of difference with 
Egypt on this, the natter could be referred to the Council 
of the League of Nations. It was felt that other Capitu­
latory powers wou*d make similar demands as a condition
p
of giving up their Capitulatory rights.
In his meeting with Lampson on 4 August 1936, 
Nahhas suggested counter-proposals. He demanded the 
immediate cessation of all control by the powers or the 
Mixed Courts over the epplication of Egyptian legislation 
to foreigners. He asserted that there had been proposals 
for this in the past, but the Wafdists had opposed them 
on the grounds that it was a matter which could not be 
settled until the main question of Anglo-Egyptian relations 
had been put on a proper basis. No?/ that the treaty was 
nearly finished, the Capitulations should be completely 
abolished. Once they were abolished, it was felt, their
3-. E.O. 371/20130, No. J 6909/190/16, Note by Campbell 
to Lord Halifax on Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the Capitu­
lations, 10 August 1936.
2. E„0* 371/20129, No. I969/I90/16, Minute by Beckett on 
the Mixed Courts and Capitulations in Egypt, 3 March 
1936.
instrument, the Mixed Courts, should go with them, 
particularly as these Courts were only intended to he 
provisional and could be abolished by the Egyptians at 
a year’s notice. Nahhas, however, suggested their 
immediate abolition in principle and their actual abolition 
after a transitional period of five years, during which 
questions of procedure and legislation affecting foreigners 
should be settled. The British government should under­
take to collaborate actively with the Egyptian government 
to secure this.**" Nahhas argued that the Egyptians had 
already given important concessions on the military points 
and should get some in return on the Capitulations. 
Moreover, the question did not affect Britain, as the 
Egyptians were asking the powers, not Britain, for 
concessions. Satisfaction on this point was essential
foe the sake of Egyptian national dignity and to obtain
o
acceptance of the other clauses of the treaty.'"
Lampson refused all Nahhas’s proposals. He 
claimed that they were contrary to the desiderata of the 
Egyptian1 leaders stated in their note of 12 December 1935* 
Tnis contained no mention of the abolition of the Mixed
1. E.G. 371/20116, Despatch No. 932 (7/607/36), Lampson 
to Eden: Minutes of the Meeting between the Heads of 
the Two Delegations on d August 1936, 6 August 1936.
2. Ibid.
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Courts, and its last paragraph stated that the Egyptians 
were ready to sign the 1930 draft treaty, which did noH; 
refer to them. In the interval that had elapsed since 
the presentation of this note, the Egyptians had not 
shown any desire to modify their original proposals. It 
was on the basis of these that the British government was 
approached. Nahhas1s counter-proposals, it was felt, were 
outside anything previously considered, and could only 
throw out the whole timetable. The British government 
would not contemplate any proposal for unilateral violation 
of treaties concluded with a large number of powers, as 
this would be "a very bad augury for the future of the 
treaty"."' Unilateral denunciation of the Mixed Courts 
would mean a reversion to the previous system, when all 
jurisdiction over foreigners was exercised by their 
respective Consular Courts. In Britain's view?-, the 
abolition of the Mixed Courts would damage Egyptian 
interests by frightening away foreign capital. It would 
not be accepted by the British comnunitj^ in Egypt, which 
was felt to have a strong voice in the British Parliament. 
There would be considerable difficulty in securing the 
acceptance of the British proposals by foreign powers, 
and it v/as quite certain that they would not accept those
1. Ibid.
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of Egypt. Representatives of Erance, Japan and Anerica 
had already approached the Residency and shown their 
concern ah out the question. Lampson appealed to ITahhas 
to "believe
"that he was speaking as a genuine friend 
and admirer of Egypt, who wanted to help.
Ee fully understood the feelings of Egyptians 
in the natter. Patriotism and nationalism 
both naturally inspired a desire to get 
rid of the Capitulations, but they must 
approach the question slowly".
Having failed to wreck the treaty over the
military issue, the minority parties attempted to do so
over the Capitulations, and Mahmud reluctantly accepted
the military text provided that he was "free to go back
on his consent failing satisfaction over both the Sudan
2
and capitulations". In their press and inside the 
Egyptian delegation, the minority leader's asserted that 
BiItain should give up her Capitu3 atory rights immediately 
after the signature of the treaty. V/hile this would help 
Egypt? to persuade other powers to follow Britain’s 
precedent, the retention of British Capitulatory rights 
was felt to be contrary to the spirit of the alliance as 
it implied that Britain did not trust the Egyptian courts.^
1. Ibid.
2. E.O. 371/20115, Tel. Ho. 738(R), Lanpson to Eden, 
24 July 1936c
3* ll-Siyasa ■> 12 August 1936.
Though. Beckett, the legal adviser at the Foreign Office,
advised the British government to give up its rights at
1a certain c.ate whatever the other powers did, it insisted 
that this should he in concurrence with other powers. It 
did not want to leave its nationals in an inferior position, 
and was afraid of the outcry in Britain if the other 
powers did nob follow this lead. The minority parties 
asserted that the British promise to help Egypt to get 
rid of theCapitulations in a future conference was not 
satisfactory. Experience had shown that any negotiations 
with the Capitulatory powers would he ".engthy and diffi­
cult, and might he useless, as some pov;ers, such as Italy
2
and Greece, migbc refuse to give up their rights. If 
Britain refused the abolition of the Capitulations by a 
unilateral Egyptian action, Mahmud and Hilmi cIsa sugges­
ted that the negotiations should ho broken off immediately.
The majority of the Egyptian delegates, however, 
accepted the essence of the British scheme "provided it 
could he presented in a manner which would create a less 
unfavourable impression amongst theii public and if 
certain points to which they attached importance could
1. F.O. 371/20109  ^ Enclosure in despatch lo. 137(221/2/36), 
Comment by Beckett.. 28 February 1936.
2. Q,anun Tliamanrn li-Sanat 1936, p. 62.
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be made c l e a r C o m p a r e d  with the military and Sudan
clauses, the Capitulations and Mixed Courts were of
secondary importance to the British government. The two
former might be prejudiced by delay in reaching agreement
on the latter. Consequently the British government
authorized Lampson to accept or propose minor amendments
2
to its original proposals* On 7 August 1936 a drafting 
committee was formed of British and Egyptians including 
Muhammad Salah al-Din, the assistant secretary-general 
of the Egyptian delegation. After a difficult four-hour 
meeting a text was produced for reference to both delega­
tions. Owing to Mahmudfs objections, the initialling of 
the final text by tne heads of the two delegations was 
delayed till 12 August. Nahhas had a number of stormy 
meetings with him, and slight modifications were made to 
prjvent him from running out at the last minute.
The Egyptian delegation withdrew their demand 
for the unilateral denunciation of the legislative 
Capitulations. They accepted the British proposal to 
abolish them by agreement with the powers, provided that 
discussions took place at once and were pressed with the
1. Fo0« 371/20130, Tel. ho. 791(E)v Lampson to Eden
8 August 1936.
2. B.O. 371/20130, Tel. No. 491» Lden to Lampson, 6 
August 1936.
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utmost vigour to a conclusion. Britain gave Egypt the
righb to invite tlio powers to a conference on this as
1soon as possible. Speedy settlement with the powers
was in fact in the interests of Britain. If it was not
reached, Egypt would certainly want to abolish them
unilaterally and "credit resulting to His Majesty's
Government from treaty settlement would then be exhausted
2
m  pressure to prevent them taking such action".
Makran tried to make the abolition of the legis­
lative Capitulations precede the establishment of the new
A
Mixed Court regime. The latter would not function before 
most, if not all, of the detailed preparatory work neces­
sary for it to function was ready. Makram feared that 
tho tactics of some of the powers would cause difficulty 
and delay by insistence on questions of detail. But 
Lanpscn rejected this, as the powers wuuld not accept it
lc P.O. 371/20130, Tel. No. 792, Lamps on tc Eden, 8 
August 193^• The British government did not itse]f 
want to initiate diplomatic correspondence or the 
convocation of such a conference. This might provoke 
a counter-demand by the Prench government fox* the 
abandon-bent of the privileges of British nationals 
in Morocco in return for a Prench agreement to abandon 
those of their nationals in Egypt.
J?.0. 371/20116, Tel. No. 488, ®den to Lampson, 5 
August 1956.
2, P.O. 371/20116, Tel. No. 2, Lampson to Eden, 28 July
1936.
3 . See above, p. 268.
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and "in any case the integral application of Egyptian 
legislation could not be effected while consular courts
p
were still operating".
As regards the Mixed Courts, the Egyptians also 
abandoned the idea of unilateral action, and Britain 
accepted that they should be abolished after "a reasonable 
and not unduly prolonged period" to be fixed at the capi­
tulatory conferenceo During this period they would 
exercise the jurisdiction hitherto vested in the Consular 
Courts. The Egyptian government would also approach the 
Capitulatory powers to obtain their agreement to this 
arrangement, "Chile the original British proposal did not 
contemplate any term being put to the existence of the 
Mixed Courts, the final agreement dido Though this was an 
advance, the British government felt that it was a reason­
able on€U as the question was bound to arise in the course 
of the conference on the transfer of the consular juris­
diction to the Mixed Courts, Britain would only be 
committed to urge the powers to agree to a fixed period, 
but its length would be open to negotiations. She would,
110 doubt, supx)ort the Egyptians against any insistence on
1. E„0. 371/20130, Tel. ho* 791(E), Lampson to Eden,
8 August 1938*
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1an unnecessarily long period.
If the Capitulatory powers wrecked this scheme 
of reform at the conference.,, the Egyptian government would 
retain all existing rights with regard to theCapitulatory
p
regime including the Mixed Courts.~ This merely safe­
guarded the rights of the Egyptian government without 
stating what they were. The Egyptian delegation had in 
mind as a possibility the urilaters.3. denunciation of the 
Capitulations, but Britain never admitted a legal right 
to do this. Hahhas repeatedly pressed, Lampson to say 
what attitude his government would adopt in this even­
tuality. The latter's complete refusal was one of the 
reasons of delay over the Capitulations discussions. He 
claimed, that the most he would do, as a purely personal 
observation, was to refer to the British attitude over 
th^ question of the Sudan debt,^ i.e. to deal with
1. E.G. 371/20130, Ho. J 6909/190/16, Hote by Campbell 
tc Lord Halifax on Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the Capitu­
lations, 10 August 1956.
2. F.O. 371/20130, Tel. Ho. 792(E), Lampson to Eden, 8 
August 1936.
3. The only Egyptian right of unilateral action which 
Britain was prepared to admit was the denunciation 
of the Mixed Courts at one year's notice.
1A0. 371/20130, Tel. Ho. 503•) ^den to Lampson, 11 
August 1936.
A. Bee above, pp. 238-45*
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questions on their own Merits as and when they arose.
The question,, therefore, remained open and unprejudiced.
If through the obstruction of other Capitulatory powers,
it was impossible te bring reform into being by agreement,
the British government would be faced with two alternatives
either to side with Egypt over unilateral denunciation, or
to oppose her. In the latter case, Lampson felt that it
would exhaust all the goodwj11 it acquired by concluding 
1the treaty. Beckett, however, thought that under the 
rreaty regime the abolition of the Capitulations by 
unilateral Egyptian action should not cause any greater 
concern to Britain than to any other power. Egypt would 
then be a member of the League of Lotions, and, apart 
altogether from any provision in the treaty with Britain, 
any Capitulatory power could bring this matter before the 
Council of the League of Nations under article 15 of the
p
Covenant. "
Britain also agreed to another insignificant 
modification of her original proposals relating to juris­
diction in statut personnel matters, "while originally 
suggesting that it would remain under the Consular Courts
1. ErO. 571/20130, Tel. No. 808(H), Lampson to Eden,
11 August 1936.
2.  E . O .  3 7 1 /2 0 1 2 9 v  Enclosure in despatch No; 137 ( 2 2 1 / 2 / 3 )  
Comment by Beckett, 28 February 1 9 3 6 .
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unless the foreign power concerned agreed to its transfer 
to the Mixed Courts, Britain agreed that this transfer 
should actually take xilace. Consideration, however,
"would be given to the desirability of making exceptions, 
at any rate in the first place, in the case of these 
capitulatory powers who wish their consular authorities
p
to continue to exercise jurisdiction in such natters".
There was a fairly strong section of Egyptian 
opinion which was anxious to see the failure of the 
proposed capitulatory conference. The British government 
felt that the Egyptian government night insist on unrea­
sons ole demands which would inevitably wreck it, e.g. a 
refusal to maintain a majority of European judges of appeal, 
and an insistence that Arabic should be the only official 
language of the Mixed Courts. To check such a danger, 
the British government made it clear that it would not 
support Egypt’s approach to the Capitulatory powers until 
agreement had been reached between the two governments,
1. BkO. 371/20130, No. J 6909/190/16, Note by Campbell to 
Lord Halifax 011 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, Capitulations,
10 August 1936.
2. Ibid„
Though it was not the only official language of the 
Mixed Courts, Erench was then "the spoken language of 
the bench and bar and personnel, the written language 
of all opinions, briefs and writs No other
language was used by lawyers in addressing the courts". 
Brinton, J .B .: The Mixed Courts of Egypt, p . 79•
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amongst other natters, on three points: the definition
of the word "foreigner", the increase in the personnel 
of the Mixed Courts, and the procedure to be adopted in 
case of remission of sentence imposed on foreigners and
i
the execution of capital sentences on them. Reference
p
to the 1920 discussions was omitted owing to the mis- 
understanding that these words would create in Egypt,
But the Egyptian delegation knew that the British govern- 
nent would probably continue to hold that these discussions 
should be used as a basis for conversations on these 
natters
Aith their strong connexions with the foreigners 
in Egypt, some extreme Conservatives in Britain were 
alarmed at the eventual abolition of the Capitulatory 
regime. This, in their view, would endanger the commercial 
undertakings and financial interests of the foreigners
1. Cab. 24/263, C.P. 184(36), Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Conversations, 
Capitulations, 25 June 1936.
2. See above, p. 268.
3. The Egyptian delegation objected to any reference to 
the 1920 discussions mainly because of the definition 
uhere of "foreigner" as anybody who was not Egyptian. 
This meant that the term would include the dependents 
as well as the nationals of the Capitulatory powers. 
Al-Ahram, 14 August 1936.
4- E.O. 371/20116, Tel. ITo. 816(E), Lampson to Eden,
13 August 1936.
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who had staked all their business fortune’s in Egypt on 
British protection. It was felt that, as in every country 
where Capitulations had been abolished, there would be 
economic xenophobia, faxes would immediately be imposed 
on foreigners, and Egyptian capital preferred at the 
expense of foreign. They denied the Egyptian claim that 
foreigners were not paying taxes to Egypt, and asserted 
that they were suoject to exactly the same taxes as the 
nationals themselves, whi^e in many cases, e.g. in matters 
of education, they derived less from them.
Ehile pleased at the expected abolition of the 
Capitulations, the Egyptian government, being well aware 
of the foreigners1 control of Egypt's economic life, 
assured then both before and after the signature of the 
treaty that there would be no discrimination or any 
danger to their lives and property. To calm foreign 
investors, Makram °Ubayd, the Minister of Finance, 
addressed a letter to the president of the Cairo Bourse 
which was read on the floor on 17 August 1936. In 
imposing taxes, he asserted, Egypt would do this with 
great moderation, and would continue to recognise, as in 
the past, the fundamental importance of a close and fruit­
ful collaboration with the foreigners in Egypt. He added 
that "no discrimination [would] be tolerated either in 
practice or in principle against foreigners in our country
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which would be contrary to our traditions and solenn
declarations and which, would gravely prejudice the interest
1of the country1'* In spite of these assurances, the
foreigners feared that after losing their privileges,
they would be asked to pay heavy taxes, to keep their
accounts in Arabic, to erploy a certain percentage of
Egyptian nationals, and they were particularly terrified
that their business would be handed over to the mercy of
Egyptian justice. It was asserted that, even if the
Egyptian government provided that the burden of taxation
should fall equally on Egyptians and foreigners, the tax
2officials would discriminate against foreigners. These 
fears were reflected in the Egyptian stock market which 
registered continuous falls particularly after the signa­
ture of the treaty. The result was that millions in 
capital were transferred abroad, particularly by Italian 
residents *
Conversations on the other civil clauses;
To the satisfaction of the Egyptians^ the other 
civil clauses were settled almost entirely on the basis
1, E*0. 371/20130, Tel. ho. 840(E), Lampson to Eden,
18 August 19300
2. Paily Telegraph, 18 August 1930.
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of the 1930 draft treaty, The 1936 treaty provided for 
the cessation of the military occupation of Egypt, and 
tlaat, immediately after the ratification of the treaty, 
there should he reciprocal diplomatic representation by 
ambassadors instead of as hitherto by a British High 
Commissioner and an Egyptian Minister. The British 
ambassador was to be senior to other diplomatic represen­
tatives in Egypt until his status was modified by revision 
of the treaty.
The 1936 treaty gave Egypt the right to apply 
for membership of the League of Nations with the support 
of the British government. The Nationalist Party and 
other extremists in Egypt asserted that Egypt would not 
get eny benefit from joining the League, particularly 
after the Japanese invasion of China and the Italian 
conquest of Abyssinia, which clearly showed that it had
p
utterly failed to protect the small nations. The 
admission to the League of other less developed countries 
than Egypt, however, had long been a sore point with most 
politically-concious Egyptians. Consequently they were 
delighted with the revision of the treaty which allowed
1. On 26 May 1937 Egypt was elected a member of the 
League of Nations.
Qanun Thamanrn li-Sanat 1936, p. S3<>
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Egypt to join. T.7i 111 an s on-IT ap i or, who had "been recently 
attached to the Oriental Secretariat to deal with the 
press, claimed that Manduh Pd.yad, the parliamentary under­
secretary of state for foreign affairs, told him that 
Egypt's membership of the League would "add enormously to 
her prestige abroad1
Another civil clause concerned the European 
Bureau of the Public Security Department which had special 
responsibility for the protection of the lives and interests 
of the foreigners in Egypt. Eb.ile it was the policy of 
the Bpitish government to maintain troops permanently in 
Cairo and Alexandria, the Army Council considered it most 
important to keep a European element and British comman­
dants in the Egyptian police for as long as possible. It 
would provide the British troops with intelligence as to 
what was happening in the cities. Since the cities were 
now to be evacuated., far less importance was attached to 
this point5 and Britain agreed to abolish forthwith the 
European Department* to dispense annually with the services
p
of one-fifth of the European police officials.
1. Adm* 116/3591v Enclosure in Tel. ho. 1059* Memorandum 
by Napier on the Reactions in Egypt to the Treaty,
8 September 1936.
2. Cab. 24-/263-, C„P. 184-(36) , Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on Anglo-Egyprian Treaty Conversations, 
Capitulations, 25 June 1936.
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The European Department and its director. Sir
Keown Boyd who was nicknamed by Dose al-Yusuf as the
]
"dictator of the flinistry of the Interior" , ' were most
unpopular in Egypt, Anile the Egyptians warmly welcomed
2
its abolition, this was naturally severely criticised by
foreigners. They claimed that there was a strong view in
some Egyptian circles that the Germans were right in the
way they were dialing with the Jews, and that the Egyptians
7)might treat foreigners in the sane way. The real motive 
behind this unjust assertion was the desire of these 
foreigners to maintain European control of the Egyptian 
police, and consequently to protect the privileges which 
they had enjoyed over a long period- There was a danger, 
however* that the prospect of no European element in the 
poldce after such a short tine might stiffen the attitude 
oi the powers in the suggested capitulatory conference.
By this provision of the treaty, 4-9 British officers and 
220 constables retired from the Egyptian city police 
during the next five years.
v;hile the 1930 draft treaty provided for the
1. Weekly Rose al™Yusuf, 26 August 1936.
2. The European Department “was closed on 1 February 1937*
3* E.Oo 371/20101, Despatch No. 210 (7/88/36), Lampson 
to Eden on the Attitude of the British Chamber of 
Commerce of Egypt on Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Negotiations, 
20 February 1936.
cessation of the posts of the Financial and Judicial 
Advisers with the end. cf the contracts of the present
p
incumbents, nothing was said in the 1936 treaty on the
subject« Nahhas pressed for a provision in the treaty
2for their abolition, but the British government only 
agreed to an oral declaretion which left the Egyptian 
government free to dispense with or retain then for .any 
period. Their inspected disappearance was regarded with 
deep concern by the foreign communities in Egypt, who 
wanted to keep then for at least twenty years. Though 
it was unlikely that they would bo retained.,"1" the British 
government did not want to dictate their retention. The 
two Advisers themselves had remarked that this would have
1. The contracts of the Financial and Judicial Advisers 
expired m  November 1937 and November 1938 respectively. 
Cab. 24/263, C.F. 184(36), Memorandum by the Foreign 
Secretary on Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Conversations, the 
Capitulations, 25 June 1936.
2. These posts were most unpopular in Egypt, and Zaghlul 
refused in October 1924 to renew the contract of the 
Judicial Adviser. By Allenby’s ultimatum, the Egyptian 
government was obliged to rotain then with status and 
function intact so as to safeguard Britain’s financial 
and judicial responsibilities towards foreigners. 
Marlowe, J. : Anglo-Bgyptian Relations, p. 269 •
3- P.O. 371/20130, Enclosure in No. 851 (7/515/36), Note 
by the British Chamber of Commerce on Certain Proposals 
for a Treaty with Egypt, 18 July 1936.
4. The Judicial Adviser might be retained for a short 
period to start the new transitional Mixed Court 
regime,
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no 1 approciable value given the loss of their political 
significance and backing under post-treaty conditions".^  
The Egyptian government, however, agreed that 
whon engaging the services of foreign experts, it would 
generally prefer British subjects with the necessary 
qualifications* As regards pensions of retired expatriate 
officials, letters were exchanged between the two govern­
ments to the effect that the Egyptian government did not 
int end
"now or in the future to subject the pensions 
of already retired Government officials of 
foreign nationality residing out of Egypt 
to Egyptian taxation or to any additional 
charge by way of Stamp Duty or otherwise over 
or .above the amounts now payable in respect 
of such pensions"
Eden suggested that the question of the protec­
tion of foreigners should be dealt with by an article in 
the terms of article 3 of the 1930 draft treaty: viz.
while the British government recognised that the respon­
sibility for the lives and property of the foreigners in 
Egypt devolved exclusively upon the Egyptian government, 
the latter undertook to fulfil its obligations in this
1. E.O. 371/200979 'Eel. No. 42, Lampson to Eden, 17 
January 1936.
2, E.O. 371/20117> Enclosure in No. J 7193/2/16, Note
from the Egyptian President of the Council of Ministers
to the High Commissioner, 12 August 1936.
Technically this note was not to fora part of the treaty.
respect. But most of his colleagues thought that this 
article alone was not enough, as it would not give the 
British government the right to act on its own initiative 
in the event of a breakdown of order in Egypt, or to 
object to intervention by foreign countries to protect 
their nationals at, or wrthout, Egypt's request. The 
Cabinet had in fact agreed on 10 February 1936 to the 
suggestion of the C.I.D. that with this article it should 
be made clear elsewhere in the treaty that "in the event 
of armed support to the civil power being required from 
outside Egyptian resources, they should invite help by 
British forces and British forces only".^ But Eden told 
his colleagues that it would not be possible to secure 
from the Egyptians any additional safeguards on this 
question. Rather than to allow conversations to break 
down, on this issue, he finally persuaded them to accept 
his view.
The Foreign Office felt that on the basis of
1. Cab., 24/259-. C.P„ 25(36), Memorandum by the Chairman 
ox ohe C ,1.A „ on the Egyptian TreaLy, 7 February 1936, 
According to this Cabinet decision, Beckett and Robert 
Campbell suggested adding to article 6 of the treaty 
a sentence stating that "the High Contracting Parties 
[would] also consult together if circumstances should 
arise involving the possibility of any intervention 
into the internal affairs of Egypt by a third power". 
P.O. 371/20101, No. J 2040/2/16, Note by Beckett and 
Campbell on the Protection of Foreigners in Egypt,
4 March 1936.
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1
article 3 of the 1930 draft treaty alone, the British 
government could claim the position it desired. Failure 
of the Egyptian government to protect the lives and 
property of the foreigners would bo a breach of its 
treaty obligation towards Britain. The latter would then 
be free of her undertaking to recognise Egypt1s respon­
sibility for the protection of foreigners and could take 
all necessary measures, including armed intervention, to 
protect them. Any attempt of a foreign power to interfere, 
it was asserted, would fall under the provisions of 
article 5 of the treaty, whereby ii any dispute with a 
third state produced a situation involving a risk of 
rupture with that state, the two governments would, consult 
eech other with a view to settling it peacefully. The 
term "risk of rupture" was deliberately chosen as it was 
vague and would allow the British government to interfere 
when it wanted to. Moreover, it was felt, the British 
forces, certainly for twenty years, would be near to the 
places where trouble night take place, and it might be 
taken for granted that a British naval vessel would be 
within a short distance of Egyptian ports. There would, 
therefore, be little risk of intervention by a third 
power before the British government could interfere for
1. This was embodied in article 12 of the 1936 treaty.
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1
the protec cion of foreigners.
Out of a population cf 14 millions in Egypt, 
there were over a million Christians, mainly Copts, and 
nearly 100,000 Jews. No mention was made in the treaty 
of the protection of minorities, though they had been 
mentioned in the Reserved Points of 1922. This meant 
that the British government relinquished the special 
position it had previously maintained to intervene for 
their protection. The absence in the treaty of any such 
guarantees censed great anxiety to missionary interests 
in Egypt and Britain as represented by the Council of 
Missionaries in Egypt, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and 
the Conference of Missionary Societies in the United 
Kingdom. They claimed that the minorities were subject 
to real disabilities, particularly after the anti- 
Christian agitation in 1933-34 when the common people 
were stirred up to a degree of fanaticism which showed
p
itself in violent anti-Christ j.an riots. They further
1. P.O. 571/20118, No. J 7308/2/16, Explanatory pLonorandum 
by Campbell on the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 28 August 
1938.
2. Against this should be set the fact that the initial 
impulse which stirred the people was rather artificial, 
as it cane from the Palace which wished to cover up its 
unpopular government "by a display of religious ortho­
doxy and nationalist prejudice". Moreover, the
P/note contd. 011 next page
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asserted that though the Egyptian Constitution provided
for religious liberty and the equality of all citizens
before the lav;, this counted for nothing before an
Egyptian court. Converts from Islam suffered treuenclous
legal injustice which was not worthy of a civilised nation.
This, they claimed, was largely due to the growth, since
the first Tor Id ”ar, of the Fan-Is lorn ic movement, the
centre of which was Egypt and which worked on the principle
declared in the Egyptian Constitution, that Islam was the
1sole national religion4
Though the British government sympathized with 
the apprehensions of the minorities, it realized the 
difficulty of securing any safeguards for them in the 
treaty, They consisted chiefly of Egyptian nationals, 
and as such were particularly a matter of internal 
Egyptian concern. Guarantees should be secured through 
the league of Nations when Egypt was admitted as a member. 
In principle the British government was reluctant to see 
any increase in the number of minority obligations under 
the League, because the countries which had treaty
footnote 2 contd. from previous page
missionaries behaved recklessly and without any com 
sidoration of local religious sentiments.
P.O. 371/20148, Enclosure in ho. 250 (376/4-/36),
0 o d deitt by Campbell, 10 Mar ch 1936,
1. Ibid.
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obligations in this respect were beconing increasingly 
restless. Nevertheless it thought that the precedent of 
Iraq, in 1932 would justify a request for Egypt to give 
such guarantees. The relations of Britain with Iraq 
under the mandatory regime provided sono analogy to that 
between Egypt and Britaii. under the Declaration of Inde­
pendence. Uith the tacit consent of the powers, the 
British government had in 1922 reserved for itself an 
obligation to see to the protection of minorities in 
Egypt. It had by its own act virtually constituted 
itself a mandatory in respect of this point. The states 
of the League of Nations., it was felt, "had some moral 
right to exact jhe same undertakings in the case of Egypt 
as in that of Iraq and to look to Kis Majesty’s Government 
to help them to secure then from Egypt'h The initiative, 
he //ever, was not to be taken by Britain, but to bo left 
to some other power interested in missionary enterprise. 
The British government rejected Nahhas1s view that the 
matter was exclusively Egyptian concern, so as not to
1. E.O. 371/20148, Tel. No. 368, Eden to Lampson, 23
April 1936.
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prejudice any action which, the League might take.^  The 
Egyptian government was expected to make more concessions 
to get into the League than to make a treaty with Britain.
1. E.O, 371/20122, No. J 8708/2/16, Note by the foreign 
Office on the Question of Minorities in Egypt, 
undated.
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CONCLUglQfl
The 1936 treaty established Britain’s relations 
with Egypt on a firm legal basis and was of great benefit 
to her in the immediately succeeding years. When the 
Second l/orld 7ar broke out the British troops were still 
in the cities, as the treaty provided for their withdrawal 
to the Canal Zone only after the construction of barracks 
there. The Egyptian government, particularly that of 
Nahhas 1942-44, fulfilled its treaty obligations and 
co-operated actively in Britain’s war effort. Even when 
the fortunes of the Allies were at their lowest ebb in 
mid-1942, Bahhas stood firmly beside them.
Nevertheless the treaty did not end Anglo - 
Egyptian controversy. As far as the Wafd’s Leaders were 
concerned, I believe, the treaty would be respected, and 
Britain would be the friend of Egypt, only if she suppor­
ted their party's continuance in power. But when she was 
reluctant to do this, she once again became the scapegoat 
for all evil. Alarmed by the British refusal to interfere 
on his behalf and prevent his dismissal by the King in 
Ocuober 1944, and hoping to establish himself and the 
Vvafd as the champions of Egyptian independence, Nahhas sent 
a note to Lord Killearn, the British ambassador, demanding 
the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egypt after the
29?
War, and the unity of the Kile Valley. While it claimed 
in the past that it had extracted the 1936 treaty from 
the British, the Vafd now asserted that it was accepted 
by Egypt under pressure of necessity, and asked for its 
immediate revision. Even when Britain accepted this in 
1946, the Vafd’s intransigence prevented an agreement in 
the Sidql - Bevin negotiations. It was probably mainly 
responsible for the continuous deterioration of Anglo- 
Egyptian relations after the Aar, reaching its culminating 
point in October 19519 when the Wafdist government uni­
laterally abrogated the 1936 treaty and the Condominium 
Agreement, and proclaimed Earuq as King of Egypt and the 
Sudan.
For Egypt the most important immediate effect 
of the treaty was the fiscal freedom conferred on her by 
the abolition of the Capitulations at the Montreux 
Conference in April and May 1937* lb-6 Egyptian government 
soon took advantage of this, and introduced taxes on 
personal incomes, and on commercial and professional 
profits. There was, however, widespread evasion because 
of the government’s technical inexperience in the assess­
ment and collection of direct taxes, and the resistance 
of the politically powerful agricultural landlords.
Internally, the treaty failed to stabilize the 
political situation in Egypt. Bo long as Faruq was a
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minorv the old trivalry between the -7afd and the Palace 
remained in abeyance. But once he came of age in 1937 
and the Hegency came to an end, Egypt's political life 
soon reverted to the old. pattern. Phile the young King 
was popular among the masses in the early years of his 
reign, he attracted the attention of all elements and 
personalities who were dissatisfied with the 7/afdist 
government. On tne other band, the ’Vafd was gradually 
losing its popularity because of its corruption and 
because of the split in 1937 when lluqrashi and Ahmad 
Mahir left it to form the Sacdist faction. All this, 
with the reluctance of Britain to interfere in Egypt's 
internal affairs, gave the Palace the chance to dismiss 
Nahhas in December 1937* He v/as succeeded by Mahmud whose 
government was only a half-way stage towards a return to 
a real Palace rule, now represented by cAli Mahir, the 
Chief of the Poyal Cabinet who assumed power in August 
1939. Once again rhe Palace dominated the political 
scene in Egypt.
The consequences of the 1938 treaty in the 
Sudan may be more briefly described. Dissatisfied with 
the 1938 treaty and encouraged by Symes's liberal policy, 
the politically conscious Sudanese formed the Graduates 
General Congress in February 1938. The Sudan government 
accepted it as an inevitable result of the treaty's
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implicit recognition that the Sudan was a separate 
political entity with an eventual political future, and, 
more important, because, when it started, it was in the 
hands of the moderates. In the early months of the Second 
World war, it stood loyal behind its rulers, hoping 
thereby to win the country's national reward when hosti­
lities ceased* But events soon showed that Syrnes was 
playing with fire when he encouraged the formation of this 
Congress, and the honeymoon between it and the adminis­
tration gradually ended. Realizing that the British were 
not sincere in their declared intention to prepare the 
Budan for self-government, and instigated by the charges 
of the Egyptian press that its members were "yes-men" for 
the British, the Congress soon entered into clashes with 
the government. Though Symes restricted its activities 
tc professional interests and social welfare, and never 
recognised it as a political body representative of the 
Sudanese, the Congress began gradually to play a political 
role. By 1940, however, the pro-British graduates were 
defeated and the Congress Leadership temporarily passed 
to the neo-MaJtidists. When they started to co-operate 
wiuh the British, they too lost influence in the Congress 
in 194-1, and turned their Ansar organisation into the 
Umma Party. The Congress was now dominated by many 
pro-Egyptian groups. In spite of previous charges that
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the Congress was a tool for the British, Egypt now realized 
that it could ha used for her own political aims.
The treaty achieved success in the short term
for British and Egyptian (particularly Wafdist) aims, 
hut could not establish a lasting settlement. The 
acceleration of political change hy the Wax1 and in parti­
cular the weakening of Britain's international position 
and the emerg/cmec of Sudanese nationalism had created a
new situation within 10 years of the treaty’s signature.
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[Ratifications exchanged at Cairo on December 22, 1930].
His Majesty The Ring of Great Britain, Ireland and the 
British Dominions beyond the .Seas, Emperor of India, and 
His Majesty the King of Egypt;
Being anxious to consolidate the friendship and the 
relations of good understanding between them and to co­
operate in the execution of their international obliga­
tions in preserving the peace of the world;
And considering that these objects will best be achieved 
by the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and alliance, 
which in their common interest will provide for effective 
co-operation in preserving peace and ensuring the defence 
of their respective territories, and shall govern their 
mutual relations in the future;
Have agreed to conclude a treaty for this purpose, and 
have appointed as their plenipotentiaries
His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the 
British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India (here­
inafter referred to as His Majesty The King and Emperor);
Great Britain and northern Ireland:
The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P. , His Frincipal 
Gecretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Rt. Hon. James Kara say MacDonald, M.P*, Lord 
President of the Council.
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The Bt. Hon. Sir John Simon, G.C.S.I., K.C*V.O., O.B.E., 
K.C., M.P., His Principal Secretary of State for the 
Home Department.
The Bt. Hon. Viscount Halifax, K.G., G.C.S.I., C.G.I.E., 
Lord Privy Seal.
Sir Miles Wedderburn Lampson, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O.,
His High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan.
His Majesty the King of Egypt:
Moustapha El Nahas Pacha, President of the Council of 
Ministers.
Dr. Ahmed. Maher, President of the Chamber of Deputies. 
Mohamed Mahmoud Pacha, former President of the Council 
of Ministers.
Ismail Sedky Pacha, former President of the Council 
of Ministers.
Abdel Pattah Xehia Pacha, former President of the 
Council of Ministers.
V/acyf Boutros Ghali Pacha, Minister of Poreign Affairs. 
Osman Moharram Pacha, Minister of Public Porks.
Llakram Ebeid Pacha, Minister of Pinance.
Mahmoud Pahray El-Nokrachi Pacha, Minister of Communi­
cations .
Ahmed Hamdi Seif El PTasr Pacha, Minister of Agriculture. 
Aly El ^hamsi Pacha, former Minister.
Mohamed Helmi Issa Pacha, former Minister.
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Hafez Afifi Pacha former Minister.
3/ho, having communicated their full powers, found in 
good and due form, have agreed as follows
ARTICLE 1.
The military occupation of Egypt by the forces of 
His Majesty the King and Emperor is terminated.
ARTICLE 2.
His Majesty The King and Emperor will henceforth he 
represented at the Court of His Majesty the King of Egypt 
and His Majesty the King of Egypt will he represented at 
the Court of St. James’s hy Ambassadors duly accredited.
ARTICLE 3.
Egypt intends to apply for membership to the League of 
Nations. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, 
recognising Egypt as a sovereign independent State, will 
support any request for admission which the Egyptian 
Government may present in the conditions prescribed by 
Article 1 of the Covenant.
ARTICLE 4.
An alliance is established between the High Contracting 
Parties with a view to consolidating their friendship, 
their cordial understanding and their good relations.
ARTICLE 5.
Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to 
adopt in relation to foreign countries an attitude which
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is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to conclude politi­
cal treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the 
present treaty.
ARTICLE 6„
Should any dispute with a third State produce a situa­
tion which involves a risk of a rupture with that State, 
the High Contracting Parties will consult each other with 
a view to the settlement of the said dispute by peaceful 
means, in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations and of any other international 
obligations which mau be applicable to the case.
ARTICLE 7.
Should, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 6 
above, either of the High Contracting Parties become 
engaged in war, the other High Contracting Party will, 
subject always to the provisions of Article 10 below, 
immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally.
The aid of His Majesty the King of Egypt in the event 
of war, imminent menace of war or apprehended international 
emergency will consist in furnishing to His Majesty the 
King and Emperor on Egyptian territory, in accordance 
wiuh the Egyptian system of administration and legis­
lation, ail the facilities and assistance in his power, 
including the use of his ports, aerodromes and means of 
communication. It will accordingly bo for the Egyptian
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Government to take all the administrative and legislative 
measures, including the establishment of martial law 
and an effective censorship, necessary to render these 
facilities and assistance effective.
ARTICLE 8.
In view of the fact that the Suez Canal, whilst being 
an integral part of Egypt, is a universal means of communi­
cation as als^ an essentis.1 means of communication between 
the different parts of the British Empire, His Majesty the 
King of Egypt, until such time as the High Contracting 
Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to 
ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security 
of navigation of the Canal, authorises His Majesty, The 
King and Emperor to station forces in Egyptian territory 
in the vicinity of the Canal, in the zone specified in the 
Annex to this Article, with a view to ensuring in co­
operation with the Egyptian forces the defence of the 
Canal. The detailed arrangements for the carrying into 
effect of this Article are contained in the Annex hereto. 
The presence of these forces shall not constitute in any 
manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the 
sovereign rights of Egypt.
It is understood that at the end of the period of twenty 
years specified in Article 16 the question whether the 
presence of British forces is no longer necessary owing
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to the fact that the Egyptian Army is in a position to 
ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security 
of navigation of the Canal may, if the High Contracting 
Parties do not agree thereon, he submitted to the Council 
of the League of Kations for decision in accordance with 
the provisions of the Covenant in force at the time of 
signature of the present treaty or to such other person 
or body of persons for decision in accordance with such 
other procedure as the High Contracting Parties may agree#
Annex to Article 8,
1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 7? 
the numbers of the forces of His Majesty The King and 
Emperor to be maintained in the vicinity of the Canal 
shal] not exceed, of the land forces, 10,000, and of the 
air forces, 400 pilots, together with necessary ancillary 
personnel for administrative and technical duties- These 
numbers do not include civilian personnel, e.g., clerks, 
artisans and labourers.
2. The British forces to be maintained in the vicinity 
of the Canal will be distributed (a) as regards the land 
forces, in Moascar and the Geneifa area on the south-west 
siae of the Great Bitter Lake, and (b) as regards the
air forces, within 5 miles of the Port Said-Suez railway 
from Kantara in the north, to the junction of the railway 
Suez-Cairo and Cuez-Ismailia in the south, together with
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an extension along the Ismailia-Gairo railway to include 
the Royal Air Force Station at Abu Sueir and its satellite 
landing grounds; together with areas suitable for air 
firing and bombing ranges, which may have to be placed 
east of the Cana.lc
3. In the localities specified above there shall be 
provided for the British land and air forces of the numbers 
specified in paragraph 1 above, including 4,000 civilian 
personnel (but less 2,000 of land forces, 700 of the air 
forces and 450 civilian personnel for whom accommodation 
already exists), the necessary lands and durable barrack 
and technical accommodation, including an emergency water 
supply* The lands, accommodation, and water supply shall 
be suitable according to modern standards. In addition, 
amenities such as are reasonable, having regard to the 
character of those localities, Ym.ll be provided by the 
planting of trees and the provision of gardens, playing 
fields, etc. for the troops, and a site for the erection 
of a convalescent camp on the Mediterranean coast.
4- The Egyptian Government will make available the 
lands and construct the accommodation, v/ater supplies, 
amenities and convalescent camp, referred to in the pre­
ceding paragraph as being necessary over and above the 
accommodation already existing in these localities, at 
its own expense, but His Majesty's Government in the
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United Kingdom will contribute (1) tiic actual sum spent 
by the Egyptian Government before 1914 on the construction 
of new barracks as alternative accommodation to the ICasr- 
el-Uil Barracks in Cairo, and (2) the cost of one-fourth 
of the barrack and technical accommodation for the land 
forceso The first of these sums shall be paid at the 
time specified in paragraph 8 below for the withdrawal 
of the British forces from Cairo and the second at the 
time for the withdrawal of the British forces from Alexan­
dria under paragraph 18 below. The Egyptian Government 
mars charge a fair rental fox' the residential accommodation 
provided for the civilian personnel. The amount of the 
rent ?/ill bo agreed between His Majesty's Government in 
tbe United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government.
The two Governments will each appoint, immediately 
the present treaty comes into force, two or more persons 
who shall together form a committee to whom all questions 
relating to the execution of these works from the time of 
their commencement to the time of their completion shall 
be entrusted. Proposals for, or outlines of, plans and 
specifications put forward by the representatives of His 
Majesty's Goverment in the United Kingdom will be accepted, 
provided they are reasonable and do not fall outside the 
scope of the obligations of the Egyptian Government under 
paragraph 4* Ihe plans and specifications of each of the
310
works to be undertaken by the Egyptian Government shall 
be approved by the representatives of both Governments 
on this committee before the work is begun. Any member 
of this committee , as well as the Commanders of the British 
forces or their representatives, shall have the right to 
examine the works at all stages of their construction, and 
the United Kingdom members of the committee may make 
suggestions es regards the manner in which the work is 
carried out, The United Kingdom members shall also have 
the right to make at any time, while the work is in 
progress, proposals for modifications or alterations in 
the plans and specifications. Effect shall be given to 
suggestions and proposals by the United Kingdom members, 
subject to the condition that they are reasonable and do 
not fall outside the scope of the obligations of the 
Egyptian Government under paragraph 4* In the case of 
machinery and other stores, where standardization of type 
is important, it is agreed that stores, of the standard 
type in general used by the British forces will be obtained 
and installed. It is, of course, understood that His 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom may, when the 
bairacks and accommodation are being used by the British 
forces, make at their own expense improvements or alter­
ations thereto and construct new buildings in the areas 
specified in paragraph 2 above.
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6 . In pursuance of their programme for the development 
of the road and railv/ay communications in Egypt ? and in 
order to bring the means of communicoitions in &gypt up to 
modern strategic requirements, the Egyptian Government will 
construct and maintain the following roads, bridges and 
railways
(A) - Roads
(i) Israai] ia -Alexandria, via Tel-el-Kebir, Zagazig, 
Zi.fta, lanta, Kafr--el~-Zayat, harnanhour.
(li) Ismailia-Cairo, via 1el~el~Kebir and thence con­
tinuing along the Sweet hater Canal to Heliopolis.
(iii) Port Said-Ismailia-Sues.
(iv) A link between the south end of the Great Bitter 
Lake and the Cairo-Suez road about 15 miles west of Suez.
In order to bring them up to the general standard of 
good-class roads for general traffic, these roads will 
be 20 feet wide, have bye-passes round, villages, &e*v and 
be made of such material as to be permanently utilisable 
for military purposes, and will be constructed in the 
above order of importance. They will comply with the 
technical specifications set out below which are the 
ordinary specifications for a good-class road for general 
traffic.
Bridges and roads shall be capable of carrying 
a double line of continuous columns of either heavy four-
wheeled mechanical transport, six-wheeled mechanical 
transport or medium tanks. ~'ith regard to four-wheeled 
vehicles, the distance between the front axle of one 
vehicle and the rear axle of the vehicle next ahead shall 
be calculated at 20 feet, the load on each rear axle to 
be 14- tons, on each front axle to be 6 tons and the 
distance between axles 18 feet. fith regard to six-wheeled 
vehicles, the d:’sranee between the front axle of one 
vehicle and the rear of that next ahead shall be calcu­
lated to be 20 feet, between rear axle and middle axle to 
be 4 feet and between middle axle end fron axle 15 feet; 
the load on each rear and middle axle to be 8.1 tons and 
on each front axle vo be 4 tons, Tanks shall be calcu­
lated for as weighing 19.25 tons, to be 25 feet over all 
in length and to have a distance of 5 feet between the 
fr^nt of one tank and the rear of the next ahead; the 
joad of 19.25 tons to be carried by tracks which have n 
bearing of 15 feet upon the road or bridge.
(B) - Sailways
(i) Sailway facilities in the Canal Zone will be 
increased and improved to meet the needs of the increased 
garrison in the zone and to provide facilities for rapid 
entrainment of personnel, guns’ vehicles and stores
1 See note No. 1 on p. 540 ^
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according to tlie requirements of a modern army. His 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are hereby 
authorised to make at their own expense such subsequent 
additions and modifications to those railway facilities 
as the future requirements of the British forces may 
demand, there such additions or modifications affect 
railway lines used for general traffic, the permission 
of the Egyptian Government must be obtained.
(ii) the lino between Zagazig and Tanta will be doubled 
(iii) The Alexandria-Mersa Matruh line will be improved
and made permanent.
7* In addition to the roads specified in paragraph 
6 (A) above, and for the same purposes, the Egyptian 
Government will construct and maintain the following roads:-
(i) Cairo south along the Kile to Kena and Kus;
(ii) Kus to Kosseir;
(iii) Kena to Hurghada
These roads and the bridges thereon will be constructed 
to satisfy the same standards as those specified in 
paragraph 6 above.
It may not be possible for the construction of the roads 
referred to in this paragraph to be undertaken at the same 
time as the roads referred to in paragraph 6 , but they 
will be constructed as soon as possible.
8. Then, to the satisfaction of both the High Con-
de­
tracting parties, the accommodation referred to in 
paragraph 4 is ready (accommodation for the forces re­
tained temporarily at Alexandria in accordance with 
paragraph 18 below not being included) and the works 
referred to in paragraph 6 above (other than the railways 
referred to in (ii) and (iii) of part (B) of that para­
graph) have been completed, then the British forces in 
parts of Egyxt other than the areas in the Canal Zone 
specified in paragraph 2 above and except for those main­
tained temporarily at Alexandria, will withdraw and the 
lands, barracks, aircraft landing grounds, seaplane 
anchorages and accommodation occupied by them will be 
vacated and, save in so far as they may belong to private 
persons, be handed over to the Egyptian Government.
S, Any difference of opinion between the Governments 
rerating to the execution of paragraphs 3, 4 , 6 , 7 and
8 above will be submitted to the decision of an Arbitral 
Board, composed of three members, the two Governments 
nominating each a member and the third being nominated by 
the two Governments in common agreement. The decision 
of the Board shall be final.
10. In order to ensure proper training of British 
troops v it; is agreed that the area defined below will be 
available for the training of British forces: - (a) and
(b) at all times of the year, and (c) during February
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and March for annual manoeuvres:-
(a) ”'Ost of the Canal6. From Eantara in the north to 
the Suez-Cairo railway (inclusive) in the south and as 
far as longitude 31 degrees 30 minutes east, exclusive 
of all cultivation;
(t) East of the Canal as required;
(c) A continuation of (a) as far south as latitude 
29 degrees %  minutes north, thence south-east to the 
junction of latitude 29 degrees 30 minutes north and long­
itude 31 degrees 4k minutes east and from that point east­
wards along latitude 29 degrees 30 minutes north*
The areas of the localities referred to above are in­
cluded in the map (scale 1 : 500,000) which is annexed to 
tie present Treaty.^
11* Unless the two Governments agree to the contrary, 
the Egyprian Government will prohibit the passage of air­
craft over the territories situated on cither side of 
the Suez Canal and within 20 kilometres of it, except 
for the purpose of passage from east to west or vice 
versa by means of a corridor 10 kilometres wide at Eantara. 
This prohibition will not, however, apply tothe forces 
of bhe High Contracting Fartres or to genuinely Egyptian
lc A map (scale 1 : 1,000,000) to illustrate the Treaty 
is annexed*
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air organisations or to air organisations geuinely belonging 
to any part of the British Commonwealth of Nations oper­
ating under the authority of the Egyptian Government.
12. The Egyptian Government will provide when necessary 
reasonable means of communication and access to and from 
the localities where British forces are situated and will 
also accord facilities at Port Said and Suez for the land­
ing and storage of material and supplies for the British 
forcess including the maintenance of‘small detachment of 
British forces in these ports to handle and guard this 
material and these supplies in transit,
15* In view of the fact that the speed and range of 
modern aircraft necessitate the use of wide areas for the 
efficient training of air* forces * the Egyptian Government 
will accord permission to- the British air forces to fly 
wherever they consider it necessary for the purpose of 
training. Reciprocal treatment v/ill be accorded to 
Egyptian air forces in British territories.
14. In view of the fact that the safety of flying is 
dependent upon provision of a large number of places 
where aircrafr can alight, the Egyptian Government will 
secure the maintenance and constant availabilit}^ of ade­
quate landing grounds and seaplane anchorages in Egyptian 
territory and waters. The Egyptian Government will accede 
to any request from the British air forces for such ad-
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ditional landing grounds and seaplane anchorages as ex­
perience may show to he necessary to make the number 
adequate for allied requirements.
15* The Egyptian Government will accord permission for 
the British air fences to use the said landings and sea­
plane anchorages, and in the case of certain of them to 
send stocks of fuel and stores thereto, to be kept in 
sheds to be erected thereon for this purpose, and in case 
of urgency to undertake such work as may be necessary for 
the safety of aircraft.
16. The Egyptian Government will give all necessary 
facilities for the passage of the personnel of the British 
fences, aircraft and stores to and from the said landing 
grounds and seaplane anchorages. Similar facilities will 
be afforded to the personnel, aircraft and stores of the 
Egyptian forces at the air bases of the British forces.
17. The British military authorities shall be at 
liberty to request permission from the Egyptian Government 
to send parties of officers in civilian clothes to the 
Western Desert to study the ground and draw up tactical 
schemes. This permission shall not be unreasonably 
withheld.
18. Iiis Majesty the King of Egypt authorises His 
Majesty the King and Emperor to matinain units of his 
forces at or near Alexandria for a period not exceeding
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eight years from the date of the coming into force of 
the present treaty, this "being the approximate period 
considered necessary by the two High Contracting Forties -
(a) For the final completion of the barrack accommo­
dation in the Canal Zone;
(b)^ For the improvement of the roads - 
(i) Cairo-Suez;
(ii) lairo-Alexandrja-Mersa Matruh;
so as to bring them up to the standard specified
in part (A) of paragraph 65
(c) The improvement of the railway facilities between 
Ismailia and Alexandria, and Alexandria and Mersa Matruh 
referred to in (ii) and (iii) of part (B) of paragraph 6.
The Egyptian Government will complete the work speci­
fied in (a), (b) and (c) above before the expiry of the 
period of eight years aforesaid. The roads and railway 
facilities mentioned above will, of course, be maintained 
by the Egyptian Government *
19* The British forces in or near Cairo shall, until 
the time for withdrawal under paragraph 8 above, -and the 
British forces in or near Alexandria until the expiry of 
the time specified in paragraph 18 above, continue to 
enjoy the same facilities as at present.
1. See note Ho. 2 011 p , 3h2<
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ARTICLE 9-
The immunities and privileges in jurisdictional 
and fiscal matters to be enjoyed by the forces of His 
Majesty the King and Emperor who are in Egypt in accordance 
with the provision of the present treaty will be determined 
in a separate convention to be concluded between the 
Egyptian Government and His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom.
ARTICLE 10
Nothing in the present treaty is intended to or 
shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations 
which devolve, or may devolve, upon either of the High 
Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of 
Nations or the Treaty for the Renunciation of Ear signed 
at Paris on the 27th August, 1928*
ARTICLE 11
1. while reserving liberty to conclude new conven­
tions in future, modifying the agreements of the 19th 
January and the ] Oth July, 1 8 9 9 the High Contracting 
Parties agree that the administration of the Sudan shall 
continue to be that resulting from the said agreements.
The Governor-General shall continue to exercise on the 
joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the powers 
conferred upon him ~bj the said agreements.
The High Contracting parties agree that the primary
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aim of their administration in the Sudan must be the wel­
fare of the Sudanese.
nothing in this article prejudices the question of 
sovereignty over the Sudan.
2*x Appointments and promotions of officials in the 
Sudan will in consequence remain vested in the Governor- 
General , who, in making new appointments to posts for 
whi ch qualif i ed Sue!anese aro not avai 1 ab 1 e , wi 11 se 1 e ct 
suitable candidates of British and Egyptian nationality.
3. In addition to Sudanese troops, both British and 
Egyptian troops shall be placed at the disposal of the 
Governor-General for the defence of the Sudan.
4. Egyptian immigration into the Sudan shall be un­
restricted except for reasons of public order and health,
5* There shall be no discrimination in the Sudan be­
tween Brutish subjects and Egyptian nationals in matters 
of commerce, immigration or the possession of property.
6. The High Contracting Parties are agreed on the 
provisions set out in the Annex to this Article as regards 
the method by which international conventions are to be 
made applicable to the Sudan,
Annex to Article 11.
lo Unless and until the High Contracting Parties
1, See note No. 3 PP* 342-43.
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agree to the contrary in application of paragraph 1 of 
this Article , the general principle for the future shall 
he that international conventions shall only become appli­
cable to the Sudan by the joint action of the Governments 
of the United Kindom and Egypt, and that such joint 
action shall similarly also be required if it is desired 
to terminate the participation of the Sudan in an inter­
national convention which a]reads7- applies to this territory.
2. Conventions to which it will be desired that the 
Sudan should be a party will generally be conventions of 
a technical or humanitarian character, Such conventions 
almost invariably contain a provision tor subsequent 
accession, and an such cases this method of making the 
convention applicable to the Sudan will be adopted. 
Accession will be effected by a joint instrument, signed 
on behalf of Egypt and the United Kingdom respectively 
by two persons duly authorised for the purpose. The 
method of depositing the instruments of accession will 
bo the subject of agreement in each case between the two 
Governments. In the event of its being desired to apply 
to the Sudan, the method by which this should be effected 
will be the subject of consultation and agreement between 
the two Governments.
3 * If the Sudan is already a party to a convention, 
and it is desired to terminate the participation of the
Sudan therera, the necessary notice of termination will he 
given jointly by the United Kingdom and by Egypt.
4. It is understood that the participation of the Sudan 
in a convention and the termination of such participation 
can only be effected by joint action specifically taken in 
respect of the Sudan, and. does not follow merely from the 
fact that the United Kingdom and Egypt are both parties to 
a convention or have both denounced a convention,
5* At international conferences where such conventions 
are negotiated, the Egyptian and the United Kingdom dele­
gates would naturally keep in touch with a view to any 
action which they may agree to be desirable in the interests 
of Sudan.
ARTICLE 12,
His Majesty The King and Emperor recognises that the 
responsibility for the lives and property of foreigners 
in Egypt devolves exclusively upon the Egyptian Government, 
who will ensure the fulfilment of their obligations in 
this respect,
ARTICLE 13.
His Majesty The King and Emperor recognises that the 
capitulatory regime now existing in Egypt is no longer in 
accordance with the spirit of the times and with the 
present state of Egypt.
His Majesty the King of Egypt desrres the abolition
of this regime without delay#
Both High Contracting Parties are agreed upon the 
arrangements with regard to this matter as set forth in 
the Annex to this Article,
Annex to Artic1e 13.
1# It is the object of the arrangements set out in 
this Annex
(i) To bring about speedily the abolition of the
Capitulations in Egypt with the disappearance of 
the existing restrictions on Egyptian sovereignty 
in the ’matter of the application of Egyptian legis­
lation (including financial legislation) to 
foreigners as its necessary consequence;
(±±') To institute a transitional regime for a reasonable 
and not unduly prolonged period to be fixed, during 
which the Mixed Tribunals will remain and will, in 
addition to their present judicial jurisdiction, 
exercise the jurisdiction at present vested in the 
C oils ul ar C o ur t s .
At the end of this transitional period the Egyptian Govern- 
ment will be free to dispense with the Mixed Tribunals.
cLm As a first step, the Egyptian Government will 
approach the Capitulatory Towers as soon as possible with 
a view to (a) the removal of all restrictions on the 
application on Egyptian legislation to foreigners and
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(b) the institution of a transitional regime for the Mixed 
Tribunals as provided in paragraph 1 (ii) above.
3. His MajestyTs G-overnment in the United Kingdom, as 
the Government of a Capitulatory Power and as an ally of 
Egypt, are in no way opposed to the arrangements referred 
to in the preceding paragraph and will collaborate actively 
with the Egyptian Government in giving effect to them by 
using all their influence with the Powers exercising 
capitulatory rights in Egypt.
4 . It is understood that in the event of its being 
found impossible to bring into effect the arrangements 
referred to in paragraph 2, the Egyptian Government re­
tains its full rights unimpaired with regard to the capi­
tulatory regime, including the Mixed Tribunals.
5. It is understood that paragraph 2 (a) involves not 
merely that the assent of the Capitulatory Powers will be 
no longer necessary for the application of any Egyptian 
legislation to their nationals but also that the present 
legislative functions of the Mixed Tribunals as regards 
the application of Egyptian legislation to foreigners 
will terminate. It would follow from this that the 
Mixed Tribunals in their judjcial capacity would no longer 
have to pronounce upon the validity of the application
to foreigners of an Egyptian law or decree which has been 
applied to foreigners by the Egyptian Parliament or
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Government, as the case may be,
6. His Majesty the King of Egypt hereby declares that 
no Egyptian legislation made applicable to foreigners will 
be inconsistent with the principles generally adopted in 
modern legislation or, with particular relation to legis­
lation of a fiscal nature, discriminate against foreigners, 
including foreign corporate bodies.
7. In view of the fact that it is the practice in most 
countries to apply to foreigners the law of their nation­
ality in matters of "statut personnel11, consideration will 
be given to the desirability of excepting from the transfer 
of jurisdiction, at any rate in the first place, matters 
relating to "statut personnel:1 affecting nationals of 
those Capitulatory Powers who wish that their Consular 
authorities should continue to exercise such jurisdiction.
8. The transitional regime for the Mixed Tribunals and 
the transfer to them of the jurisdiction at present exer­
cised by the Consular Courts (which regime and transfer 
will, of course, be subject to the provisions of the 
special convention referred to in Article S) will neces­
sitate the revision of existing laws relating to the 
organisation and jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals, 
including the preparation end promulgation of a now Code
of Criminal Procedure. It Is understood that this revision 
will include amongst other matters:-
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(i) The definition cf the word "foreigner" for the 
purpose of tho future jurisdiction of the Mixed 
Tribunals;
(ii) The increase of tho personnel of the Mixed Tribunals 
and the Mixed Parquet, which will be necessitated 
by the proposed extension of their jurisdiction;
(iii) The procedure in the case of pardons or remissions 
of sentences imposed on foreigners and also in 
connection with the execution of capital sentences 
passed on foreigners*
ARTICLE 14.
The present treaty abrogates any existing agreements 
or other instruments whose continued existence is incon­
sistent with its provisions. Should either High Contract­
ing Party so request, a list of tho agreements and instru­
ments thus abrogated shall be drawn up in agreement between 
them within six months of tho coming into force of the 
prosent treaty *
ARTICLE 15.
The High Contracting Parties agree that any difference 
on the subject of the api)lication or interpretation of the 
provisions of tho present treaty which they are unable to 
settle by direct negotiation shall be dcs.lt with in accor­
dance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations„
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ARTICLE 16
At any tine after the expiration of a period of twenty 
years from the coming into force of the treaty, the High 
Contracting Paroles will, at the request of either of them, 
enter into negotiations with a view to such revision of 
its terms by agreement between them as may be appropriate 
in the circumstances as they then exist. In case of the 
High Contracting Parties being unable to agree upon the 
terms of the revised treaty, the difference will be sub­
mitted to the Council of the League of Nations for decision 
in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant in force 
at the time of signature of the present treaty or to such 
other person or body of persons for decision in accordance 
with such procedure as the High Contracting Parties nay 
agree. It is agreed that any revision of this treaty 
will provide for the continuation of the Alliance between 
the High Contracting Parties in accordance with the prin­
ciples contained in Articles 4, 5* 6 and 7- Nevertheless, 
with the consent of both High Contracting Parties, nego­
tiations may be entered into at any tine after the ex­
piration of a period of ten years after the coming into 
force of the treaty, with a view to such revision as 
aforesaid.
ARTICLE 17-
The present treaty is subject to ratification.
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Ratifications shall ho exchanged in Cairo as soon as 
possible. Tho treaty shall come into forco on the date 
of the exchange of ratifications, and shall thereupon 
he registered with the Secretary-General of the League 
of Rations.
In witness whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries 
have signed tho present treaty and affixed thereto their 
seals,
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Done at London in duplicate this 26th. day of August, 1936 
(L.S.) ANTHONY EDEN.
(L.S.) J. BAMSAY MacDONALD
(L.S.) JOHN SIMON
(L.S.) HALIBAX
(L.S.) MILES T’. LAMPSON
(L.S.) MOUSTAPHA EL-NAHAS
(L.S.) .AHMAD MAHEB
(L.S.) M. MAHMOUD
(L.S.) I. SEDKI
(L.S.) A. YEHIA
(L.S.) UACYF BOUTKOS GHALI
(L.S.) KAKRAIJ EBEID
(L.S.) MAHMOUD FAHMY EL-NOKRACHY
(L.S.) A. HAMBY SEIE EL NASH
(L.S.) ALY EL CHAMSI
(L.S.) M. H. ISSA
(L.S.) HAFEZ AFIFI
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AGREED MINUTE.
The United Kingdom and Egyptian Delegations desire at 
the moment of signature to record in a minute certain 
points of interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty 
of Alliance upon which they are agreed.
These points are as follows
(i) It Is of course understood that the facilities 
provided for in Article 7 to he furnished to His Majesty 
The King and Emperor include the sending of British forces 
or reinforcements in the eventualities specified in that 
Article„
(Ii) Uith reference to Article 7> i^ is understood that 
as a result of the provisions of Article 6, there will 
have heen mutual consultation between the two Governments 
in the case of a risk of a rupture. In tho case of an 
apprehended international emergency, the same principle 
of mutual consultation applies.
(iii) Tho "means of communication" referred to in the 
second sentence of Article 7 include telecommunications 
(cables, telegraphs telephones and wireless).
(iv) Amongst the military, administrative and legis­
lative measures referred to in the third sentence of 
Article 7 are included measures under which the Egyptian 
Government, in the exercise of their powers as regards 
radio-electric communications, will take into account
the requirements of the W/T stations of the British 
forces in Egypt, and will continue to co-operate with the 
British authorities to prevent any mutual interference 
between British and Egyptian 7//T stations, and measures 
providing for the effective control of all means of com­
munications referred to in that Article.
(v) The words "Geneifa area” in paragraph 2 (a) of 
the Annex to Article 8 mean: along tho shox^e of the Great
Bitter Lake from a point 3 kilometres North of Geneifa 
Station to a point 3 kilometres South-East of Eayid 
Station to a depth of 3 kilometres from the shore of the 
lake.
(vi) with reference to paragraph 2 (b) of the Annex 
to Article 8, it is understood that the exact sites in 
the area therein referred to where the air forces will 
be ^ocated will be defined as soon as possible.
The Royal Air Eorce Depot at present situated at 
Aboukir will also be transferred to this area not later 
than the date of the withdrawal of the British forces 
from Cairo under paragraph 8.
(vii) With reference to paragraph 3 of the Annex to 
Article 8, it is understood (a) that British barrack 
accommodation includes married quarters for officers 
and for a proportion of the other ranks, (b) that though 
the site of the convalescent camp cannot be definitely
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fixed at the moment, SI Arish might possibly prove suit­
able, and (c) that the Egyptian Government, in pursuance 
of the policy which it has already taken in hand for the 
benefit of tho inhabitants of those areas, will take all 
reasonable sanitary measures for the combating of malaria 
in the area adjacent to those where the British forces 
are situated.
(viii) With reference to paragraph 6 of the Annex to 
Article 8, it is understood that, with regard to road No.
(iii), the Egyptian Government will, unless they are to 
make arrangements with the Suez Canal Company for the use 
of this road by the British and Egyptian forces and for 
the improvement of those sections which are not already 
up to this standard so as to satisfy the conditions j aid 
down in paragraph 6, construct an entirely new road con­
necting these places.
(ix) With reference to paragraph 13 of tho Annex to 
Article 8, it is understood that the number of the detach­
ment referred to shall be limited tc the minimum strictly 
necessary to handle and guard this material.
(x) With reference to paragraph 13 of the Annex to 
Article 8, it is understood that flying m i l  take place 
for training purposes mostly over desert areas, and that 
populated areas will only be flovm over where necessity 
so demands *>
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(xi) Kith reference to paragraph 2 of the Egyptian 
Note relating to military matters, it is of course under­
stood that the cost of the Military Mission will be de­
frayed by the Egyptian Government, and that the words 
"proper training" in this paragraph include training in 
British military colleges and academies,,
(xii) Paragraph 2 of tho Egyptian Note relating to 
military matters only applies to persons who are already 
at the time members of the Egyptian armed forces.
(xiii) The word "equipment" in paragraph 5 of the 
Egyptian Note relating to military matters, means all 
such stores as it is desirable for forces acting together 
to have as a common pattern. It does not include articles 
of clothing or articles of local production.
(xiv) With reference to paragraph 1 of Article 11, it 
is agreed that the Governor-General shall furnish to His 
Majesty's Government in tho United Kingdom and the Egyptian 
Government an annual report on the administration of the 
Sudan. Sudan legislation will be notified directly to
the President of the Egyptian Council of Ministers.
(xv) 7/ith reference to paragraph 2 of Article 11, it 
is understood that, while tho appointment of Egyptian 
nationals to official posts in the Sudan must necessarily 
be governed by the number of suitable vacancies, the time 
of their occurrence and the qualifications of the can­
didates forthcoming, the provisions of this paragraph
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will take effect forthwith 0:1 the coming into force of 
the Treaty, The pronotion, and. advancement of members 
of tho Sudan service shall he irrespective of nationality 
up to any rank hy selection in accordance with individual 
merits.
It is also understood that these provisions will not 
prevent the Governor-General occasionally appointing to 
special posts persons of another nationality when no 
qualified British subjects, Egyptian nationals or Sudanese 
ar e avai 1 ah 3r e .
(xvi) kith reference to paragraph 3 of Article 11, 
it is understood that, as the Egyptian Government aro 
willing to send troops to the Sudan, the Governor-General 
will give immediate consideration to the question of the 
number of Egyptian troops required for service in the 
Sudan, the precise places where they will be stationed 
and the accommodation necessary for thorn, and that the 
Egyptian Government will send forthwith, on the coming 
into force of tho Treaty, an Egyptian military officer
of high raid: whom the Governor-General can consult with 
regard to these matters.
(xvii) kith reference to Article 11, as it has been 
arranged between the Egyptian Government and His Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom that the question of
the indebtedness of the Sudan to Egypt and other financial
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questions affecting; the Sudan shall be discussed between 
the Egyptian Ministry of Ed.nance and the ‘Treasury of 
the United Kingdom, and as such discussions have already 
commenced, it has been considered unnecessary to insert 
in the Treaty any provision in regard to this question.
(xviii) Pith regard to paragraph 6 of the Annex to 
Article 1'3 ■> it is understood that questions relating to 
this declaration are not subjects for the appreciation 
of any Courts in Egypt.
Signed in duplicate at London this 26th day of August, 
1936.
ANTHONY EDEN
His Majesty’s Principal Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs.
MOUSTAPHA EL-NAEaS
President of the Egyptian Council 
of Ministers
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NOTES. - LONDON, AUGUST 26, 1936.
No. 1.
Moustapha el-ITahas Pacha to Mr. EcTen,
London, August 26, 1936.
Sir,
V/ibh reference to Article 2 of the Treaty signed this 
day, I have tho honour to inform Your Excellency that, as 
His Majesty The ICing of Groat Britain, Ireland and tho 
British Dominions beyond tho Seas, Emperor of India, 
will bo the first foreign sovereign to be represented in 
Egypt by an Ambassador, British Ambassadors will bo 
considered senior to the other diplomatic representatives 
accredited to the Court of His Majesty the King of Egypt.
The provisions of this note are subject to revision 
at the time and in the conditions provided for in Article 
16 of the treaty,
I avail, &c.
MOUSTAPHA EL-NARAS,
President of the Council of Ministers
No. 2.
Moustapha El-Nahas Pacha to Mr. Eden.
London, August 26, 1936.
Sir,
Uith reference to Article 12 of the treaty signed this
357
day, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the 
Egyptian Government intend to abolish forthwith the Euro­
pean Bureau of the Public Security Department, but will 
retain, for five years from the coming into force of the 
treaty, a certain European element in their city police. 
Tho said police will rem&in for the same period under the 
command of British officers.
Pith a view to facilitating the gradual substitution 
of Egyptian officials for the said European element and 
thereby securing the harmonious working of the police 
organisation, the Egyptian Government propose to dispense 
annually with the services of one-fifth of the number of 
European police officials.
The Egyptian Government, in view of the treaty of 
friendship and alliance signed to-day, will, when engaging 
the services of foreign experts, generally prefer British 
subjects possessing the necessary qualifications.
I avail, &c.
MOUSTAPHA EL-KAHAS,
President of the Council of Ministers.
Ho. 3.
Moustapha El-Fahas Pacha to Mr. Eden.
London, August 26, 1936.
Sir,
I wish to place on record certain further under-
338
standings in regard to military natters which have been 
reached between us in connexion with the Treaty of Alli­
ance signed this day.
(1) British personnel shall be withdrawn iron the 
Egyptian Army and the functions of the Inspector-General 
and his staff shall terminate,
(2) The Egyptian Government, desiring to perfect the 
training of tne Egyptian Army including the Air Force, 
and intending in the interests of the alliance which 
has been established, that such foreign instructors as 
they may deem necessary shall be chosen from amongst 
British subjects only, will avail themselves of the ad­
vice of a British Military Mission for such time as they 
may teem necessary for the purposes aforesaid. Eis 
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will furnish 
the Military Mission which the Egyptian Government desire, 
and will also undertake to receive and provide proper 
training in the United Kingdom for any personnel of the 
Egyptian forces which the Egyptian Government may desire 
to send for the purpose of being trained. In the circum­
stances created by this treaty the Egyptian Government 
will naturally not desire to send any personnel of their 
armed forces to undergo a course in any training establish­
ment or unit abroad elsewhere than in the United Kingdom, 
provided that this shall not prevent it from sending to
339
any other country such personnel as cannot he received 
in training establishments and units in the United Kingdom.
(3) In the interests of the Alliance, and in view of 
the possible necessity of co-operative action between the 
British and Egyptian forces, the armament and equipment, 
land and air, of the Egyptian forces shall not differ in 
type from those of the British forces. His Majesty’s 
Government in tho United Kingdom undertake to use their 
good offices to facilitate the supply of such armament 
and equipment from the United Kingdom, at prices similar 
to those which would be paid by His Majesty's Government, 
whenever the Egyptian Government so desire.
I avail, &c.
MOUSTAPHA EL-NAHAS,
President of the Council of Ministers
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NOTES EXCHANGED IN EGYPT. - .LUGUST 12, 1936.
No. 1.
Sir Miles Lamp son to Moustapha El-N alias Pacha,
The Residency, Ranieh
August 12, 1936.
Sir,
Nith reference to paragraph 6 (B) (i) of the Annex to 
Article PI (9) ? your Excellency asked lao on behe,lf of the 
Egyptian Delegation to communicate information as regards 
the work which would he required to he done under this 
paragraph. I have the honour to enclose a statement 
which gives these details so far as they can he stated 
at the present moment. This statement is, however, 
only approximate and further details night have to he 
added to it.
3. avarl, oc j 
MILES A. L1MPS0N,
High C o m  is si oner 
En c1o sur0 in No. 1.
Approximate Railway Requirements in Canal Zone.
Moas car.
The existing siding with troop entrainment platform 
and. one siding with end loading ramp, each to hold n60" 
unit trains, with facilities to enable a train to he
1. Article 8 In the Treaty as signed
34-1
despatched every three hours, will be maintained*
Geneifa Area*
(a) Entrainraent Station* - Two sidings with loop en- 
trainnent platforms and two sidings with end loading ramps, 
each to hold "GO" unit trains*
(b) Depot Area, facilities as given below together with 
the necessary shunting loops, &c.
Supply Depot: One spur «vith two loading sidings (each
20 units). Petrol Depot: One Loading siding (10
units)*
M.T. Vehicle Deception Depot: One end loading siding
(30 Flats).
Ordnance Depot: One spur with one loading and one
end loading siding (each 20 units)*
Gamp Equipment Depot: One loading siding (AO Units).
Ammunition Depot: One spur with two loading sidings
(each 20 units).
Hospital Area: One siding and one off-loading platform
for one Hospital train.
PaE. Stores Depot: One loading siding (20 units).
U.A.A.F.I, Depot: One loading siding (10 units).
(c) Marshalling and Locomotive Yards to enable one 
personnel train, or one M*f. train, being despatched 
every three hours throughout the twenty-four.
(d) Wharves and other unloading facilities as required.
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Note. - All loading sidings to have platforms corresponding 
with the length of the train.
No. 2.
Moustapha El-lTahas Pacha to Sir Miles Lamp son.
Ant cniad e s Palace, A1exan&ria, 
August 12, 1956.
Sir,
WIDE reference to paragraph 18 (b) of the draft Annex 
to Article Ii (9)^ initialled the 24th July last, I have 
the honour to inform Your Excellency that the work which 
is at present being done on the roads Cairo-Alexandria, 
via Giza and the desert, and Cairo-Sues will be pushed 
forward and will bo completed by the end of 1938.
I avail, &c.
MOUSTAPHA PL-NAHAS,
President of the Council of Ministers
No. 3.
Six' Miles Lampson to Moustapha El-Nahas Pacha.
The Residency, Ramieh,
A ugust 12, 1938.
Sir,
In the course of discussions on questions of detail,
lo Article 8 in the Treaty as signed. See pp. 306-7*
34-3
arising out of Paragraph 2 of Article the suggestion
for the secondment of an Egyptian economic expert for 
service at Khartum, and tho Governor-General1s wish to 
appoint an Egyptian officer to his personal staff as 
military secretary, were noted and considered acceptable 
in principle. It was alto considci-eG desirable and 
acceptable that the Inspector-General of the Egyptian 
Irrigation Service in the Sudan should be invited to 
attend the Governor-General1s Council when matters relating 
to his departmental interests were before the Council,
I avail, &c.
MILES 77. LAMPSON,
Hi gh C omm i s si oner.
OPAL DECLAK,mOE 
Minuto of a Meeting held at the Antoniades Palace,
Alexandria, on August 10, 1936*
At a meeting at the Antoniades Palace on the morning 
of the 10th August, at which the provisions of the draft 
treaty relating to the capitulations and other non mili­
tary clauses were under discussion, the following oral 
declaration was made
His Excellency Hahas Pacha, on behalf of the Egyptian 
Delegation, stated that the absence in the treaty docu-
1. Article 11 In the Treaty as signed,. See pp. 319-20.
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nents, of any mention of the Judicial and Financial 
Advisors meant that the Egyptian Government wore free 
from any restriction of an international character with 
regard to the retention or non-retention of these 
officials.
His Excellency tho High Commissioner expressed his 
agreement with the declaration of XTahas Pacha.
Map to  il lu s tr a te  
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APPENDIX II.
P.O. 371/20110, No. J 5160/2/16, 8 June 1936
AIT GLO-E GYPTIAN C ON VERS A TIONS .
Paper handed by Nahas Pasha to his Majesty's High 
Commissioner on June 1 for Communication to
l
His Ma j ost y 1 s Co vermaent.
DEPENCE CP THE SUEZ CANAL.
(A) Under tho Suez Canal Convention of Constantinople
(1888).
There is no doubr that the right of definding the 
Suez Canal belongs to Egypt as the territorial Power; 
this is not merely an application of the general principle 
that the defence of any country's shores is an attribute 
of that country’s sovereignty, but is also to be derived 
from the provisions of the Suez Canal Convention itself.
2. The Suez Canal Convention expressly provides that 
its provisions do not in any way impair the sovereign
1. The Arabic translation of a part of this memorandum 
was published in al~Balagh 011 6 November 1936. The 
newspaper promised to publish the rest on 7 November, 
but it did not. Perhaps the YJafdist government, on 
its ov/n initiative or inspired by the Residency, 
prevented this.
rights of His Imperial Majesty tho Sultan or the rights
and privileges of His Highness the IChedivo as resulting
2from the Firmans.
3. Moreover, article 12 of tho same convention provides
for the respect of Turkey’s territorial rights: ’’Sent
d ’ailleurs reserves les droits de la Turquie comme 
Puissance territorial©n; and it cannot be doubted that 
such territorial sovereignty has now devolved exclusively 
upon Egypt as an independent country, having severed her 
connexion with Turkey*
4. v/hat is more significant is that even under Turkish 
suzerainty Egypt’s territorial rights were respected in 
th o c onvoution.
Hot inerel37' article 14 (already quoted) , but also and 
particularly article 9 establishes Egypt’s rights, and 
runs as follows:-
”Le Gouverneiaent egyption prendra dans la limite de 
ses pouvoirs, tels qu’ils resultent des firmans et 
dans les conditions prevues dans le present traite, 
les mesures necessairos pour faire respecter 
1 ’execution dudit traite. Dans le cas ou le 
Gouvernernent egyption no disposera pas des noyens 
suffisants, il devra faire appol au Gouvernernent 
imperial ottoman, lequel prendra les mesures
2- Article 14 of the Convention provides: ”En dehors des
obligations prevues expressemont par les clauses du 
present traite, il n ’est porte aucune atteinto aux 
droits souverains de Sa Majestc imperials le^.Sultan et 
aux droits et ininunites de Son Altesse le Khedive els 
qu'ils resultent des firmans”.
necessaires pour repondre a cet appel, en donnora 
avis aux autres Puissances s i gnat air es de la 
Declaration de Londres du 17 Mai 1885 et, au besoin, 
se* cencertera avec elles a ce sujet".
This article obviously givos Egypt the primary right 
of defending the Canal and enforcing the provisions of 
the Convention, Turkey is only entitled to co-operate 
in the defence of the Canal if Egypt lacks adequate means 
of defence and calls upon her to partake in such defence. 
Turkey therefore come next to Egypt in the order of defence 
5- Now Egypt, having become an independent country, 
cannot surely possess less rights, under an Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty, than she did as a vassal State under the Suez 
Canal Convention. In other words, if Great Britain wore 
to have the primary right of defending the Canal while 
Egypt were merely to co-operate in such defence, as 
so jested in the new British draft of article 9^ this 
would mean that Great Britain, as an Ally, would have more 
extensive rights than Turkey as a Suzerain Power. Indeed 
Great Britain would, in that event, be deemed as having
3. The proposed British text runs as follows:-
"In view of tho position of His Britannic Majesty 
rn relation to the Canal, His Majesty the King of 
Egypt recognises that His Britannic Majesty may through 
the Commanders of his Forces take all steps necessary 
for the maintenance of the security and of the free­
dom of navigation in the said Canal. The Egyptian 
authorities will co-operate in all measures for the 
purpose aforesaid".
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legally and practically established her protectorate over 
the Suez Canal, and hence over Egypt, since the Canal is 
hut an integral part of Egypt, however much it nay ho a 
means of communication between the various parts of the 
British Empire.
(B) Under the Anglo-Egyptian Draft Treaty of 1930.
6. The AntDlo-Egyptian Draft Treaty of 1930 did not in 
any way vary with, or depart from, the fundamental prin­
ciples laid down by the Suez Canal Convention, or indeed 
the general rules of International Law, It recognises 
Egypt's territorial rights of sovereignty over the Suez 
Canal, which it describes as ,lan integral part of Egypt", 
and expressly provides for Egypt's right to defend the 
Canal and ensure the liberty and security of navigation 
thereono
At the same time, the Draft Treaty recognises the fact 
■chat the Suez Canal is "also an essential means of com­
munication between the different parts of the British 
Empire", and authorises Great Britain as an Ally to co­
operate in the defence thereof.
7* It is further to be observod that Great Britain's 
co-operation, as provided for by the Draft Treaty, is 
both extensive and efficient. It covers various forms 
cf co-operation, amongst which are the following:-
First* The stationing of British military forces in 
a specified zone near the Sues Canal (to be increased 
unrestrictedly in case of emergency, as recently suggested) 
In this connexion article 9 of the Draft Treaty ex­
pressly provides that at the end of twenty years the 
ques'cion whether the presence of British forces is no 
longer necessary owing to the fact that the Egyptian 
army is in a position to ensure by its own resources 
the liberty and entire security of navigation on the 
Canal may, if there have been any difference between 
the high contracting parties, bo submitted for settlement 
to the League cf Nations*
It is obvious that the stationing of foreign forces 
on the territory of any country would, if unrestricted 
as to time, number and pinee? pe a serious infringement 
of that country's independence and sovereign rights*
That is why it was found necessary to provide in the 
Draft Treaty expressly for the future evacuation of the 
country, making such evactuation dependent on Egypt being 
in a position to ensure the defence of the Canal by her 
own resources.
In other words, such provision was essential in order 
to emphasise Egypt's primary right of defending her own 
territory by her own resources, however insufficient 
these resources nay temporarily be.
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Second. Another fern of co-operation which is far noro 
extensive than the former is that provided for "by the 
Draft Treaty in case of war ov menace of war.
In such cases Great Brito,in as an Ally is authorised 
to co-operato to an unlimited extent in all measures of 
defence, and Egypt is bound to furnish to her British 
Ally all the facilities and assistance in her power, 
including the use of her ports, aerodromes and means of 
communication (see article 8.)
Third. It will he observed that Great Britain is en­
titled to take such unlimited measures of military co­
operation over aftor the evacuation of Egyptian territory 
by British troops. In other words, whether British 
Troops did or did not remain in the country Britain’s 
co-operation in the defence of the Canal remains intact.
(U) Legal and Practical Advantages of the 1930 Military 
Clauses from the Legal Point of Yiew.
8. As already pointed out, the Draft Treaty, while 
agreeing with the principles of International Law and 
those underlying the Suez Canal Convention, seeuros for 
both Egypt and Great Britain all the legal advantages 
resulting from their respective positions in the Draft 
Treaty.
To sum up, these legal advantages may be recapitulated 
as follows:-
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First. The Draft Treaty recognises Egypt’s territorial 
sovereignty over tiio Sues Canal and her primary right to 
defend it and secure the liberty of navigation thereon.
This is in accordance with Egypt's International status. 
Indeed., as we have already seen, the Sues Canal Convention 
(article 9) expressly re( ognised this primary right of 
Bgypt ? even although she was at the time under Turkish 
suzerainty.
Second* The Draft Treaty emphasises Great Britain's 
special interest in the Suez CanaJ. as resulting from the 
fact that the Canal is "an essential means of communication 
between the various parts of the British Empire". Accord­
ingly, Great Britain is not merely empowered by the Draft 
Treaty to station her military forces in the vicinity of 
the Canal, with a view to co-operating with the Egyptian 
forces in the defence thereof until such time as Egypt 
can by her own resources secure such defence, but also 
and particularly to continue her co-operation even after 
British troops have evacuated the Canal Zone.
In other words, the Draft Treaty combines both legal 
and practical advantages for the two countries, recog­
nising, on the one hand, Egypt’s right of defending the 
Canal, and allowing, on the other hand, Great Britain the 
most efficient co-opcration in the defence thereof.
Third. The Draft Treaty further recognises for the two
countries such extensive and durable legal rights of 
defence as result from the military Alliance itself. By 
virtue of the Alliance, Great Britain nay take most ex- 
tensive measures of military cc-operaticn at any tine 
when there is war or even menace of war. ITo greater 
guarantees ceuld ho afforded by an independent country to 
her Ally.
Pourth, A contrario, if Great Britain were given the 
primary right cf defence and were allowed a permanent 
occupation of the Canal zone, this would amount to no 
less than an open protectorate. Egypt’s consent to such 
protection would., legally, make no difference at all, for 
a Protectorate theoretically implies the consent of the 
protected c o unt ry.
Prom the practical point of view.
9* Throughout this memorandum stress has been laid on 
the different forms of military co-operation to which 
Great Britain is entitled under the Draft Treaty.
Summing up such as have already been mentioned, and men­
tioning those omitted, will doubtless give a fuller idea 
of such co-operation and the practical advantages thereof. 
Tho following is a brief synopsis of the different kinds 
of British military co-operation under the Treaty.
Pirst. Presence of British forces in the vicinity of
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the Canal, together with suggested facilities of aviation, 
manoeuvres, roads, &c. (cf. infra).
Second.. Suggested unlimited inc3?easo in numbers of 
troops in cases of emergency (cf. Infra).
Third. British military mission for training the Egyptian 
Array, as also British equipment, &c. (Cf. note annexed to 
Draft Treaty of 1930).
Fourth. Evacuation of Canal Zone by British troops can 
only take place, subject to the following conditions:-
(a) Egyptian Arny is in a position to defend Canal by 
its own jesources;
(b) England agrees to this;
(c) If England, disagrees, the question can only be 
submitted to the League after twenty years from 
the conclusions of the Treaty.
Fifth, \7hether British troops have or have not evacuated 
the Canal Zone, Great Britain is entitled to take the 
most extensive military measures in tho aid of hor Ally, 
in times of war or mere menace thereof.
10. how it may bo useful to examine, in the light of 
such practical advantages, the two difficulties raised by 
the new British texts of articles 9 and 14*
According to the proposed article 9? Groat Britain is
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to have the power to defend the Canal, Egypt merely co­
operating, And according tc the proposed article 14, 
the difforonco tc bo submitted to the league after twenty- 
years must relate only to the i:>osition and numbers of 
British troops required to ensure the protection of the 
Suez Canal.
Vie have already examined these two difficulties from 
tbe legal point of view, showing that they result in a 
permanent occupation and, protection of Egypt.
11, Let us now examine then from the practical point 
of view:-
As regards the first difficulty, wo cannot help urging, 
with all due respect, that Great Britain has all the 
piactical advantages on her side in merely "co-oij ora ting" 
in the defence of the Canal, for the simple reason that 
her co-operation is subject to no restriction whatever 
from the military point of view, not only in times of 
actual war but also in the event of a menace thereof. 
Further still, in times of peace, Great Britain is allowed 
the exceptional right of maintaining considerable forces 
in the Canal Zone until such time as she or the League 
judges that the Egyptian army is in a position to defend 
the Canal by its own resources, and provided, in the 
caso of the League, that at least twenty years should 
have ela.psed.
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Again we beg to point out that no further guarantees 
could be given by an Ally without endangering his very 
existence as an independent being.
12. As regards the second difficulty raised by the 
proposed article Id, Egypt's case would seen to be, if 
possible, even more obvious. The proposed article entails 
the permanent occupation of the Suez Canal, or, in other 
words, of Egypt. And it would seem that not only legally, 
but also practically, there would be no justification for 
a treaty, which not only fails to solve the principal 
Anglo-Egyptian problem - that of the presence of British 
troops on Egypt soil - but also helps to give it a per­
manent lease of life.
15- Moreover, the solution adopted by the original 
article Id of the Draft Treaty of 1930 is not merely 
fair to Egypt but also to Great Britain. Eor G-reat 
Britain is given by the treaty the opportunity to train 
the Egyptian Army by a British military mission and 
according to British military standards, and will there­
fore be in a singular position to judge whether the 
Egyptian Army has attained the necessary standard for 
delending the Canal by its own resources pending the 
arrival of Allied aid. England's say in the matter will 
be decisive before the lapse of twenty years; and after 
the lapse of such a long period of close co-operation
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and alliance it seems hardly probable that the two Allies 
will differ on a natter of such importance - and even if 
they do they will both have their say in the League, It 
would seen that no fairer solution could be given of a 
problem so delicate, and so vital.
Id-. Nor is the solution adopted by the Draft Treaty 
foreign to the Sues Canal Convention itself. Lor it 
will be remembered that article 9 of the Convention 
provides that Egypt is to call upon Turkey if she lacks 
sufficient means of defence; and, in such event, Turkey, 
if need be, will advise the Signatory Powers.
Now, in case cf difference between Egypt and Turkey 
as to whether the fornor did or did not possess the ade­
quate means to defence, the question would surely have 
been submitted for settlement to the signing Powers.
Such is the solution adopted by the 1930 Draft Treaty, 
merely substituting the League for the Suez Convention 
Powers.
(D) The Last Conversations.
15* It seems hardly necessary to mention here, in any 
detail, the different stages of the last conversations, 
the cordial atmosphere in which they were carried, or the 
progress which was made. Nor, we feel sure, is there 
any desire to minimise the concessions made or suggested
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by the Egyptian side- The recent set-back is thus most 
unfortunate, but we hope and trust that it will be over­
come .
With reference to the last British note containing 
’’Preliminary Horn arks" re Cairo and Alexandria, wo think 
that a satisfactory solution with respect to the British 
troops stationed near Alexandria would be afforded by the 
fact that the Egyptian Government would naturally begin 
to build accommodations for the British troops remaining 
in the vicinity of Alexandria after preparing the 
necessary accommodations for the troops posted in Cairo 
and its vicinity. This will doubtless require a certain 
length cf time and will, we feel sure, provide a satis­
factory solution.
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